Database Info

[Completed] [Q] What does this logcat mean?

I am having a crash when I try to view emails on the stock app. I am having this logcat;
Code:
[ 12-12 18:33:56.046 1094: 1094 D/CrashAnrDetector ]
Build: samsung/serranoltexx/serranolte:4.4.2/KOT49H/I9195XXUCNJ4:user/release-keys
Hardware: MSM8960
Revision: 5
Bootloader: I9195XXUCNH5
Radio: unknown
Kernel: Linux version 3.4.0-brisK-g1091455 ([email protected]) (gcc version 4.7.4 (crosstool-NG linaro-1.13.1+bzr2694 - Linaro GCC 2014.06 - Cortex-A15) ) #1 SMP Sun Dec 7 14:49:19 CET 2014
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
Build fingerprint: 'samsung/serranoltexx/serranolte:4.4.2/KOT49H/I9195XXUCNJ4:user/release-keys'
Revision: '5'
pid: 17632, tid: 17818, name: WebViewCoreThre >>> com.android.email <<<
signal 11 (SIGSEGV), code 1 (SEGV_MAPERR), fault addr 00000004
r0 00000004 r1 659b6ea0 r2 00000004 r3 00000004
r4 00000000 r5 669e6828 r6 00000000 r7 00000000
r8 653ff3d8 r9 64e65fd0 sl 00000000 fp 00000001
ip 40647b18 sp 659b6e00 lr 4055781b pc 4017761c cpsr 000f0010
d0 408000003f800000 d1 0000000000000000
d2 0000000000000000 d3 0000000000000000
d4 7767574737f6e6d6 d5 f7e7d7c7b7a79787
d6 0000000002020011 d7 0000000000000000
d8 3fa999999999999a d9 41d522c9c0abf4f9
d10 0000000000000000 d11 0000000000000000
d12 8080808080808080 d13 0000000000000000
d14 0000000000000000 d15 0000000000000000
d16 006c00690061006d d17 0072006600200073
d18 0073006c00690061 d19 00200072006f0020
d20 00200075006f0079 d21 006c0020006f006e
d22 00650067006e006f d23 0077000a00200072
d24 4024000000000000 d25 0000000000000000
d26 4025931319798d6e d27 4059000000000000
d28 4024000000000000 d29 4059000000000000
d30 3ff0000000000000 d31 4082c00000000000
scr 68000013
backtrace:
#00 pc 0000361c /system/lib/libcutils.so (android_atomic_inc+8)
#01 pc 000cc817 /system/lib/libskia.so (SkString::RefRec(SkString::Rec*)+14)
#02 pc 000cc877 /system/lib/libskia.so (SkString::SkString(SkString const&)+6)
#03 pc 001b2c45 /system/lib/libwebcore.so
#04 pc 001b2843 /system/lib/libwebcore.so
#05 pc 001aa363 /system/lib/libwebcore.so
#06 pc 003ac38d /system/lib/libwebcore.so
#07 pc 003acfd3 /system/lib/libwebcore.so
#08 pc 0018c227 /system/lib/libwebcore.so
#09 pc 001d020b /system/lib/libwebcore.so
#10 pc 001e0977 /system/lib/libwebcore.so
#11 pc 001dbca9 /system/lib/libwebcore.so
#12 pc 001d03e1 /system/lib/libwebcore.so
#13 pc 001d9855 /system/lib/libwebcore.so
#14 pc 001daf05 /system/lib/libwebcore.so
#15 pc 001dbcb1 /system/lib/libwebcore.so
#16 pc 001d03e1 /system/lib/libwebcore.so
#17 pc 001d9855 /system/lib/libwebcore.so
#18 pc 001daf05 /system/lib/libwebcore.so
#19 pc 001dbcb1 /system/lib/libwebcore.so
#20 pc 001d03e1 /system/lib/libwebcore.so
#21 pc 001d9855 /system/lib/libwebcore.so
#22 pc 001daf05 /system/lib/libwebcore.so
#23 pc 001dbcb1 /system/lib/libwebcore.so
#24 pc 001d03e1 /system/lib/libwebcore.so
#25 pc 001d9855 /system/lib/libwebcore.so
#26 pc 001daf05 /system/lib/libwebcore.so
#27 pc 001dbcb1 /system/lib/libwebcore.so
#28 pc 001d03e1 /system/lib/libwebcore.so
#29 pc 00225dc3 /system/lib/libwebcore.so
#30 pc 00173bfb /system/lib/libwebcore.so
#31 pc 0033faeb /system/lib/libwebcore.so
stack:
659b6dc0 659b6dd0 [stack:17818]
659b6dc4 6103fc91 /system/lib/libwebcore.so
659b6dc8 00000001
659b6dcc 6103fdfd /system/lib/libwebcore.so
659b6dd0 00000000
659b6dd4 00000000
659b6dd8 00000000
659b6ddc 7e8a0000
659b6de0 00000000
659b6de4 00000000
659b6de8 648fb680
659b6dec 6103fea9 /system/lib/libwebcore.so
659b6df0 67a65c68
659b6df4 659b6e7c [stack:17818]
659b6df8 00000000
659b6dfc 61040b8b /system/lib/libwebcore.so
#00 659b6e00 659b6e14 [stack:17818]
........ ........
#01 659b6e00 659b6e14 [stack:17818]
659b6e04 40557
[ 12-12 18:33:56.046 1094: 1094 D/CrashAnrDetector ]
processName:com.android.email
[ 12-12 18:33:56.056 1094: 1094 D/CrashAnrDetector ]
broadcastEvent : com.android.email SYSTEM_TOMBSTONE
I have tried replacing libwebcore.so with another version, but I still have the crash.
Would appreciate any help provided.
Kind regards,

