Related
At the android-platform group, we've been hashing out a scheme for adding in official apps-to-sd support to AOSP. We have a couple of google engineers following along/helping out and are now at a state where the initial testing implementation (we're using an incremental development approach) steps are defined in a fairly simple manner and we are ready to start at it from an actual implementation details/start coding perspective.
The actual thread is located here: http://groups.google.com/group/android-platform/browse_thread/thread/bf0709c157451cd9
Basically, if implemented, it will do the following;
1) totally obsolete current hacker apps2sd approaches by allowing actual sdcard removal from device.
2) ultimately ship with devices stock (when in a state where it is easy to use, stable, and at least as secure for non-root users as internal storage currently is).
3) keep application data on the same device as the actual application with no side-effects (like internal apps being broken while waiting for second partition to mount).
4) allow MULTIPLE sdcards containing apps to be swapped on the same device.
5) allow sdcard containing apps to be swapped between DIFFERENT devices.
Note: 4 and 5 are not in the initial implementation, first proof of concept and working system, then enhancement with additional features. 4 and 5 are not requirements for inclusion in AOSP, but they are cool features that ultimately should be implemented.
What we need:
Several good developers, web storage w/source/patch management, etc.
Anyone interested, please read the thread to get an idea of the current state of thought, and please don't pollute that thread with nonsense. There is a current state of organization, and though not set in stone, it should be considered as NOT open for major architectural changes (i.e., the google engineers don't have any major problems with the proposal that we can't work through). Minor glitches and implementation details will be handled along the way. If you must pollute a thread with nonsense, use this one.
Really? Nobody AT ALL is interested?
This is the *ONE* major feature missing from AOSP!
Id PM twistedumbrella and cyanogen and shafty
JAC would prolly be interested but hes been busy with personal stuff i guess?
Just keep bumping this thread to keep it at the top. this needs to be done, and is long overdue on android...
It's a must
I'm sorry that I'm not a developer. Good speed!
I really don't think a2sd is a good solution at all (I've been following the discussion at android groups), rather, I believe the lack of an a2sd solution will eventually lead to device manufacturers to increase the amount of internal storage available on the device for applications (this is what this project is all about, isn't it, not enough storage for apps?) like Samsung did with it's Galaxy.
We shouldn't assume that a device is going to be used a particular way because then we'll run into problems. We shouldn't assume that an user will want to have their device used that particular way, be it partitioned or with a custom, secure filesystem stored in the SD. How do we explain that they'll lose some of their sdcard to app storage? If we make it automatic, how do we allow the user to disable it if they do not want it? How do we make it if an user wants to have one SD card with apps on it and another one without them?
Again I believe we should let the demand for more storage drive the evolution for the next android devices instead of just making it work and have manufacturers ignore the real need for increased internal storage.
I disagree with it not being a good solution. Technology is always advancing, but people can't always follow suit with what is the latest. Be it financials or whatever, Having this as an option will allow older hardware to run more efficiently, Bring costs down for manufacturers and give everyone more options.
@Jubeh, All the questions you raised I believe could be addressed, Have a new settings menu and let them choose. If they select it, it will give it pop up saying "x amount of space will be reserved on your SD card for app storage".
And with AOSP, Android is not just a mobile phone os anymore, It is a mobile platform. Imagine if you buy and download apps on your phone, You save them to your SD card because of this suggested add-in. Now you also own a media tablet that runs android, For example something with a bigger screen usually used for movies and gaming, Now if we had this you could put your sd card in that device and have all your apps like that. I think that would be an amazing feature for android.
I can think of big issues being encryption, piracy seems like it would be easy to accomplish with something like this, but again this should still be addressed and at least attempted to make available. It would be a huge step for the android platform. My 2 and a 1/2 cents worth
I dont think its a bad idea at all...
Jubeh while i agree with your ideas, we definitely need to get more on board memory. But things like apps, and even most cache's shouldnt hinder or take up precious phone storage. I mean seriously, are we hoping for gigs in the near future? Probably not, lol. But the apps2sd is something we can and should change now, to help bring on future ideas.
And what about those already locked into their devices, or where purchasing a newer improved version isnt feasable? Its hard to rationalize a new smart phone every year, even though we all do it, lol. But some bought the g1 hoping to not have to purchase a new device for multiple years, dont they deserve some kind of back compatablity as well?
Whether it should or should not be implemented is not open to debate. The objective is to actually IMPLEMENT it -- in a manner that meets the stability and security requirements of AOSP. One way or another, community needs WILL implement this system, problem is that the current implementations are just crazy HACKS --- unstable, unreliable, etc. As someone who WILL be installing applications to sdcard, *I* want the system to actually WORK PROPERLY, and I'm sure that not only most everyone else (with VERY VERY few exceptions...) does.
Also, the fact that anyone (jubeh) would bring up those completely retarded points about "assumptions regarding use cases" proves in no uncertain terms that they didn't read the thread linked to (even if they did make themselves look completely retarded by replying in it).
In other words jubeh: If you don't read before you reply, you will make yourself look like an a$$. Now run along.
Oh, and what did I say about keeping the NONSENSE out of that thread? Really... you need to learn to READ.
lbcoder, I have to hand it to you. You killed your project quicker than anybody else possibly could have. While many users wouldn't necessarily agree with what jubeh said, he was raising what he considered were valid points in a fairly reasonable manner. Instead of pointing out that you had already worked on those points and that you didn't want to rehash them, you trashed him (three times) and made it pretty clear that you would be an a$$ to work with. I wish you luck in finding devs who want to put up with that.
I think either member have the right to say what they please.
While lbcoder was a bit harsh, I can understand his frustration.
They're both senior members however, and have both have contributed MASS amounts to the comunity. If they want to hash out a problem so be it.
All its doing is keeping this thread at the top
sykokenndogg said:
I think either member have the right to say what they please.
While lbcoder was a bit harsh, I can understand his frustration.
They're both senior members however, and have both have contributed MASS amounts to the comunity. If they want to hash out a problem so be it.
All its doing is keeping this thread at the top
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
i agree. this should DEFINITELY stay at the top non-rooted g1 users at the very least should have these a2sd AOSP updates... and everyone else can just get the regular updates because they have enough internal memory
lbcoder said:
the current implementations are just crazy HACKS --- unstable, unreliable, etc.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Not to fill this thread with more nonsense but I have to disagree with you on saying the current apps2sds are just crazy hacks. Hacks? yes. Crazy, unstable, and unreliable? No. The new roms that are out currently automatically move your apps to your ext partition on startup if the ext partition is there. If not then the apps will not move there. The fact that you can dual mount your sd now also illiminates any FCs while you have the phone mounted to a pc. I am not saying that the method can not improve but anyone that is currently running an Enom or Cyan rom can tell you if you didnt personally create the partition then you would have no idea that the apps were on the sd.
Agreed, A2SD is stable
If you follow the directions, Apps2SD is more stable than most of the apps on it, imho.
I think the problem that people are having with stability involve the several ways to get there, the fact that each is a multi-step process, and Android users seem to run the gamut from someone who could hack into Sun Microsystem's payroll to someone who just got their first ,uh, smartphone. Most of us tend toward the latter. If you wrest the control from the user and automate it, then I think we'd see the last of A2SD instability.
Internal memory isn't just for apps, and I think it'll grow regardless. People like high numbers on boxes. WM (WP?) has had this since pre-turn of the century, and the demand for more phone memory hasn't decreased. As a matter of fact, the ROMs just grew, and grew, and grew.
Hey, it's cheaper, it's pretty much just as fast, and if it's easy, people will be able to figure out what the different partitions are once they get them and have to manage them, so it'll teach the masses. I'm all for it. Can't code for diddly, but I like the idea.
Yeah. Bump.
Edit: Yes, you will catch more flies with honey. In the friendliest way I can say it, lose the 'tude, or you'll lose out on a lot, lot, lot of other stuff, and you likely won't be able to figure out why things aren't working out for you. You can't really look back and say what might've been, either. You can, and please do, still say what you need to say, maybe even more, but *how* you say it really matters.
a2sd is FAR from being a stable, reliable, sane solution to the device's storage problem, I've said it time and time again.
Being "Senior Member" is in no way a measure of reliability, experience, or knowledge. I could fill 10,000 posts with 4/5ths of them being "Reported 10 chars" and be a senior member. Also, although I've tried to help where I can, I don't think I've yet contributed anything significant, mainly to avoid the barrage of posts afterwards asking how to make it work... and that brings me back to topic; the storage of apps on SD-card would be hell for carrier's support lines. The implementation is mostly non-existent in MASS MARKET headsets, and although you're right to point out that Android is making strides beyond the phone market, I believe the implementation would be shunned by google for several reasons; the formerly mentioned carrier support hell, both carriers and manufacturer's desire for handsets to become obsolete, google's desire to keep android appealing to both carriers and manufacturers, and possible competition in the thin-portable client and netbook spaces against it's own upcoming Chrome OS.
