Hi!
I've gotten my new HTC One A9 last Friday on the release-date here in Denmark. Everytime i restart the phone, it asks me to enter my 4 digit pincode (from the Android security settings) to decrypt the phone (which doesn't happen actually) - it then shows a green Android and boots up to Android. I've sent a mail to HTC Support but haven't recieved an answer yet (still waiting), but thought I would ask you guys if you know what it could be
Tobseren said:
Hi!
I've gotten my new HTC One A9 last Friday on the release-date here in Denmark. Everytime i restart the phone, it asks me to enter my 4 digit pincode (from the Android security settings) to decrypt the phone (which doesn't happen actually) - it then shows a green Android and boots up to Android. I've sent a mail to HTC Support but haven't recieved an answer yet (still waiting), but thought I would ask you guys if you know what it could be
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
The encryption is probably enabled in settings --> storage --> phone storage encryption. If its like the previous HTC models, the only way to remove encryption is with a factory reset. Afaik, Encryption is know enabled by default on all 6.0 phones that are fast enough to support it without a noticeable performance drop.
alray said:
The encryption is probably enabled in settings --> storage --> phone storage encryption. If its like the previous HTC models, the only way to remove encryption is with a factory reset. Afaik, Encryption is know enabled by default on all 6.0 phones that are fast enough to support it without a noticeable performance drop.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Well, I got an explanation from HTC Denmark. The rep. said it's enabled as an extra security feature, when I've enabled finger-print + pincode as a lockscreen security. If I turn the extra security off and delete the fingerprints saved in the phone, it doesn't ask me to put in the pincode to decrypt the phone when booting it. It's apparently something new on HTC phones, the rep. said.
Tobseren said:
Well, I got an explanation from HTC Denmark. The rep. said it's enabled as an extra security feature, when I've enabled finger-print + pincode as a lockscreen security. If I turn the extra security off and delete the fingerprints saved in the phone, it doesn't ask me to put in the pincode to decrypt the phone when booting it. It's apparently something new on HTC phones, the rep. said.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
interesting, thanks!
Tobseren said:
Well, I got an explanation from HTC Denmark. The rep. said it's enabled as an extra security feature, when I've enabled finger-print + pincode as a lockscreen security. If I turn the extra security off and delete the fingerprints saved in the phone, it doesn't ask me to put in the pincode to decrypt the phone when booting it. It's apparently something new on HTC phones, the rep. said.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
I believe it's a security feature of Marshmallow 6.0, not specific to HTC all Android 6.0 phones are encrypted by default, they also must provide a secure erase feature when factory resetting the phone from the settings menu. Progress, if you ask me
gheymann said:
I believe it's a security feature of Marshmallow 6.0, not specific to HTC all Android 6.0 phones are encrypted by default, they also must provide a secure erase feature when factory resetting the phone from the settings menu. Progress, if you ask me
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Hardware encryption(supported by almost all decent smartphone)=strong key pair
If the private key is deleted, then no way to decrypt. So it will be OK even if you don't erase the flash with garbage data.
I just got my pixel, and found two very bitter disappointments. First, as expected, even an unrooted device will not pass safetynet (i.e., let you run android pay) if you've unlocked the bootloader.
Second, however, and a bit more of a shock, there appears to be no way to require a passphrase on bootup. The option on the nexus 5X and 6P that you get while selecting a PIN simply does not exist. So does this mean there is basically no way to secure my phone?
This is doubly infuriating. On one hand Google wants to prevent me from learning my own device encryption keys, supposedly in the name of security. But then on the other hand, they reserve the right to extract my keys themselves if they ever sign a backdoored bootloader (that can extract the now unencrypted keys from firmware).
For me the whole benefit of the fingerprint reader has been that it lets me select a very long boot passphrase, since I don't have to type it to unlock the phone. However, I'm now seriously considering removing the PIN from my lockscreen so I don't delude myself into storing anything of value on my phone.
Am I the only one super annoyed at these security developments?
Mine asks for my pin on first login.
Moogagot said:
Mine asks for my pin on first login.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Yes, but by the time it prompts for a PIN, it has clearly already decrypted the flash storage. So this means that if your bootloader is unlocked, someone could have messed with your system partition to bypass the lockscreen.
