accounts.db encoding - General Questions and Answers

Sorry if this is the wrong place;
I'm trying to retrieve a Google account password stored on my phone. I don't want to change it, or go through the lengthy password recovery system (it's a very old account, I can't remember the security questions and the recovery email is long gone).
I read an article about how Google passwords were stored in plain text, in the accounts.db database. Some people said this is still the case as of JB (I'm on ICS).
To test this, I opened the database on my computer but the passwords are not in plain text. Instead, each is a 70-character long string, making it look like some sort of hash -- but I thought that storing passwords as hashes would not work because they cannot be decrypted, so perhaps it's an encoding.
Does anyone know what sort of encoding is used for these? And is it possible to decrypt back to plain text?
Thanks,
Mark

Not sure bro..but the accounts.db doesn't contain your password or so I think
I think it only contains a authentication token..no real password is stored..I think..I know this is the case for 2 step authentication users..but not sure about the rest
If it really is encrypted,then it must be encrypted using some kind of password(which you also do not know.. Google wouldn't be stupid to use the same password for encryption all phone's accounts.db)
However,you could login into your account from the stock browser right?
Could it be used to change passwords?

_Mark_B said:
Sorry if this is the wrong place;
I'm trying to retrieve a Google account password stored on my phone. I don't want to change it, or go through the lengthy password recovery system (it's a very old account, I can't remember the security questions and the recovery email is long gone).
I read an article about how Google passwords were stored in plain text, in the accounts.db database. Some people said this is still the case as of JB (I'm on ICS).
To test this, I opened the database on my computer but the passwords are not in plain text. Instead, each is a 70-character long string, making it look like some sort of hash -- but I thought that storing passwords as hashes would not work because they cannot be decrypted, so perhaps it's an encoding.
Does anyone know what sort of encoding is used for these? And is it possible to decrypt back to plain text?
Thanks,
Mark
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Click to collapse
i have the same problem , please help

Related

SECURITY: passwords storing

I would be really pleased if someone could give me a technical description (a cryptographic one) about how ANDROID stores the user´s private passwords. I mean, how are they are encrypted (if it does)? ¿using what algorithms and keys?
The reason is easy to understand. A normal user gives it´s phone 2 types of passwords that should be protected:
1.- One, is the Google´s main password used by the phone to sync (GMail, Calendar, etc)
2.- The second are the passwords that have been marked in the ANDROID´s browser as: "remembered"
Isn´t hard to imagine a situation in what you phone becames lost and it arrives at hands of someone that (before formatting it) wants to take advantadge or obtain all the phone´s stored passwords.
In fact, reading the internal file system or the SD one, must be almost trivial, and from there obtaining the passwords. ¿How does ANDROID protects the user against it?

how to find out which passwords were transmitted to Google? Perhaps by using restore?

When the backup functionality is used, perhaps by human error, perhaps on demand, then Google knows every password you have. E.g: WLAN passwords. As stated by the german magacine heise.de the data is not deleted when the functionality is deactivated. (Suprise)
Is there a way to find out which data is being transferred so the passwords can be changed?
I imagine this could be done by using the restore functionailty. The passwords restored have to be saved somewhere on the phone.
Even if you find were the phone stores the passwords, it will be encrypted.
But you have a point: the password is stored, not only it's md5/hash as the most web-login-check, so in theory yes there is a way.