At this point already, the hope that the feature will "2) ultimately ship with devices stock" is pretty, pretty slim.
As opposed to what most members here might think, we're in the minority (rooted Dream users), and although a2sd does cater to some rooted users, we're still talking about the minority of Dream devices out there (since really, it seems the only reason behind implementing a2sd is the Dream's stock 70 MB app storage space, most other devices at least double that amount). Normal people (read: not us geeks) change devices often almost as a fashion statement, so any solution, if it did make it as an update, would be to support the desire of a small fraction of an almost obsolete device.
Besides, even starting with the way apps are currently handled by the device, it would require a major re-working of the platform to get this monstrosity working. Currently, apps are handled in two spaces, system apps, which can't be un-installed, and user apps, which can be un-installed, updated, etc, but not by the user, but by the package-manager. A better solution would be a third app space for sd-card installed apps. The system/package manager would not install these apks downloaded directly to the sd-card's fat32, rather, they would just show up on the app launcher (we could have scans for new apps every time an sd-card was inserted/removed). With donut's on-demand dexopting, we could create another directory in /data, say, /sd-dalvik-cache, or even leave the .dex in the sdcard while the app was in use and remove it when the app stops (and clear any .dex on sd-card mount), and create a third category of apps that could be installed to sd (in lieu of it, apps would get thrown into /data/app and moved back to sd as soon as one was available, of course, after prompting the user). This way, developers would be able to choose for their apps to be installed to SD and they could take the appropriate security measures to ensure the safety of their code, if that's what they want.
A2SD should have been an option for android in first place. Windows mobile has it, why not android? Is it stable and usable the way it is - sure. But what happens if I want to take out my sdcard and put it in a card reader?
It's one of the major failures of android along with it not supporting adhoc
networks, bluetooth obex as default and some other significant issues.
Don't get me wrong here - there are many things I love abut the platform but
flaws are there too. I've had winmo standart, winmo pro and now an android phone and in terms of "getting the job done" all three have their + and -.
The *current* mechanism to install applications on SD is an EXTREMELY hacky piece of junk.
Though it will work, it will only do so under the following conditions;
1) the user is fully aware of the limitations of the system and doesn't do anything that will stress it out,
2) the sdcard is *always* in the device, never removed.
3) it is impossible to use multiple sdcards in the same device.
Let me pose this question to everyone;
WHAT HAPPENS if you are using hack-apps2sd and you remove the sdcard? You know, just PULL IT OUT... This is something that "regular" users do *all the time*.
This is only one of many conditions that need to be managed by an apps2sd system before it can be considered for inclusion in a consumer device.
Needs to be done;
1) The user needs to be able to chose whether or not to enable apps-to-sd and must set itself up on the phone itself by just the click of a button.
2) The user must be able to SWAP SDCARDS at will. This includes the case where they just rip the card out without unmounting it.
3) When an sdcard is inserted containing apps, the system must automatically set it up and add those applications to the package manager.
4) UID collisions must NEVER happen.
5) External apps must be able to be sanely removed from the package manager upon unmount (planned or unplanned).
6) Processes with open file handles must be politely shut down upon a planned unmount.
7) Processes with open file handled must be CLEANLY killed off upon an UNPLANNED unmount.
8) PROTECTED-APPS must be copy protected when stored on the sdcard to at least equal security to that used internally, i.e. they should be encrypted using a randomly generated key stored in a root-only location within /data.
9) The user must be able to chose where to install a new application.
10) Application home directory and dalvik-cache must be stored on the same media as the application is installed to, i.e. internally installed apps should have their home directory and dalvik-cache stored internally, externally installed apps should have their home directory and dalvik-cache stored externally.
11) Optional: Ability to grow/shrink the amount of storage on the sdcard devoted to applications.
In other words, the user experience should be like this;
1) With a regular sdcard inserted (or no sdcard inserted), the user experience must not be any different than it is currently.
2) User can go to Settings-->SD card & phone storage-->(SD card) Enable application install to SD card. This prompts the user for how much space to devote to applications (default, say equal to internal), and then sets it up.
2B) optional -- user can go to Settings-->SD card & phone storage-->(SD card) "Change SD card space reserved for applications". Prompts for new size (min size = current space used, max size = current available + total sdcard available).
3) User goes to install a new app, if the card has application storage enabled, the installer asks where to install the application to (internal or sdcard).
4) User safely unmounts sdcard -- if applications are running, prompt "There are applications running on the sdcard (list them), these will be terminated. Continue?", terminates applications, removes them from package manager, unmounts.
5) User unsafely pulls sdcard -- if applications were running, message "These applications were running on the sdcard. They have been terminated and any unsaved data has been lost."
6) User inserts or mounts sdcard, system scans if application install is enabled on the card, if it is, the applications are added to package manager.
discussion management
lbcoder,
The thread at groups.google is definitely the technical thread, so I am using this one to comment on your reply dated Oct 30 2:39 pm.
Hands down I believe that for the sake of keeping the discussion open (one of the pillars of the scientific method) is to allow comments that may or may not agree with your or anyone else's point of view.
I agree on that Armando's idea is wrong, just like you do. Although he does have some valid points, which anyone who reads carefully can see. He is probably out of line writing what he did on the technical thread instead of here; and should be scolded for that. But not for sharing his thoughts. I won't elaborate on my own ideas on the matter this because it is not my purpose with this post.
My purpose is to ask everyone working on both this and the technical thread to tone it down, please. XDA sometimes becomes a battleground, sometimes funny and sometimes wasteful and even annoying and both this and the technical thread at groups.google could be very valuable for the platform.
BTW: I'm a well seasoned developer, with well over 15 yrs of experience and who leads reasonably big projects.
Thanks for the thread. It is well worth it, whatever the outcome is.
fosormic said:
lbcoder,
The thread at groups.google is definitely the technical thread, so I am using this one to comment on your reply dated Oct 30 2:39 pm.
Hands down I believe that for the sake of keeping the discussion open (one of the pillars of the scientific method) is to allow comments that may or may not agree with your or anyone else's point of view.
I agree on that Armando's idea is wrong, just like you do. Although he does have some valid points, which anyone who reads carefully can see. He is probably out of line writing what he did on the technical thread instead of here; and should be scolded for that. But not for sharing his thoughts. I won't elaborate on my own ideas on the matter this because it is not my purpose with this post.
My purpose is to ask everyone working on both this and the technical thread to tone it down, please. XDA sometimes becomes a battleground, sometimes funny and sometimes wasteful and even annoying and both this and the technical thread at groups.google could be very valuable for the platform.
BTW: I'm a well seasoned developer, with well over 15 yrs of experience and who leads reasonably big projects.
Thanks for the thread. It is well worth it, whatever the outcome is.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
There is no place in this discussion for opinions. Its not about battling, its not about opinions, its not about any of that BS. What I am asking is for anyone INTERESTED in CONTRIBUTING (either in code, or in rational discussion regarding implementation details) to come forward and do so. Everything else is irrelevant and out of place.
As for his having valid points... not relevant since ALL of his valid points have been addressed. His purpose (if he has any at all) is therefore simply to disrupt progress.
And since he has effectively destroyed this thread with his nonsense, I may cease monitoring this thread. Anyone interested in contributing, please contact me by PM. Anyone interested in being disruptive, don't waste your time -- really, just go away.
lbcoder said:
The *current* mechanism to install applications on SD is an EXTREMELY hacky piece of junk.
Though it will work, it will only do so under the following conditions;
1) the user is fully aware of the limitations of the system and doesn't do anything that will stress it out,
2) the sdcard is *always* in the device, never removed.
3) it is impossible to use multiple sdcards in the same device.
Let me pose this question to everyone;
WHAT HAPPENS if you are using hack-apps2sd and you remove the sdcard? You know, just PULL IT OUT... This is something that "regular" users do *all the time*.
This is only one of many conditions that need to be managed by an apps2sd system before it can be considered for inclusion in a consumer device.
Needs to be done;
1) The user needs to be able to chose whether or not to enable apps-to-sd and must set itself up on the phone itself by just the click of a button.
2) The user must be able to SWAP SDCARDS at will. This includes the case where they just rip the card out without unmounting it.
3) When an sdcard is inserted containing apps, the system must automatically set it up and add those applications to the package manager.
4) UID collisions must NEVER happen.
5) External apps must be able to be sanely removed from the package manager upon unmount (planned or unplanned).
6) Processes with open file handles must be politely shut down upon a planned unmount.
7) Processes with open file handled must be CLEANLY killed off upon an UNPLANNED unmount.
8) PROTECTED-APPS must be copy protected when stored on the sdcard to at least equal security to that used internally, i.e. they should be encrypted using a randomly generated key stored in a root-only location within /data.
9) The user must be able to chose where to install a new application.
10) Application home directory and dalvik-cache must be stored on the same media as the application is installed to, i.e. internally installed apps should have their home directory and dalvik-cache stored internally, externally installed apps should have their home directory and dalvik-cache stored externally.