15xda said:
Yes, but by the time it prompts for a PIN, it has clearly already decrypted the flash storage. So this means that if your bootloader is unlocked, someone could have messed with your system partition to bypass the lockscreen.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
That's not true. With device encrypted data and Direct Boot enabled, this restricted mode allows apps to perform limited actions and access non-personal data (i.e. specific system files), allowing it to boot up to the lock screen securely without any user interaction.
You have to enable it though, by going to developer options and selecting "covert to file encryption”. This WILL perform a factory reset though.
msaitta said:
That's not true. With device encrypted data and Direct Boot enabled, this restricted mode allows apps to perform limited actions and access non-personal data (i.e. specific system files), allowing it to boot up to the lock screen securely without any user interaction.
You have to enable it though, by going to developer options and selecting "covert to file encryption”. This WILL perform a factory reset though.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
There is no "convert to file encryption" option in the developer options on the Pixel. Anyway, since the lock screen shows personal images and notifications and such, clearly a lot of data is available if someone decrypts the file system, even if there were an option to double-encrypt a few individual sensitive files. Anyway, what are the chances that every app developer encrypts every file I care about? This is why I want full device encryption, and I want full device encryption without storing my keys someplace where a backdoored bootloader can get at them.
15xda said:
Anyway, since the lock screen shows personal images and notifications and such, clearly a lot of data is available if someone decrypts the file system, even if there were an option to double-encrypt a few individual sensitive files.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Well, I stand partially corrected, actually. The device definitely seems to show some of my settings on reboot, like, for instance, volume. On the other hand, it can't receive VOIP calls (suggesting it doesn't have access to the SIP password I configured in the dialer), and incoming mobile calls don't show the contact name. So I guess it does offer some protection, but it's much harder to figure out what.
In case anyone lands on this thread, here is an explanation of what is happening on bootup:
https://developer.android.com/training/articles/direct-boot.html
The short answer is Pixel uses file-based-encryption now instead of disk-based encryption. I'm still not happy about this design because it somewhat reduces privacy and potentially complicates examining applications as root, but it's not as bad as I originally throught.
Hi!
I'm considering buying Pixel 6a for its worth at around 300USD worth but after using Android for several years, I'm concerned about security after rooting, like after theft etc.
Afaik, if bootloader is unlocked, the thief can just flash a new image and that's it!
It's different with iOS where icloud lock (even after jailbreak) can render the device practically unusable.
Can someone guide if some kind of google lock is a possibility nówadays with Android or newer versions of Android?
Are you looking at this from a data security standpoint? Or from "make sure its worthless to the thief".
Data security I believe is much more important than causing the phone to self destruct if stolen, and from a data security standpoint, you don't need to worry about root, because the data stored in the userdata partition is ENCRYPTED, and this encryption is tied to lockscreen security. In other words, they need to be able to legitimately get past the lockscreen in order to have unencumbered access to your data, regardless of what they change with respect to boot and system partitions.
If on the other hand, you're more worried about rendering the device worthless if stolen (i.e., thief can't actually use it), then you're actually talking about gooble's factory reset protection, which pretty much locks you to factory images, and locked bootloaders, and the "unlock bootloader" switch set to not-unlockable.
Factory reset protection works by forcing you to validate that you are the owner of the gooble account previously registered as owner of the device. It can be trivially bypassed as long as the "allow oem unlocking" flag is set to true, or the device has a 3rd party OS key installed, such as from grapheneos.
Also, having the device REPORTED as stolen if it is, will make it unable to connect to a cellular network, which pretty effectively makes it worthless.
Thanks for detailed answer. It answers my question.
While data is first priority, rendering device non-usable is also a deterrent.
Gotta find some ROMs which allow encryption tho. Thanks again
tarun0 said:
Thanks for detailed answer. It answers my question.
While data is first priority, rendering device non-usable is also a deterrent.
Gotta find some ROMs which allow encryption tho. Thanks again
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
It isn't a useful deterrent to theft, because they have to steal it first before they can find out if its been rendered useless or not. Its not like they'll return it if they find out that its useless.
tarun0 said:
Hi!