SplashID v7 upgrade security issue

Besides the issues SplashData has with their SplashID v7 android upgrade losing many customers data, there is also a very worrying security issue which splashdata ignores = and actively censors, my messages regarding this on their FB page have been deleted and I am blocked from commenting our writing there)
Here is the issue:
The new SplashID version 7 had a cloud sync feature (30 day free trial, then for a fee). When first starting the upgraded version (which may have been installed automatically on Android if one allows auto upgrades!), one first has to again enter one's email address/username, and then the password (which is the one used to encrypt one's database containing all one's private, sensitive data!). Then the upgrade asks whether one wants to try the cloud sync feature.
Even if one declines and opts to stay with the existing Wi-Fi sync feature only(which does not need a cloud account), the upgrade goes ahead and automatically creates such a cloud account on splashdata's servers.*and it uses the same password* for this. (In fact as further part of the upgrade procedure one needs to log into those cloud servers using that password after receiving an activation link in email.
So, splashdata leaks the master password which one uses to secure one's most private data (credit card pins, login password etc) into their cloud, without telling that this will be fine, not asking permission.
There is no info whether the password is stored securely (doubt it), whether it is in ask cases transmitted securely (doubt that too) and anyhow, once this has happened one had lost control over that most important password. It's burnt.in the wild, out of one's own control
Note that changing the password on one's own copy of SplashID us a good idea after that, but any old copy of one's encrypted database that might still live on any old disk backup, cloud service (dropbox etc) or SD card somewhere, us now vulnerable.
And because splashdata in their 'wisdom' associated one's email address (and thus identity) with that password, it's easier for hackers to fund it.better companies than splashdata have lost password in the past.
It is even a very bad idea to user the same password for s cloud service as one uses for securing one's private data. Forcing this into users without permission or warning is almost criminal.
Sent from my GT-N7000 using Tapatalk 2
sejtam said:
Besides the issues SplashData has with their SplashID v7 android upgrade losing many customers data, there is also a very worrying security issue which splashdata ignores = and actively censors, my messages regarding this on their FB page have been deleted and I am blocked from commenting our writing there)
Here is the issue:
The new SplashID version 7 had a cloud sync feature (30 day free trial, then for a fee). When first starting the upgraded version (which may have been installed automatically on Android if one allows auto upgrades!), one first has to again enter one's email address/username, and then the password (which is the one used to encrypt one's database containing all one's private, sensitive data!). Then the upgrade asks whether one wants to try the cloud sync feature.
Even if one declines and opts to stay with the existing Wi-Fi sync feature only(which does not need a cloud account), the upgrade goes ahead and automatically creates such a cloud account on splashdata's servers.*and it uses the same password* for this. (In fact as further part of the upgrade procedure one needs to log into those cloud servers using that password after receiving an activation link in email.
So, splashdata leaks the master password which one uses to secure one's most private data (credit card pins, login password etc) into their cloud, without telling that this will be fine, not asking permission.
There is no info whether the password is stored securely (doubt it), whether it is in ask cases transmitted securely (doubt that too) and anyhow, once this has happened one had lost control over that most important password. It's burnt.in the wild, out of one's own control
Note that changing the password on one's own copy of SplashID us a good idea after that, but any old copy of one's encrypted database that might still live on any old disk backup, cloud service (dropbox etc) or SD card somewhere, us now vulnerable.
And because splashdata in their 'wisdom' associated one's email address (and thus identity) with that password, it's easier for hackers to fund it.better companies than splashdata have lost password in the past.
It is even a very bad idea to user the same password for s cloud service as one uses for securing one's private data. Forcing this into users without permission or warning is almost criminal.
Sent from my GT-N7000 using Tapatalk 2
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Ouch, that sounds a bad idea. If the user doesn't want a remote account made, they should respect that. Can you give me any more details about this, I would like to contact them and request some proper response to this. While they might not be leaking the plaintext password, anything that can be "opened" with your password is a significant enough leak, as it would allow an attacker to verify they have the right password.
pulser_g2 said:
Ouch, that sounds a bad idea. If the user doesn't want a remote account made, they should respect that. Can you give me any more details about this, I would like to contact them and request some proper response to this. While they might not be leaking the plaintext password, anything that can be "opened" with your password is a significant enough leak, as it would allow an attacker to verify they have the right password.
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Click to collapse
Not much more that I already said. I am a long-time user of their SplashID (Mac) Desktop and Android app to store all my credit card, bank acount and yes, many systems passwords in.
The database they use is encrypted with a 'master password' which one has to enter on ones' Android (or iPhone, etc) or Desktop everytime to
unlock and decrypt (in memory), so that one access the data.
The same password is used on both the mobile and desktop of course.
A few days ago, an upgrade to SplashID v7 was made available on the Google Play store. I don't allow 'automatic' updates (though I am sure a lot of folks do!), but this time I also did not really check what the upgrade offered, and clicked 'UPDGRADE ALL' when it was offered along with a nunber of other upgrades. So it got installed.
When i subsequently opened SplashID again, it told me about all the shiny new features (cloud sync etc) and as normal asked me for my password (it also asked for my email address. I though that this was for them to check my purchase/license ans what features woudl be enabled)..
I thought that it would then show me my data. But wrong. Instead it offered me a selection whether I want to use the new 'cloud sync' feature (30 day free trial, later for $$), or stay with the normal 'wifi sync'.
I opeted for the latter (because I don't trust having my data sent to the cloud).
Anyway, the next thing I get is a message: (paraphrasing) "we have created your cloud account, you will get an email and will have to verify your email). Sure enough, I get an email:
Thank you for signing up for SplashID Safe Personal Edition!
To activate your account, please verify your email address by clicking the link below: Verify Email
Then check your email for our SplashID Safe Welcome message.{/QUOTE]
The link goes to: https://www.splashid.com/personal/webclient/login.php
I had to again ther enter my email address, and *the same password* that I entered before (which I thought would be for my private data-store).
Yes, that same password was used to create my account on their cloud server, even though I opted for the Wifi Sync *only* and never
asked for a cloud-sync.
Nor did the app tell me that the same password would be used to secure that aco****.
The issues with this are self-evident:
a) my most secure password, the one used to secure my data on my mobile and on my desktop is now 'leaked' to their cloud account
b) I have *no* idea how secuerly that password was transferred (in clear, encrypted, just a hash), nor how securely it is stored
c) it clearly is linked to my cloud-account on their website, so
- someone somehow learning that password could 'verify' it by accessing that account
- if someone hacked their system and accessed their database, that link would be apparent to them
d) I have nost *all control* over securing that password myself. It is 'burnt', 'in the wild'
e) Any pass backups of my secure SplashID database that may live on SD cards of mine, on backup disks, which may have
been copied to the cloud (dropbox, others) are now vulnerable. It is no use for me to change this password here now, as
old copies that may still exist somewhere are still encrypted with this password (and I cannot change them back).
Yes, I am trying to limit exposure for that password data file as much as possible, but eg Titatium Backup may have at some point in teh past backed it up and copied a backup to the cloud (yes, that is also encrypted, but once that featire failed).
More that that, of course users who are not as security conscious may have opeted for 'could sync'.
While I have not tried this feature myself, it sounds to me like thsi does copy the teh data to SplashID's cloud and
there secures it too only with that one single password.
So many users wh may not have thought all this out may have opted for the 'CloudSync' trial, and not only have their
password 'leaked'/'burnt' now, but also have all their data in the cloud, again secured only with a password that is no longer in their sole possession.
In fact, any secure, trustworthy system would have
a) been *very* upfront about what they are going to do with the password and the cloud account
b) used a separate password to secure the cloud account
c) only stored my encrypted copy of the database in their cloud, without *them* having the password for it
d) done any syncing on the client (ie, transfer the complerte encrypted password to the mobile or desktop where the comparisonupdates would happen) and then copied back again a secured file, that was encrypted on the mobile).
Click to expand...
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More discussion on SplashID's own site: http://forum.splashdata.com/showthr...ically-send-in-background-to-splash-id-server