11) Optional: Ability to grow/shrink the amount of storage on the sdcard devoted to applications.
In other words, the user experience should be like this;
1) With a regular sdcard inserted (or no sdcard inserted), the user experience must not be any different than it is currently.
2) User can go to Settings-->SD card & phone storage-->(SD card) Enable application install to SD card. This prompts the user for how much space to devote to applications (default, say equal to internal), and then sets it up.
2B) optional -- user can go to Settings-->SD card & phone storage-->(SD card) "Change SD card space reserved for applications". Prompts for new size (min size = current space used, max size = current available + total sdcard available).
3) User goes to install a new app, if the card has application storage enabled, the installer asks where to install the application to (internal or sdcard).
4) User safely unmounts sdcard -- if applications are running, prompt "There are applications running on the sdcard (list them), these will be terminated. Continue?", terminates applications, removes them from package manager, unmounts.
5) User unsafely pulls sdcard -- if applications were running, message "These applications were running on the sdcard. They have been terminated and any unsaved data has been lost."
6) User inserts or mounts sdcard, system scans if application install is enabled on the card, if it is, the applications are added to package manager.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
well the extremely hacky piece of junk took a lot of hard work from the developers here......show some respect
Hi, there!
Like many others, I have only recently switched from WM6.5 to Android (with my new HTC Desire).
WM 6 introduced the possibility to encrypt the SD Card, making it only readable in the PPC it was originally encrypted in. I found this a very helpful tool and had bought a respective app from Spritesoft. Unfortunately, their Android software is still in the beginning status, and therefore, I bought yesterday the app from WaveSecure.
I was surprised, however, that they do not offer an encryption for the SD card as I know it from my old TyTN II.
Is anybody here who can advice - tweak, app, or whatever?
I mean, it's nice to secure the phone - but the sensible data are being stored in files on the SD card in the end. And if you lose your device, it may well be broke, but the SD card lives and cannot be wyped in a broken device either.
I couldn't agree more. There are a few applications that either offer individual file passwords, which is not very secure, or just offer encryption of its own text files, like OI Safe. I used to use a commercial application on Windows Mobile, Sentry 2020, which allowed you to create a an encrypted volume within your storage, internal or external. This was ideal, as it allowed you to store any kind of files in this. After a timeout period, the volume was automatically closed and your files were secure. It is a shame that the last activity in Sentry's website is in 2007.
I should be receiving a desire very shortly and am very concerned by the current lack of device level encryption.
Does anyone know if there are any products in development that will soon allow device encryption?
Is the hardware and OS itself capable of supporting full device encryption?
hi, i want to reopen this issue because today i asked myself the same question.
i have tested several apps but most of them are not useable for a large number of files or folders.... what we really need is a secret partition and something like truecrypt.... i didn´t find anything in the net... so if somebody has an idea or solution for that, i would be happy...
thank you!
htclerman said:
hi, i want to reopen this issue because today i asked myself the same question.
i have tested several apps but most of them are not useable for a large number of files or folders.... what we really need is a secret partition and something like truecrypt.... i didn´t find anything in the net... so if somebody has an idea or solution for that, i would be happy...
thank you!
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
did you encounter anything using AES/Rijndael or at least Blowfish or Twofish algorithm? I need something to encrypt single files/folders only. TIA!
wizja said:
did you encounter anything using AES/Rijndael or at least Blowfish or Twofish algorithm? I npartitioneed something to encrypt single files/folders only. TIA!
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Do you speak about apps?
If yes, there is nothing out there
I know that is working fast with a big number of files. There must be an option to encrypt a whole partition,
That's the only thing that would make sense.
Sent from my HTC Desire using XDA App
http://tasker.dinglisch.net/tour.html
Claims to support encryption, kind of complicated through.
htclerman said:
Do you speak about apps?
If yes, there is nothing out there
I know that is working fast with a big number of files. There must be an option to encrypt a whole partition,
That's the only thing that would make sense.
Sent from my HTC Desire using XDA App
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
With the ability to put apps on the SDCard this is going to be an unlikely feature to work well....
Your best bet is looking for something with a good remote wipe/lock feature.
If you have a partition formatted with ext2/3/4, it's only a matter of copying over static binaries of lvm, device-mapper and cryptsetup, and creating a script called via initrc or controlled via /etc/init.d
I've posted about a similar solution for /data. Search for it.
Push for implementating it in Android:
Using dm-crypt to Encrypt the SD Card...? - xda-developers
Using dm-crypt to Encrypt the SD Card...? - CyanogenMod Forum
Issue 11211 - android - Android too insecure - Encryption of the SDcard is crucial - Project Hosting on Google Code
Issue 3748 - android - Add support for partition/block device encryption - Project Hosting on Google Code
Just bought a new Galaxy Tab S 10.5 Wifi and I have been debating whether to enable full disk encryption. I know that the stock android implementation of encryption is entirely software based, but Samsung mentioned in their documentation that their ODE (On Device Encryption) system supports hardware accelerated encryption. However, information on the topic is scarce, and I cannot confirm which models actually support acceleration.
Does anyone know of a list of android devices that supports hardware accelerated encryption?
snapper.fishes said:
Just bought a new Galaxy Tab S 10.5 Wifi and I have been debating whether to enable full disk encryption. I know that the stock android implementation of encryption is entirely software based, but Samsung mentioned in their documentation that their ODE (On Risk Encryption) system supports hardware accelerated encryption. However, information on the topic is scarce, and I cannot confirm which models actually support acceleration.
Does anyone know of a list of android devices that supports hardware accelerated encryption?
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Go to Settings/Security and if it says Storage Type-Hadrware Backed, then your device has crypto module. However, big warning here: if your master encryption key sits in hardware (like in Iphones), there is nothing easier for a sophisticated attacker to get the key directly from there. If, like in Lollipop, the master key is salted on hard drive and crypto module holds another key used to sign the master key, that provides an additional layer of protection against brute force attack. In other words, someone can take an image of your entire hard drive and then brute force your password offline or in the case of Iphone, just get the key from hardware. In lollipop, it is impossible. So, sometimes google does good things (by mistake)...
In lollipop, it is impossible.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Android disk encryption is based on dm-crypt, which means it's at the block device layer. The encryption algorithm used is AES-128 with cipher-block chaining (CBC) and ESSIV:SHA256. The master key is encrypted with 128-bit AES via calls to the OpenSSL library. New Lollipop devices encrypted at first boot cannot be returned to an unencrypted state.
The unlock PIN/password is used to derive the AES disk encryption key which is stored in the volume header. As from 4.4, scrypt is used to derive the keys in order to make brute force attacks a little harder, but using a strong password instead of a stupid PIN remains highly recommended. On certain Nexus devices, the key is hardware-protected (likely TEE).
Nothing is impossible but's harder:
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-31765672
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs...-apple-and-google-users-researchers-discover/
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-31729305
CHEF-KOCH said:
Nothing is impossible but's harder:
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-31765672
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs...-apple-and-google-users-researchers-discover/
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-31729305
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
What have these news to do with Android encryption?
Seriously, there was a clear question by the OP and you didn't even try to answer at all. Instead you copy and paste text fragments from other websites and post irrevelant links...
@bastei
And how your post helps here? I explained very well that FDE is vulnerable with several attacks. It isn't worth to use it, especially on such hardware, because it costs a lot of performance for nothing.
FDE isn't secure to use, especially if you have a mobile device which allows the attacker to get physical access to it + the mentioned attacks.
But to answer the question:
Hardware accelerated encryption is dependent on which hardware (needs to support special flags like AES/AES-NI/AVX) you use and if your os supports it (minimum Android 3.x) or not. And no there is no list, because all new hardware after (and some of them before) Android 3.x comes with support for it, the Tab S uses AES 256-Bit Encryption according to the specs.
ODE (On Risk Encryption)
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
It's Samsung On-Device Encryption (ODE) and not on Risk ...
Yup that's a typo. Going to check the settings when I get home today.
CHEF-KOCH said:
@bastei
I explained very well that FDE is vulnerable with several attacks. It isn't worth to use it, especially on such hardware, because it costs a lot of performance for nothing.
FDE isn't secure to use, especially if you have a mobile device which allows the attacker to get physical access to it + the mentioned attacks. .
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
With all due respect, but your explanation is wrong. If encryption is properly implemented, you reduce vulnerability to virtually none. Users just have to understand how encryption works and what it is designed for. Contrary to popular beliefs, disk encryption is not designed to protect the device that is live/running, it only prevents access to your data, when your phone is off. By the way, the term "full disk encryption" , as it applies to Android, is highly misleading, because unlike in Linux, Android only provides for data encryption.
However, Android allows to implement encryption in a way that it is virtually impossible to break. You can have separate passwords short for screen and long/strong for boot and encryption. In addition, Android Lollipop provides an extra layer of protection by putting a second key, which is used to sign the master key in crypto module (hardware). This is much better than in IOS (iphones) where the master key simply sits in hardware crypto module and therefore could be easily obtained by a sophisticated attacker (think back doors in crypto module and weak hardware assisted random number generation).