I'm considering buying Pixel 6a for its worth at around 300USD worth but after using Android for several years, I'm concerned about security after rooting, like after theft etc.
Afaik, if bootloader is unlocked, the thief can just flash a new image and that's it!
It's different with iOS where icloud lock (even after jailbreak) can render the device practically unusable.
Can someone guide if some kind of google lock is a possibility nówadays with Android or newer versions of Android?
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
You should be worried more about having unlocked bootloader as opposed to root.
Root can only be obtained via Magisk, which creates a layer making your System think that Magisk is a part of it. No root could be obtained other than through Magisk manager, and even then, you will get a prompt to allow root to an app or adb. You can provide time limited root or one time only for apps. In other words, root gives the user control. Your OS already has root regardless of Magisk. All Magisk does is give you the power to grant or deny root.
Locked vs unlocked bootloader: this is where you should be concerned. If your bootloader is unlocked, it might be possible to boot or flash a modified recovery or TWRP that will have full write access to your system partitions, which are not encrypted. Android, unlike Linux or Windows never encrypted anything but data partition, and a few years ago, Google dropped even that in favor of file encryption. So, your data partition is no longer encrypted, just the files. So, when TWRP has full access to your system, an adversary may succeed in removing your screen lock/password/pattern and force system to boot straight without any lock. Note, the attacker wouldn't have to deal with encryption at all, but rather use natural Android weakness, which is: the first boot after installing a brand new rom is always without password prompt. So, in this case, the attacker will have the full access to your data.
With locked bootloader, this is not possible, as all fastboot actions are disabled.
99.9% of custom roms require unlocked bootloader. Those few, which are available on locked bootloader, do not provide root. There are only 1 or 2 developments that can provide optional root + locked bootloader.
optimumpro said:
You should be worried more about having unlocked bootloader as opposed to root.
Root can only be obtained via Magisk, which creates a layer making your System think that Magisk is a part of it. No root could be obtained other than through Magisk manager, and even then, you will get a prompt to allow root to an app or adb. You can provide time limited root or one time only for apps. In other words, root gives the user control. Your OS already has root regardless of Magisk. All Magisk does is give you the power to grant or deny root.
Locked vs unlocked bootloader: this is where you should be concerned. If your bootloader is unlocked, it might be possible to boot or flash a modified recovery or TWRP that will have full write access to your system partitions, which are not encrypted. Android, unlike Linux or Windows never encrypted anything by data partition, and a few years ago, Google dropped even that in favor of file encryption. So, your data partition is no longer encrypted, just the files. So, when TWRP has full access to your system, an adversary may succeed in removing your screen lock/password/pattern and force system to boot straight without any lock. Note, the attacker wouldn't have to deal with encryption at all, but rather use natural Android weakness, which is: the first boot after installing a brand new rom is always without password prompt. So, in this case, the attacker will full access to your data.
With locked bootloader, this is not possible, as all fastboot actions are disabled.
99.9% of custom roms require unlocked bootloader. Those few, which are available on locked bootloader, do not provide root. There are only 1 or 2 developments that can provide optional root + locked bootloader.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Ahhh... So there are options albeit just 1 or 2 which can root with bootlocker locked!!
I thought it's just impossible to root without unlocking bootloader.
Thanks for the nice explanation
tarun0 said:
Ahhh... So there are options albeit just 1 or 2 which can root with bootlocker locked!!
I thought it's just impossible to root without unlocking bootloader.
Thanks for the nice explanation
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Just my view: if I were you, I wouldn't buy any Pixels phone that has Titan chip in it. It is just one more reliance on such a 'bastion' of privacy as Google. Note Titan is closed source, and not only it deals with certificates, but it can also modify firmware. Here is Zdnet's description:
"The Titan chip manufacturing process generates unique keying material for each chip, and securely stores this material -- along with provenance information -- into a registry database. The contents of this database are cryptographically protected using keys maintained in an offline quorum-based Titan Certification Authority (CA).
"Individual Titan chips can generate Certificate Signing Requests (CSRs) directed at the Titan CA, which -- under the direction of a quorum of Titan identity administrators -- can verify the authenticity of the CSRs using the information in the registry database before issuing identity certificates."