App-specific passwords not working anymore under Android 5

Hi!
I am using multi-factor authentication for all my Google accounts.
I am pretty sure that I once used app-specific passwords on my Android (that time version 4 of Android) devices to authenticate.
Yesterday I reset my device and also the app-specific passwords I created earlier. I recreated new app-specific passwords.
Then, after having restarted my freshly reset Android device I tried to add one of my Google account after the other. As part of that I am, for each single account, first asked for my mail address and password. But, for whatever reason the app-specific passwords are just not accepted. Once entered I am just prompted again and asked for my password. Fascinatingly Google seems to recognize that the password is correct, because if I enter a wrong one on purpose I really get an error saying that the password is wrong.
Entering my "main" Google password works and leads me to a UI then asking for my Google Authenticator code.
Are app-specific passwords no longer support for adding my accounts on Android or am I doing something wrong?
Thanks!
P.S.:
Yes I have seen this thread here: http://forum.xda-developers.com/gen...n-specific-password-google-t2964926?nocache=1
But I wonder if there are meanwhile more official news available?

Is there a way to force use of yubikey?

Hallo.
We are a small club that want to share some info (.txt, doc) with each other, without other people are able to read get access to the files.
I have seen many programs that have encrypted files, even that you can use yubikey to login. BUT after login, the device will be logged in, so if someone loses the mobile, the files are open to the person who find the mobile.
Is there a way to use the yubikey to force login each time you will look at a file?
Before you could lock the mobile, and had to unlock it with the yubikey, not that function is gone on android, so even if you use advanced security from google, your device is logged in, and everyone who are able to unlock your phone, are able to read exemple google drive.
Hope you understand what i am searching for, kinda like a dropbox where the user (5 persons) have to type username, password and use the yubikey to enter the files, or, that the files itself are asking for the yubikey.
Another question is if there is an easy fast way to logout from all accounts?
wbr
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