Let me give you an example with my Sony Xperia Z1 running custom lollipop. I have enabled 256 bit encryption; I have increased the length of various keys, as well as the number of iterations for random number generation; then I have disabled in kernel hardware based weakened random number generator and enabled all other methods inactive by default (thanks to google and sony for making it easier to break for spooks); I then disabled hardware overlay option, which causes slow down, so, now, there is no visible difference in performance with unencrypted device. And finally, I have encrypted the phone via adb shell by using a long pass phrase, so that screen pin was not used in encryption in any way, including its salted traces on the device. By the way, when you encrypt lollipop via adb shell, you don't input your raw passphrase, but rather its hexed version, and guess what, I hexed it on my computer, as opposed to the phone. So, when I turn my phone off, I know that no sophisticated spook can get access to my data even if they take an image of all my partitions and try to brutforce the password off the phone. They simply can't. No one can break properly implemented 256 bit AES encryption. That is why the spooks need backdoors in hardware and weak random number generation (the latter is disabled in kernel on my Z1).
So, properly implemented encryption (and Android Lollipop provides for that) does not visibly slow down the device and can make it impossible for spooks to break. .
With all due respect, but your explanation is wrong. If encryption is properly implemented, you reduce vulnerability to virtually none. Users just have to understand how encryption works and what it is designed for. Contrary to popular beliefs, disk encryption is not designed to protect the device that is live/running, it only prevents access to your data, when your phone is off. By the way, the term "full disk encryption" , as it applies to Android, is highly misleading, because unlike in Linux, Android only provides for data encryption.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
But Android is not a Computer which is on the same place all the time which means that it is a lot of easier to get physical access to it. That means an attacker have all the time to crack it, which in fact is only a matter of time. With or without additional protection mechanism - it will be cracked soon or later, and if you asking me it's not worth to use FDE on a mobile device, it coasts performance (as said for nothing).
The focus should be to protect data, correct but these kind of protection not protect against usage data stealing if most aps need internet connection which never use any secure way to send and receive data - So the risk here is much higher that a attacker can collect all necassary data if your phone is unlocked and a app xyz is running in the background which logs all stuff, such as Pin, passwords for website logins or whatever.
However, Android allows to implement encryption in a way that it is virtually impossible to break. You can have separate passwords short for screen and long/strong for boot and encryption. In addition, Android Lollipop provides an extra layer of protection by putting a second key, which is used to sign the master key in crypto module (hardware). This is much better than in IOS (iphones) where the master key simply sits in hardware crypto module and therefore could be easily obtained by a sophisticated attacker (think back doors in crypto module and weak hardware assisted random number generation).
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
It's very easy breakable there a several tools out there, exploits and poc's - and why need to crack something if you better steal data that are necessary over internet? Which tactic is easier - sure the last. Yes, lollipop is the first secure os, but not all people use it right now or the oem rolls out the update for every device. But I generally agree in the aspect that lollipop fix most stuff which are vulnerable compared to Android 4.x.
There are several attacks which affects all Android versions even latest lollipop:
- First, the encryption doesn't help much if you haven't set a passcode!
- Limitations in lollipops encryption explained over here
- Only the /data partition and all stuff in there will be protected (only the sdcard is protected if it's non-removable)
- The attacker boot to recovery and factory reset the device.
- If your phone is rooted and booted up, they'll use adb to copy your unencrypted data (e.g. sdcard). If it's not booted, they're stuck.
- The attack can use a download mode from there they flash a custom recovery or custom kernel (rooted) image. Most custom recovery's allows root adb which is needed to bypass the lockscreen.
- The attacker can simply use some software holes to bypass the pin and of course several known tools to crack the image master password.
- Military-grade encryption just doesn’t matter if an attacker has access to the key already.
- Nobody use a strong password (eg 20 chars) since you can't use a hardware token + the fact it's too long to type on the phone (and this each time).
- Android just required you to use a strong password/passphrase when starting up the device, but for some absurd reason they also require that you use the same password as your screen lock password
So, properly implemented encryption (and Android Lollipop provides for that) does not visibly slow down the device and can make it impossible for spooks to break. .
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Yes and no, you right if you say the stuff about the implementation but overall encryption always takes performance for e.g. if you use AES 256 encryption anything that needs to decrypt constantly during the read and write process will causes performance impacts examples are give over here and here. But AES is most common used which is already "optimized".
The conclusion is that the performance of your device will take a slight hit if you enable encryption (dependency which hardware you use and which encryption algo was used + possible bugs/implementation problems) but to fight with this only for a technique that will be cracked it the near feature is really not worth to use or recommend if you asking me. It's more like a placebo, nothing is really secure as long the user is to lazy to use a very strong passcode/password
CHEF-KOCH said:
But Android is not a Computer which is on the same place all the time which means that it is a lot of easier to get physical access to it. That means an attacker have all the time to crack it, which in fact is only a matter of time. With or without additional protection mechanism - it will be cracked soon or later, and if you asking me it's not worth to use FDE on a mobile device, it coasts performance (as said for nothing).
The focus should be to protect data, correct but these kind of protection not protect against usage data stealing if most aps need internet connection which never use any secure way to send and receive data - So the risk here is much higher that a attacker can collect all necassary data if your phone is unlocked and a app xyz is running in the background which logs all stuff, such as Pin, passwords for website logins or whatever.
It's very easy breakable there a several tools out there, exploits and poc's - and why need to crack something if you better steal data that are necessary over internet? Which tactic is easier - sure the last. Yes, lollipop is the first secure os, but not all people use it right now or the oem rolls out the update for every device. But I generally agree in the aspect that lollipop fix most stuff which are vulnerable compared to Android 4.x.
There are several attacks which affects all Android versions even latest lollipop:
- First, the encryption doesn't help much if you haven't set a passcode!
- Limitations in lollipops encryption explained over here
- Only the /data partition and all stuff in there will be protected (only the sdcard is protected if it's non-removable)
- The attacker boot to recovery and factory reset the device.
- If your phone is rooted and booted up, they'll use adb to copy your unencrypted data (e.g. sdcard). If it's not booted, they're stuck.
- The attack can use a download mode from there they flash a custom recovery or custom kernel (rooted) image. Most custom recovery's allows root adb which is needed to bypass the lockscreen.
- The attacker can simply use some software holes to bypass the pin and of course several known tools to crack the image master password.
- Military-grade encryption just doesn’t matter if an attacker has access to the key already.
- Nobody use a strong password (eg 20 chars) since you can't use a hardware token + the fact it's too long to type on the phone (and this each time).
- Android just required you to use a strong password/passphrase when starting up the device, but for some absurd reason they also require that you use the same password as your screen lock password
Yes and no, you right if you say the stuff about the implementation but overall encryption always takes performance for e.g. if you use AES 256 encryption anything that needs to decrypt constantly during the read and write process will causes performance impacts examples are give over here and here. But AES is most common used which is already "optimized".
The conclusion is that the performance of your device will take a slight hit if you enable encryption (dependency which hardware you use and which encryption algo was used + possible bugs/implementation problems) but to fight with this only for a technique that will be cracked it the near feature is really not worth to use or recommend if you asking me. It's more like a placebo, nothing is really secure as long the user is to lazy to use a very strong passcode/password
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
I agree with you regarding weaknesses, but they all are rellated to improperly implemented encryption or user's misunderstanding. You have acknowledged that if the phone is off "they are stuck." That's what I call properly implemented encryption, and no tool can help including their super fast computers. By the way, if they do it on the device, in lollipop, data will be erased after 10 attempts, not to mention that there is a slowdown mechanism to prevent brutforce. Stealing online: yes, this is true, but again, it is possible to restrict any app from contacting the internet (afwall that was recently updated for lollipop and Xprivacy). On my phone, only web browser, mail client and sip client (all non google) have access to the internet; and since I have no Gapps, there is no "phoning home" Google's servers. Performance: it is true that encryption degrades performance somewhat, but again, if it is properly implemented, human's eye wouldn't notice. By the way, I think the reason Google is back pedalling on default encryption is that they have realized they really created something that is difficult to crack. Hence, they'll "modify" it soon to help their sponsoring spooks.
"Nobody use a strong password (eg 20 chars) " I use a boot pass phrase that has over 60 characters. This one was used for encryption, as opposed to a screen pin. You can only do it via adb shell.... Again, it is all about implementation. And by the way, most of the time I use soft reboot, which does not require me to use the long phrase at all.
A lot of people over-estimate spook's abilities. Despite the recent revelations: they can't do magic, meaning breaking encryption and they know it. That's why they are colluding with everyting that "moves" to put backdoors, weaken number generation, force weaker ciphers and so on.
May I ask you if using an xposed module is a risk for the whole system itself? It shouldn't be too hard to abuse it and to bypass xprivacy itself and the Android firewall.
Funny stuff, you not use gapps but you trust goggles encryption even if they already worked together in the past with GCHQ/NSA ...