So, each machine's individual key is stored with some 'magic' database maintained by Titan Certification Authority. In other words, an entity funded by three-letter agencies now has an additional database holding individual keys for each phone.
optimumpro said:
Just my view: if I were you, I wouldn't buy any Pixels phone that has Titan chip in it. It is just one more reliance on such a 'bastion' of privacy as Google. Note Titan is closed source, and not only it deals with certificates, but it can also modify firmware. Here is Zdnet's description:
"The Titan chip manufacturing process generates unique keying material for each chip, and securely stores this material -- along with provenance information -- into a registry database. The contents of this database are cryptographically protected using keys maintained in an offline quorum-based Titan Certification Authority (CA).
"Individual Titan chips can generate Certificate Signing Requests (CSRs) directed at the Titan CA, which -- under the direction of a quorum of Titan identity administrators -- can verify the authenticity of the CSRs using the information in the registry database before issuing identity certificates."
So, each machine's individual key is stored with some 'magic' database maintained by Titan Certification Authority. In other words, an entity funded by three-letter agencies now has an additional database holding individual keys for each phone.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Thanks for the opinion broski! But what brand are available there?
I don't like Samsung anymore because they destroy screen with update and don't help customers. Rest brand look more on papers but not in real.
tarun0 said:
Thanks for the opinion broski! But what brand are available there?
I don't like Samsung anymore because they destroy screen with update and don't help customers. Rest brand look more on papers but not in real.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Onepluses allow relocking bootloader on custom roms.
tarun0 said:
Thanks for the opinion broski! But what brand are available there?
I don't like Samsung anymore because they destroy screen with update and don't help customers. Rest brand look more on papers but not in real.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Don't be intimidated by the technical language - it's not as complicated as it seems. All hardware security modules come with a key that is installed at the factory and signed by the manufacturer. This initial key is only used to establish a basic level of trust, and the HSM will then generate a unique key for encrypting your data and performing attestation. This process is the same no matter what brand of device you use, whether it's an OnePlus, a pixel, or any other brand
Newer pixel models have a feature called ATTEST_KEY that allows each device to have its own unique keys. If one of these HSM keys were to be compromised, it wouldn't affect your security. However, rooting your phone can compromise your security and make verified boot ineffective, even if the bootloader is locked. If you value security, it's important not to root your phone
tarun0 said:
Ahhh... So there are options albeit just 1 or 2 which can root with bootlocker locked!!
I thought it's just impossible to root without unlocking bootloader.
Thanks for the nice explanation
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
This statement is incorrect. The Android user interface was not designed to handle permission prompts for root access. When you root your phone, you increase the potential for UI bugs that were previously not able to cause harm to become attack vectors that can be used to gain full access to your phone. Rooting also weakens the security of your phone by adding new permissive domains and making the *_app SELinux domains more permissive
It is heavily recommended to read this article https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/android.html
tarun0 said:
Thanks for detailed answer. It answers my question.
While data is first priority, rendering device non-usable is also a deterrent.
Gotta find some ROMs which allow encryption tho. Thanks again
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
For the past five years, it has been required that all Android phones have encryption enabled by default. If you purchase a Pixel phone, it will come with encryption already enabled, but you can further enhance the security of the encryption by installing GrapheneOS as they increase the file name padding length to the maximum supported by the kernel make certain attacks harder.
Block-based encryption is generally considered to be less secure than file-based encryption because it uses a single key to encrypt all data, rather than multiple keys for individual files (which is what FBE does). Android 10 introduced metadata encryption, which encrypts the sector 0 on the data partition, making it inaccessible to attackers even when attempting to access the data through recovery mode. One of the main reasons file-based encryption is preferred over block-based encryption is that it is more difficult to verify the security of block-based encryption, and the algorithms used in block-based verification can be complex and challenging to implement correctly. Additionally, block-based encryption only encrypts data and does not provide any integrity checking, so if the data becomes corrupt, there is no way to detect it and the decryption process will continue. This can result in broken files at best and potentially allow attackers to tamper with or exploit the Linux kernel at worst, as noted by Linux kernel maintainers
optimumpro said:
So, when TWRP has full access to your system, an adversary may succeed in removing your screen lock/password/pattern and force system to boot straight without any lock. Note, the attacker wouldn't have to deal with encryption at all, but rather use natural Android weakness, which is: the first boot after installing a brand new rom is always without password prompt. So, in this case, the attacker will have the full access to your data.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
This quote is mostly (the bad part) FALSE. The decryption on the files cannot be performed until AFTER the device has been unlocked. If an attacker installs something that skips the lockscreen, the files will NOT be decrypted, since that lockscreen password/pin/pattern/etc. is needed to gain access to the key.