Stealing online: yes, this is true, but again, it is possible to restrict any app from contacting the internet (afwall that was recently updated for lollipop and Xprivacy)
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Again apps are not the first line of defense, they are the last. Xprivacy can't protect/or fake mac address, ID's or your imei/phone number (please read the whole FAQ) and on Lollipop there are a lot of more restrictions generally and they are not all implemented yet.
Since Xprivacy needs root (or should I say the Xposed framework) this is also a possible security risk, the attacker can use adb (which can be rescricted by an app) to disable/uninstall/freeze XPrivacy or any other app even if you use them as admin (the app will once crash and not restart).
...and no tool can help including their super fast computers
... data will be erased after 10 attempts
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Erased? Are you sure? I don't think so I guess the os will just shutdown but to erase something would be horrible.
On my phone, only web browser, mail client and sip client (all non google) have access to the internet; and since I have no Gapps, there is no "phoning home" Google's servers.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Yes, and this is a mistake here in this thread, people forgett that most users are not experts, they not even know about XPrivacy/AFWall+ or root. The benefit of encryption should that all people even without bigger knowledge can handle it without disadvantages or other hints. So that already failed, google now reverted there own statement which means the encryption will not default enabled for all (see my links for there statement: In short - OEM complaining about performance!).
So security isn't activated from the beginning which is also a possible risk.
Performance: it is true that encryption degrades performance somewhat, but again, if it is properly implemented, human's eye wouldn't notice.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
No it's not and you not understand it the I/O performance is slower, that can be a little bit different from device to device (due other hardware) but it's definitely noticeable (and not only in benchmarks) - please read the links. Not every use high end devices, never forget it -> again security should be available for all and the fact google reverted it clearly shows that we are not ready yet.
By the way, I think the reason Google is back pedalling on default encryption is that they have realized they really created something that is difficult to crack. Hence, they'll "modify" it soon to help their sponsoring spooks.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
It's a matter of time anyone found a solution, the only thing we can do is to upgrade the OS to fix the possible holes asap - but that won't protect anyone who not update direct after each new release. And oem's usally needs aslo time to update there stuff, if they not already gave up due the massive fragmentation.
I use a boot pass phrase that has over 60 characters. This one was used for encryption, as opposed to a screen pin. You can only do it via adb shell.... Again, it is all about implementation.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Yes and because of implementation there are always security holes, possible risk and negative side-effects and because of this there will always a way to crack thinks as long if you're rooted.
And again because you use that it not means the mass use this - I'm not the only one who complains about that several known security experts and on several sites a lot of people saying that the length of the password is always a problem. Sure there are a lot of tools, but in our case they only works after a login and again ... mostly only experts using them.
A lot of people over-estimate spook's abilities. Despite the recent revelations: they can't do magic, meaning breaking encryption and they know it. That's why they are colluding with everyting that "moves" to put backdoors, weaken number generation, force weaker ciphers and so on.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Maybe, maybe not. Maybe NSA already have the ability to crack it with some exploits, maybe not - but we can bet on it they are working on it right know we talking about it. But why holidng on stuff that is placebo? There are already problems which can't be denied.
So we are now a bit off-topic, but if you believe the myth that it can't be bypassed you must be naive it was done in the past and it will be soon or later with lollipop with tools every script kiddy can use (like on 4.x). That's not what I call implementation related, it's also not encryption related it's the fact that as long users can side-load stuff or execute root it's only a matter of time - that was and ever will a possible security risk (not only on Android).
pikatchu said:
May I ask you if using an xposed module is a risk for the whole system itself? It shouldn't be too hard to abuse it and to bypass xprivacy itself and the Android firewall.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Don't use any xposed module that is not open source
Use Afwall built in iptables binaries, as opposed to system ones or better move builtin iptables into your system
Prevent any xposed module including xprivacy and xposed framework from internet access
---------- Post added at 04:39 PM ---------- Previous post was at 03:50 PM ----------
CHEF-KOCH said:
Funny stuff, you not use gapps but you trust goggles encryption even if they already worked together in the past with GCHQ/NSA ...
Again apps are not the first line of defense, they are the last. Xprivacy can't protect/or fake mac address, ID's or your imei/phone number (please read the whole FAQ) and on Lollipop there are a lot of more restrictions generally and they are not all implemented yet.
Since Xprivacy needs root (or should I say the Xposed framework) this is also a possible security risk, the attacker can use adb (which can be rescricted by an app) to disable/uninstall/freeze XPrivacy or any other app even if you use them as admin (the app will once crash and not restart).
Erased? Are you sure? I don't think so I guess the os will just shutdown but to erase something would be horrible.
Yes, and this is a mistake here in this thread, people forgett that most users are not experts, they not even know about XPrivacy/AFWall+ or root. The benefit of encryption should that all people even without bigger knowledge can handle it without disadvantages or other hints. So that already failed, google now reverted there own statement which means the encryption will not default enabled for all (see my links for there statement: In short - OEM complaining about performance!).
So security isn't activated from the beginning which is also a possible risk.
No it's not and you not understand it the I/O performance is slower, that can be a little bit different from device to device (due other hardware) but it's definitely noticeable (and not only in benchmarks) - please read the links. Not every use high end devices, never forget it -> again security should be available for all and the fact google reverted it clearly shows that we are not ready yet.
It's a matter of time anyone found a solution, the only thing we can do is to upgrade the OS to fix the possible holes asap - but that won't protect anyone who not update direct after each new release. And oem's usally needs aslo time to update there stuff, if they not already gave up due the massive fragmentation.
Yes and because of implementation there are always security holes, possible risk and negative side-effects and because of this there will always a way to crack thinks as long if you're rooted.
And again because you use that it not means the mass use this - I'm not the only one who complains about that several known security experts and on several sites a lot of people saying that the length of the password is always a problem. Sure there are a lot of tools, but in our case they only works after a login and again ... mostly only experts using them.
Maybe, maybe not. Maybe NSA already have the ability to crack it with some exploits, maybe not - but we can bet on it they are working on it right know we talking about it. But why holidng on stuff that is placebo? There are already problems which can't be denied.
So we are now a bit off-topic, but if you believe the myth that it can't be bypassed you must be naive it was done in the past and it will be soon or later with lollipop with tools every script kiddy can use (like on 4.x). That's not what I call implementation related, it's also not encryption related it's the fact that as long users can side-load stuff or execute root it's only a matter of time - that was and ever will a possible security risk (not only on Android).
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
GAPPS vs. Google encryption: I can't examine or modify GAPPS, but I can Google encryption, which is open source
Xposed modules: Xposed framework needs root once only during installation. After that you can revoke root permission
Attacker use of ADB: no matter what attacker does, he can't mount Data. Even on a live device, if pings are disabled, as well as all incoming connections, there is no way to reach the system over the internet. Now, I am not talking about baseband or simcard exploits, but if you face that kind of an attacker, then you don't use cell phones at all. The point stands: if your phone is off and it is properly encrypted, there is virtually no way to get the data. And I say virtually only because of baseband/simcard exploits.
Erasing data: If you look at lollipop's /system/vold/cryptfs.c and .h, you will see that erasing data is implemented after 10 unsuccessful attempts (the number could be reduced).
Low end devices vs. high end; regular user vs. advanced: you can't have a product that will satisfy all. You can't lower safety standards to satisfy the low end regular user. 2015 Mercedes is safer on the road than 1976 Honda. If you have advanced knowledge, you'll benefit more than a regular user. And if that user refuses to help himself, he will have to face the consequences.. That's the way Linux (and Android is its ugly daughter) is built...
GAPPS vs. Google encryption: I can't examine or modify GAPPS, but I can Google encryption, which is open source
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Open source isn't a guarantee for security. I'm tired to saying this over and over again here on xda and in other forums. And no, it's not open source since most devices comes with own stock android builds which may use other hardware/drivers and maybe other or touched encryptions. There is also no guarntee that it hold what it promise as long nobody can proof or deny it.
Xposed modules: Xposed framework needs root once only during installation. After that you can revoke root permission
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Once is more than enough, to get infected by faked Xposed Installers or other possible attacks. You scenarios are very unrealistic, nobody only use root only for one single module - You can't tell me that. Attackers don't need to mount data if you installed apps on external sdcard which isn't encrypted.
as well as all incoming connections, there is no way to reach the system over the internet.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Incoming connections are not necessary, outgoing is more important to send data to a eg. C&C.
The point stands: if your phone is off and it is properly encrypted, there is virtually no way to get the data. And I say virtually only because of baseband/simcard exploits.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Sure but it's unrealistic too, I will use the phone and not use encryption which can be attacked or bypassed except the phone is offline.
Erasing data: If you look at lollipop's /system/vold/cryptfs.c and .h, you will see that erasing data is implemented after 10 unsuccessful attempts (the number could be reduced).