No matter what, whether the device bootloader is unlocked or not, or the device has root access or not... if the device is physically outside of the owner's control, it is necessary to assume that security on it has been compromised and should not be trusted. As the owner, you should assume that it has been backdoored, so wipe it fully and reinstall OS.
there is one exception, though. in AFU state, FBE is already decrypted (same as FDE)
https://bugs.xdavidhu.me/google/2022/11/10/accidental-70k-google-pixel-lock-screen-bypass
(does not concern powered off devices)
96carboard said:
Are you looking at this from a data security standpoint? Or from "make sure its worthless to the thief".
Data security I believe is much more important than causing the phone to self destruct if stolen, and from a data security standpoint, you don't need to worry about root, because the data stored in the userdata partition is ENCRYPTED, and this encryption is tied to lockscreen security. In other words, they need to be able to legitimately get past the lockscreen in order to have unencumbered access to your data, regardless of what they change with respect to boot and system partitions.
If on the other hand, you're more worried about rendering the device worthless if stolen (i.e., thief can't actually use it), then you're actually talking about gooble's factory reset protection, which pretty much locks you to factory images, and locked bootloaders, and the "unlock bootloader" switch set to not-unlockable.
Factory reset protection works by forcing you to validate that you are the owner of the gooble account previously registered as owner of the device. It can be trivially bypassed as long as the "allow oem unlocking" flag is set to true, or the device has a 3rd party OS key installed, such as from grapheneos.
Also, having the device REPORTED as stolen if it is, will make it unable to connect to a cellular network, which pretty effectively makes it worthless.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Not all of this is really right on the head.
tarun0
FRP is VERY easy to bypass. Takes me about 2 minutes on Android 13 Jan 2022 update on 7 Pro, 7, 6a, 6 pro, 6, 5a, 5, 4a 5g and the 4a. The data is wiped though, so it at least can't have data stolen, but the FRP is more like a fence with a gate that you can just reach the other side to unlock with a paper clip lol
As far as getting past lock screen, there's USB plug-in's that if a true back actor wanted to get into the phone, it bypasses usb debugging and can force test thousands of pins and patterns per minute without flagging the maximum attempt trigger. But again, what's the chance of a phone getting stolen by someone with that level of knowledge? 90% of phone thieves take it, run and sell it quick flip.
Also, with a custom Android recovery, adb commands are possible, so if the device is rooted with a custom recovery, there's ways to extract the lock screen file where its stored and use it. I don't think the recoveries based on LineageOS can do this, but TWRP definitely can as I've done it personally. So far there's no twrp for any android 13 device to my knowledge. Even the android 12 variants of twrp are shotty and barely function.
Dirty flashing a rom will also remove any passcode generally on a phone. and make data accessible.
Reporting it stolen only goes so far. You can spoof the IMEI if rooted or straight up change it if you have tools like MiracleBox
Long story short, an unlocked bootloader and a rooted android device make the device very insecure. The only roms out there that let you re-lock the bootloader after flashing the rom are Graphene and CalyxOS. And I really don't recommend calyx. Its a pile of ****. Don't root graphene either, as you'll have to leave the bootloader unlocked
TechX1991 said:
Dirty flashing a rom will also remove any passcode generally on a phone. and make data accessible.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
we are talking about FBE encryption, not old FDE encryption with default_password. do not claim what you haven't tested yourself. FBE is simply secure in BFU state. also against bruteforce as gatekeeper lives in TEE. after 140 attempts the timeout has increased to 1 day.
kindly read about how FBE works
https://android.stackexchange.com/a/241688