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Please give me the source, thanks. According to this normal userdata not getting any wipe on encryption fail and on other systems then EXT4 or F2FS nothing will be done (no access). And as long /data is not mounted there is also no access, that's the reason android temporary mount /data each time to promt for passwords, other processes and such (for more look in the documents)
I didn't know that but nvm it's unimportant since the master key is still on the device itself - which will definitely not erased and as said it not protect against privacy data stealing which is more important, nobody want you android files, only you passwords etc ...
Use Afwall built in iptables binaries
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Iptables are not installed on every system and not working anymore since Android 5 need some extra flags like -pie and to replace the system own or installing them needs root too - oh, and to fix possible startup data leaks also needs root for init.d.
Low end devices vs. high end; regular user vs. advanced: you can't have a product that will satisfy all.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
I'm not saying other stuff but you are the one which said that the performance impact is minimal and I'm the one which said encryption should work out of the box for all on any device - sure it's definitly an implementation thing, but as a workaround older devices may just simple lower the encryption e.g. 256 -> 128 Bit.
You can't lower safety standards to satisfy the low end regular user. 2015 Mercedes is safer on the road than 1976 Honda. If you have advanced knowledge, you'll benefit more than a clueless user who refuses to help himself....
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
I'm not comparing cars I only compare the encryption algos which haven't much changed over the years (just some fixes here and there but under the hood the car still needs 4 wheels).
We talked about encryption and possible attacks and you still can't deny them all. You try to find some excuses but under the line it will be cracked - and not in 10 years, this or next year I promise because of this reasons:
- Cracking the pins normally takes only seconds: they are simply to short or follow patterns due to being the same as the lock screen password. Practically speaking, the security of this entire story depends on the passphrase the user sets. If it is very long, it makes brute forcing difficult. But most people would set a 4/6/8 digit PIN, because who would want to enter a 20 digit password with alphabets and special characters every time you want to make a call or send a message?!
- Cracking Encryption in general -> Encrypted Master Key + Salt stored in footer and they are usually stored at the end of the partition or in a footer file on other partitions
- OEM's may use a different key management module
- Some forensic boot images are available which makes it possible to start early in the boot chain before the whole system loads ->
- Keyloggers or memory catcher allowing the attacker to capture unencrypted data -> including encryption keys and passwords for non encrypted content
- If the device is already compromised with malware it will be possible send things into the internet
- Some root kits already breaking most of all hard disk encryption such as the "Stoned" bootkit on TrueCrypt
- A factory reset also resets the master key
optimumpro said:
I have enabled 256 bit encryption; I have increased the length of various keys, as well as the number of iterations for random number generation; then I have disabled in kernel hardware based weakened random number generator and enabled all other methods inactive by default (thanks to google and sony for making it easier to break for spooks); I then disabled hardware overlay option, which causes slow down, so, now, there is no visible difference in performance with unencrypted device.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
You already mentioned some of these things over at unclefab's "How To Secure Your Phone"-thread. Any chance to get some more detailed steps or even diffs of your changes?
Thanks!
CHEF-KOCH said:
Open source isn't a guarantee for security. I'm tired to saying this over and over again here on xda and in other forums. And no, it's not open source since most devices comes with own stock android builds which may use other hardware/drivers and maybe other or touched encryptions. There is also no guarntee that it hold what it promise as long nobody can proof or deny it.
Once is more than enough, to get infected by faked Xposed Installers or other possible attacks. You scenarios are very unrealistic, nobody only use root only for one single module - You can't tell me that. Attackers don't need to mount data if you installed apps on external sdcard which isn't encrypted.
Incoming connections are not necessary, outgoing is more important to send data to a eg. C&C.
Sure but it's unrealistic too, I will use the phone and not use encryption which can be attacked or bypassed except the phone is offline.
Please give me the source, thanks. According to this normal userdata not getting any wipe on encryption fail and on other systems then EXT4 or F2FS nothing will be done (no access). And as long /data is not mounted there is also no access, that's the reason android temporary mount /data each time to promt for passwords, other processes and such (for more look in the documents)
I didn't know that but nvm it's unimportant since the master key is still on the device itself - which will definitely not erased and as said it not protect against privacy data stealing which is more important, nobody want you android files, only you passwords etc ...
Iptables are not installed on every system and not working anymore since Android 5 need some extra flags like -pie and to replace the system own or installing them needs root too - oh, and to fix possible startup data leaks also needs root for init.d.
I'm not saying other stuff but you are the one which said that the performance impact is minimal and I'm the one which said encryption should work out of the box for all on any device - sure it's definitly an implementation thing, but as a workaround older devices may just simple lower the encryption e.g. 256 -> 128 Bit.
I'm not comparing cars I only compare the encryption algos which haven't much changed over the years (just some fixes here and there but under the hood the car still needs 4 wheels).
We talked about encryption and possible attacks and you still can't deny them all. You try to find some excuses but under the line it will be cracked - and not in 10 years, this or next year I promise because of this reasons:
- Cracking the pins normally takes only seconds: they are simply to short or follow patterns due to being the same as the lock screen password. Practically speaking, the security of this entire story depends on the passphrase the user sets. If it is very long, it makes brute forcing difficult. But most people would set a 4/6/8 digit PIN, because who would want to enter a 20 digit password with alphabets and special characters every time you want to make a call or send a message?!
- Cracking Encryption in general -> Encrypted Master Key + Salt stored in footer and they are usually stored at the end of the partition or in a footer file on other partitions
- OEM's may use a different key management module
- Some forensic boot images are available which makes it possible to start early in the boot chain before the whole system loads ->
- Keyloggers or memory catcher allowing the attacker to capture unencrypted data -> including encryption keys and passwords for non encrypted content
- If the device is already compromised with malware it will be possible send things into the internet
- Some root kits already breaking most of all hard disk encryption such as the "Stoned" bootkit on TrueCrypt
- A factory reset also resets the master key
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Wipe after 10 attempts, see here https://github.com/CyanogenMod/android_device_qcom_common/blob/cm-12.0/cryptfs_hw/cryptfs_hw.c
A factory reset wipes data, so whatever happens to master key is not significant. But even if the master key is reset, there is no use of it in terms of trying to get previously encrypted data. And by the way, the term reset is not correct: if you do a regular reset, the master key is not touched, as it is not sitting on data partition and if you wipe system and data, your master key is gone and the new one will be generated only when you enable encryption again.
I don't understand your consistent point that users won't bother with long passwords, when Android provides for separate passwords one for boot/encrption and another for screen (which is not used for encryption). As I have already said, I use an over 60 character boot password and a short screen pin. If I need to reboot the device, I use soft reboot, which does not require the password at all. So, having a long password does not create any undue burden.
Again, data/disk encryption is valuable, because it protects your device when it is off, meaning, no one can access your data... I have close to personal experience with "sophisticated attackers": they can do nothing with properly encrypted device that is turned off...
Closed source vs. open source. I am not saying open source is secure. I am saying that open source could be examined unlike proprietary one.
My last words on this:
Well in the source nothing to user data gets wiped, only stuff that protects android system related files which proofs that the user data aren't safe if someone use forensic image and cloned everything.
Short screen pins can be cracked in minutes so as long we can sideloading anything before or after a boot especially if not all stuff is mounted it is still a risk.
Fastboot/softboot or whatever you want to call it isn't available on every device so you whole argumentation about complex passwords are useless (for example a friend of mine recently got the LG G3 which had fastboot deactivated). And of course if you got an error like kernel panic or other crash you can't fast reboot which also required that complicated and complex password - especially on mobile devices this is pretty annoying.
Again FDE on Android is placebo that's all, as long the user can dump the whole system and crack it on a PC which is powerful enouth it will be always useless. Apple use a unique key (if we can believe it) which can't be extracted with any tool or read out during the boot (maybe some day but I don't know any tool yet) so everything like brute force must be directly on the device which takes a lot of more time compared to a computer with an external powerful nvidia card and tools like hashkill/hashcat.
About explaining closed source, if you are good enouth you can reverse engineering most of the code - you don't even need to deobfuscate all stuff but in most time if you know the basics you know which weakness e.g. the encryption may have.
As long you not understand that sideloading is the biggest problem in android you not understand that all can be cracked soon or later and because you use xyz do not means that millions of stock users doing such complicated steps too to "secure" the phone which do not protect all stuff except the os itself. Android has defenses yes, but it is more to protect itself and not the private data that's the conclusion. It's a good step what was made with lollipop but there are still attacks which can't be that easily blocked, especially if the user doesn't know how or most if the mechanism are deactivated or simply to complex.
CHEF-KOCH said:
My last words on this:
Well in the source nothing to user data gets wiped, only stuff that protects android system related files which proofs that the user data aren't safe if someone use forensic image and cloned everything.
Short screen pins can be cracked in minutes so as long we can sideloading anything before or after a boot especially if not all stuff is mounted it is still a risk.
Fastboot/softboot or whatever you want to call it isn't available on every device so you whole argumentation about complex passwords are useless (for example a friend of mine recently got the LG G3 which had fastboot deactivated). And of course if you got an error like kernel panic or other crash you can't fast reboot which also required that complicated and complex password - especially on mobile devices this is pretty annoying.
Again FDE on Android is placebo that's all, as long the user can dump the whole system and crack it on a PC which is powerful enouth it will be always useless. Apple use a unique key (if we can believe it) which can't be extracted with any tool or read out during the boot (maybe some day but I don't know any tool yet) so everything like brute force must be directly on the device which takes a lot of more time compared to a computer with an external powerful nvidia card and tools like hashkill/hashcat.
About explaining closed source, if you are good enouth you can reverse engineering most of the code - you don't even need to deobfuscate all stuff but in most time if you know the basics you know which weakness e.g. the encryption may have.
As long you not understand that sideloading is the biggest problem in android you not understand that all can be cracked soon or later and because you use xyz do not means that millions of stock users doing such complicated steps too to "secure" the phone which do not protect all stuff except the os itself. Android has defenses yes, but it is more to protect itself and not the private data that's the conclusion. It's a good step what was made with lollipop but there are still attacks which can't be that easily blocked, especially if the user doesn't know how or most if the mechanism are deactivated or simply to complex.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
And here are my last words. Click the link in the previous post and you will see code to wipe user data. There is annotation that says we will wipe everything related to encryption followed by the code itself that contains the words "wipe user data":
} else {
if(ERR_MAX_PASSWORD_ATTEMPTS == err)
wipe_userdata();
With regard to cracking everything soon, this is just your opinion that is not based on known facts. And one of the facts is that if spooks could break the encryption, they wouldn't need back doors and weakening.
Again, I fail to understand your point about users not using long screen passwords. You don't need long ones for your screen. But let's leave it there and agree to disagree.
bastei said:
You already mentioned some of these things over at unclefab's "How To Secure Your Phone"-thread. Any chance to get some more detailed steps or even diffs of your changes?
Thanks!
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Look here for kernel changes:
https://github.com/AOSP-Argon/android_kernel_sony_msm8974/commit/29d918c1f11247602c58096a62084811bccc328f
// When device comes up or when user tries to change the password, user can
// try wrong password upto a certain number of times. If user enters wrong
// password further, HW would wipe all disk encryption related crypto data
// and would return an error ERR_MAX_PASSWORD_ATTEMPTS to VOLD. VOLD would
// wipe userdata partition once this error is received.
#define ERR_MAX_PASSWORD_ATTEMPTS -10
#define QSEECOM_DISK_ENCRYPTION 1
#define MAX_PASSWORD_LEN 32
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
It won't touch userdata at all, it wipes only (as written) disk encryption related data stuff but I'm talking about sideloading user data and this will never be wiped since this will destroy other stuff too - so this prevents only some attacks if you just start you're phone. - Or if you dump the data without - in a locked state - the master key.
The stuff you linked is also different from my link from AOSP project since it's CM, also a mistake, because CM isn't stock or based on OEM's firmware. So all you're stuff may applies only to custom firmwares - I'm talking again about stuff which use the mass and not only certain "expert" people.
Look here for kernel changes:
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
This is also from CyanogenMod which also only affects /cache/recovery which doesn't matter if the system was already booted success and (as shown) some stuff was already compromised or running in the background.
With regard to cracking everything soon, this is just your opinion that is not based on known facts. And one of the facts is that if spooks could break the encryption, they wouldn't need back doors and weakening.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Yes and your wrong opinion is that it isn't crackable, same was said years ago about TrueCrypt which now is labeled as unsafe and I already mentioned tools which break it.
Seems you're to ignorant to understand which possible negative effects may comes with side-loading. As long you not understand this we can stop the entire discussion here (I already gave up because you don't know s much as I do which tools can break stuff) - it will be cracked and the the dm-crypt stuff was already cracked in Android 4. because of some fixes that doesn't mean anything. Again, because you use xyz that doesn't mean all use the same stuff you already ignored this several times now and I already said that - but okay.
CHEF-KOCH said:
It won't touch userdata at all, it wipes only (as written) disk encryption related data stuff but I'm talking about sideloading user data and this will never be wiped since this will destroy other stuff too - so this prevents only some attacks if you just start you're phone. - Or if you dump the data without - in a locked state - the master key.
The stuff you linked is also different from my link from AOSP project since it's CM, also a mistake, because CM isn't stock or based on OEM's firmware. So all you're stuff may applies only to custom firmwares - I'm talking again about stuff which use the mass and not only certain "expert" people.
This is also from CyanogenMod which also only affects /cache/recovery which doesn't matter if the system was already booted success and (as shown) some stuff was already compromised or running in the background.
Yes and your wrong opinion is that it isn't crackable, same was said years ago about TrueCrypt which now is labeled as unsafe and I already mentioned tools which break it.
Seems you're to ignorant to understand which possible negative effects may comes with side-loading. As long you not understand this we can stop the entire discussion here (I already gave up because you don't know s much as I do which tools can break stuff) - it will be cracked and the the dm-crypt stuff was already cracked in Android 4. because of some fixes that doesn't mean anything. Again, because you use xyz that doesn't mean all use the same stuff you already ignored this several times now and I already said that - but okay.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
I guess we speak different languages. My point is (and it stands) that if encryption is properly implemented, there is no way to get data from unmounted encrypted partition. Let's forget about wiping, any sophisticated attacker will take an image of the device and then try to break a copy. However, to mount data, he will have to bruteforce my 60 character password that will unlock master key or break 256 bit AES. Good luck on either front. And I am not talking about stock, aosp or Cm roms. It makes no difference, the bottom line is he won't be able to do either of the above. I also don't care about careless users. They have a right to be ignorant and most enjoy it very much. Linux (on which Android is based) was not created for ignorant users...
Hello,
I have a rather interesting question, if someone (expert only please) can help, it would be very much appreciated
I have bought a new phone (Huawei Mate 10 Lite) which already has the preinstalled Android 7 OS.
After I turned it on, I've upgraded it to Android 8 (and EMUI 8) via the Software Updater.
So now, I am running Android 8 on Huawei Mate 10 Lite.
Until here, everything works like charm
The problem starts here: I'm used to having my ENTIRE user data partition (phone/device, call it as you wish) ENCRYPTED.
I am using my phone very much in different environments and if I accidentally loose it or it gets stolen, I want to ensure that nobody can access my private data by any possible means.
So, when I go to the classical place for encrypting phones: Settings -> Security & Privacy, I noticed that the "Encrypt Phone" option is MISSING.
I have only "Encrypt SD Card", but I do not have an SD Card, nor do I use one. I use only the internal flashdisk memory.
I even turned on the Developer mode and searched for that specific setting, but I cannot find it.
I googled about this problem and what I found even deepens the mystery, as there are some contradicting information and it doesn't paint a clear picture on how the hell encryption works on Android 7/8...
- In one place, it says that starting with Android 6 phones, the option of encrypting the entire phone is no longer available, as all phones with Android 6+ preinstalled are already encrypted !
Bump ! Really ?
- Somewhere else, someone says that the Full Disk Encryption (FDE) has been replaced with File Encryption and Google is slowly marking full disk encryption as obsolete...
I found the File Encryption on my phone and I have the possibility to create a file encryption "folder" or "vault" or what is that, but I do NOT want that, as I want the entire partition to be encrypted !
I am using VPNs, SSH keys, Pictures, E-mail accounts, Web browsers with stored passwords, basically the entire user partition contains secrets ! I cannot move everything to a secure container... maybe I forget something, and that something remains unencrypted ?
I cannot move everything to a secure SD Card or to put it in that encrypted "folder", because some secrets are files, some secrets are particular app settings or credentials.
Yes, I read about the fact that in Full Disk Encryption mode, a PIN is required for startup (as I had with my previous phone, which was great for me, by the way), and that PIN can prevent the booting of some basic functions of the device or the functioning alarms or something like that.
To tell you honestly, I don't care about those functions. I only want ENTIRE device encryption with one single PIN code.
I have already changed my SIM PIN (which is another thing, it doesn't relate to this), and I generated a phone PIN & Fingerprint on my phone, and set my phone to Lock after 15 seconds.
For everyday usage, the PIN/Fingerprint is enough to keep others from accessing my content, but what about plain disk access (using some other tools that read the flash disk) if I loose my phone or if my phone gets stolen ?
I liked the previous encryption method.
So, basically, I want to encrypt ENTIRE partition (FDE encryption) with one PIN, not SD Card encryption, not other file encryption solutions, not special vaults, not other stuff... I want my classic encryption back !
Please explain me:
1. Are all the new phones starting from Android 6 already encrypted ?
1.1. If so, why is there a file encryption tool to further encrypt particular files if the user partition is already encrypted ?
1.2. If so, what is the encryption key ? or what kind of encryption is that which does not require a PIN or something ? that means that the key is stored in plain text ? (if I don't offer it a PIN, it means that it must read the key from other places in order to decrypt the data (key that can be read by a thief, too?))
2. If Android 6+ phones are not encrypted, how can I implement full device encryption, and why the hell does Google abandon this kind of full, quick and not-giving-extra-security-thoughts encryption ?
I would kindly ask only experts to reply me.
If you are an expert or you know these things for sure, please reply.
I need a correct, documented (if possible), answer, because the security of my phone depends on it !
Thank you !
Well... anyone ??? Is this really such a hard question ???
I was getting so excited when I read your question, because I am looking for the exact same answer. But then I saw there aren't any answers.
Please can someone who knows about this answer this for us?
Mar0615 said:
I was getting so excited when I read your question, because I am looking for the exact same answer. But then I saw there aren't any answers.
Please can someone who knows about this answer this for us?
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
I'm not an "expert" but I can tell you your data is safe & encrypted by default, that is why you can't find an encryption setting.
As I understand it
1. Yes (Google makes manufacturers sign agreement)
1.1 The data is encrypted on phone but you may choose not to lock it. Also you may allow some other people access to your phone even if you set screen lock or it's possible somebody may get your phone before it automatically locks, that is why here is a separate encryption system that some people may want ho use to encrypt certain files. (I'm assuming this is what you are referring to as I have never used Huawei)
1.2 Yes the system can generate it's own key from it's internal information automatically (note also, if you put in a simple passcode it is just one element the phone will use to generate a long key, so hackers can't crack a simple passkey to get into your phone as it also uses it's internal data to generate the key)
2, All your data is encrypted, ok maybe not all eg if you consider an alarm time your data, as some apps may be able to access limited data eg alarm times.
A quick search produced these two articles that are not overly technical & also show the numerous security improvements that all go to make your phone more secure. I hope it puts your mind at rest (though of course nothing can be guaranteed 100% secure if a well resourced group has physical access to your phone eg a government)
https://m.androidcentral.com/how-android-n-addresses-security
https://www.computerworld.com/article/3220446/android/android-8-oreo-security.html
Hello guys,
I have been searching for answers to some of the tech stuff, but couldn't find them.
Here are some of those questions. Hope some of you would have answers to these. Thanks in advance!
ANDROID
1. How to share files between multi-users on Android 11?
Before Android 11, it was possible to save files inside the Android/ obb folder, and these files were visible for all users on the device. In Android 11, this is no longer working as the 'obb' folder appears to be exclusive to each user.
I know this is possible via USB OTG or a cloud service, but is there a solution without these?
2. How to copy/ backup game data for non-rooted devices?
Helium Backup doesn't seem to work. I have played a game for long on my Mediapad, and I would like to copy that game to my phone. Unfortunately, my Mediapad is not rooted and losing all that game progress has become a nightmare. I have written to the app developer to provide some sort of backup using either Google Play Games or social media integration like Facebook/ Twitter, but haven't received any response.
3. How to force apps (esp. file managers & gallery apps) to use in-app media viewer without changing system default.
For example, I may use the stock gallery app as default for viewing media. But if I am using another gallery app or a file manager that is capable of viewing media files using its own media viewer, I would rather want it use it than open the default app. Is there a way to do it?
4. Replace stock file manager (a system app) with another app from Google Play Store or other sources. Is this possible?
I am not asking how to convert a user app into system app. I know that part. I tried replacing the apk file of the stock file manager with a 3rd party apk, even renamed it, but it didn't work.
5. Extract a system app from one device and install it on another device without root. Is this possible?
I have tried it, but apk installation fails. For example, Samsung Gallery app on OnePlus phones.
iOS
1. How to install .ipa (iPhone app) on an iPhone (not jail-broken) without a laptop (iTunes)?
2. Is it possible to have SFTP server for iPhone?
All Operating Systems
1. How to provide LAN only access for non-rooted devices as well as in Windows & iOS?
For rooted devices, we have apps like AFWall+ that can do it. But is there a way to do it for devices without root, as well as for Windows and iOS?
For non-rooted devices, we have apps like Netguard that support 'Allow LAN access' whilst blocking internet access.
Are there any alternatives and solutions for other platforms?
2. How safe is it to enter login credentials in an app to allow it access to network drives?
I use several apps (on various platforms) to connect to my laptop over SMB. This requires me to provide the app with my Windows Login Credentials, which is a Microsoft account. Am I risking my account by providing this info to the app? Is it safe to enter login credentials of cloud services in file manager apps?
Just bumping this thread as it seems to have been lost/ unnoticed.
@Ultramanoid can you answer some of these?
Sridhar Ananthanarayanan said:
@Ultramanoid can you answer some of these?
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Can't help much, sorry. As to Android, some notes :
1. Never have used an OEM / Google's version of Android, or anything other than rooted single-user systems.
2. In addition to the previous answer, I'm not a gamer.
3. I usually don't ever set defaults with some rare exceptions, so I am always given a choice of what I want to use to handle a file. It may vary depending on many things; I may want to edit an SVG file as text, or view it as an image, for instance. There are applications / services that will intercept intents to allow you to do this sort of thing as well, but I can't recommend a specific one, never use them myself.
4. Possible, but will break Android as by now the system requires it as a file picker in many instances without recognizing alternatives and developers of most applications do expect it as well and their services will not work without it. Don't do it. With recent Android storage changes, including the scoped storage debacle, this is not a viable option anymore.
5. Depends, but not likely as a general rule, specially for OEM garbage, which relies on their own proprietary modifications of Android, their libraries, frameworks, et al. You'd have to carry those over to the destination too, which may not even be possible. Use OEM-independent and not Google Services reliant applications. ( Edit : you'll find some of those applications built to install on all devices here on XDA by single developers, "SONY camera for all devices" and that sort of thing, not recommended anyway, not well supported or long-lived experiments. )
Ultramanoid said:
Can't help much, sorry. As to Android, some notes :
1. Never have used an OEM / Google's version of Android, or anything other than rooted single-user systems.
2. In addition to the previous answer, I'm not a gamer.
3. I usually don't ever set defaults with some rare exceptions, so I am always given a choice of what I want to use to handle a file. It may vary depending on many things; I may want to edit an SVG file as text, or view it as an image, for instance. There are applications / services that will intercept intents to allow you to do this sort of thing as well, but I can't recommend a specific one, never use them myself.
4. Possible, but will break Android as by now the system requires it as a file picker in many instances without recognizing alternatives and developers of most applications do expect it as well and their services will not work without it. Don't do it. With recent Android storage changes, including the scoped storage debacle, this is not a viable option anymore.
5. Depends, but not likely as a general rule, specially for OEM garbage, which relies on their own proprietary modifications of Android, their libraries, frameworks, et al. You'd have to carry those over to the destination too, which may not even be possible. Use OEM-independent and not Google Services reliant applications. ( Edit : you'll find some of those applications built to install on all devices here on XDA by single developers, "SONY camera for all devices" and that sort of thing, not recommended anyway, not well supported or long-lived experiments. )
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Thanks very much. But I wish you answered the last 2 questions as well.
If time permits, would you be interested in telling us how you use your phone? I mean which device, which OS and what apps you use. I would like to give that a try (on a spare device) and see if it is possible for me to live without Google.
Sridhar Ananthanarayanan said:
Thanks very much. But I wish you answered the last 2 questions as well.
If time permits, would you be interested in telling us how you use your phone? I mean which device, which OS and what apps you use. I would like to give that a try (on a spare device) and see if it is possible for me to live without Google.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Didn't answer because it won't be helpful.
As to the 1st, I don't use LAN, and I don't keep data in any device or computer unless in use. External independent encrypted storage to be used wherever, whenever, independent of device, cables if needed.
As to the second, it's a matter of common sense, being informed of vulnerabilities and aware of reputation, and trust. Would you trust Chrome or Mozilla with data if you're online banking ? Seems reasonable -- but be aware of major vulnerabilities that may be going on. Would you trust an application released yesterday by a single developer for the same ? Probably not a good idea.
Finally, I doubt what I use and how I use it would be acceptable for you, or most people. In essence you could : Install latest firmware, wipe device, install latest security patched Lineage build for it, remove vendor / Lineage applications, get full root, remove anything you don't need or use which could have vulnerabilities; frameworks, libraries, binaries, etc ( Bluetooth, SMS, Android system-wide downloader, system-wide WebView, NFC, and on and on .. ), install your own binaries, fonts, hosts file, and applications where appropriate ( /bin /etc et al ), install Termux and all Linux packages required for your use, everything open source whenever possible, and stay away from any Google services / Play / applications with ANY trackers, analytics, data mining or even crash report capabilities; zero tolerance. Internet permission only for a secure web browser -- and terminal if / when needed. Half of what I do or use goes through terminal to be honest. In short, for me an Android device is a full Linux laptop replacement with added perks : Always on and on me, camera, GPS, pedometer, unlimited LTE data, and emergency calls for medics / police. ( Edit : And Japanese EEW alarm of course ! Only notification I use. We learned our lesson well in 2011. )
You can use ApkExport to extract any apk including system apks. I've transferred apks between other devices devices with it.
Never had need of doing that though with a system apk.