Hi,
As a senior member of XDA, you should know to always read the stickies at the top of sections, like this one in the Assist section,
> General discussion > XDA Assist > The Purpose of XDA Assist [Please Read]
So please ask about this in your device section.
Thanks for understanding, thread closed.

Evaluating CVE-2015-1474 to escalate to system privileges

I hope that with this thread we are able to gain system privileges with the help of CVE-2015-1474.
To begin with I try to write down what I have found. This is just a compilation of information so they might look mixed up.
The class GraphicBuffer is utilized by the system service SurfaceFlinger. My current understanding is that the vulnerable method "unflatten" is used to create a GraphicBuffer object from raw data that is sent to the service by IPC using Binder. A forged message might be easiest supplied via adb shell using this commando
Code:
[email protected]:/ $ service call SurfaceFlinger ...
I am not sure yet how the parcel get's eventually to the GraphicBuffer. It is a lot of code and I do not understand the low level graphics system of Android yet. The IGraphicBufferConsumer interface has a sub class BufferItem which has also an unflatten method which will call unflatten on GraphicBuffer. My gut tells me that the Parcel class is also involved in that process, but I'm not sure how yet.
One important piece of information that I'm still missing is how the unflattened data is used in the further processing of SurfaceFlinger. I don't think it is possible to freely write in the memory of SurfaceFlinger with this bug. There are still a lot of sanity checks to come by.
This could also effect on how we have to implement the communication with SurfaceFlinger. Maybe it's also possible with some forged objects and a SurfaceView.
Maybe together we are able to bring some light into this. A little bump in the right direction might help.

Phate123 said:
I hope that with this thread we are able to gain system privileges with the help of CVE-2015-1474.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Take a look at the thread below, It looks like there is already some research begin done but I can't quite get my head around whether they are on the right track. This might help us get going in the right direction though.
http://forum.xda-developers.com/not.../rd-rooting-n910a-n910v-models-t3042045/page6

awinston said:
Take a look at the thread below, It looks like there is already some research begin done but I can't quite get my head around whether they are on the right track. This might help us get going in the right direction though.
http://forum.xda-developers.com/not.../rd-rooting-n910a-n910v-models-t3042045/page6
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Good news ( @Phate123, @awinston )! I have managed to crash the surfaceflinger on 4.5.2 (should also work on 4.5.3).
I'll upload the code on github, but first I want to briefly explain how I did it.
In Android everything that is a graphical element is represented by an GraphicBuffer.
GraphicBuffers are wrapped in BufferItems and managed by BufferQueues.
Each Queue has two sites, a producer side (IGraphicBufferProducer) and a consumer side (IGraphicBufferConsumer). In the basic scenario an app is the producer and the surfaceflinger is the consumer. These are obviously two different processes, but both must use the same BufferQueue.
BufferQueues are always created and owned by the consumers and consequently live in the same address space as the consumer. Producers must go through Binder to access their side of the queue.
As with everything in Android, the BufferQueue provides the same interface for both native (in the same process) and remote usage. The remote interface is implemented by a proxy that communicates through Binder with the other side.
In android KK BufferQueue implements the native side of the interface for both the producer (BnGraphicBufferProducer) and the consumer (BnGraphicBufferConsumer). These native implementations must provide a handler (onTransact) for requests that come from the remote proxies.
You can read more at https://source.android.com/devices/graphics/architecture.html.
Naturally, the first idea that comes into mind is to attack the native implementations of the BufferQueue that reside in the surfaceflinger. As the bug is in the unflatten routine of GraphicBuffer, we would like to craft a rogue parcel that represents a GraphicBuffer and then wait for the surfaceflinger to choke with it.
Unfortunately, from my findings, the bugged unflatten method is not called from the onTransact handler in the native implementations.
Only the proxy implementations seem to be a valid target, through BpGraphicBufferProducer::requestBuffer and BpGraphicBufferConsumer::aquireBuffer. Now we have a problem: as the BufferQueue resides in the surfaceflinger, there is no proxy implementation to attack.
Our only hope is to somehow create the BufferQueue in our process, so that we are the consumers, and use the surfaceflinger as the producer. This way the surfaceflinger would be accessing the BufferQueue through the bugged proxy (BpGraphicBufferProducer::requestBuffer). One way to use the surfaceflinger as a producer is to make screen captures.
I found the screencap command to be a very nice starting point to tinker with the idea as it does exactly what we wanted - it uses the surfaceflinger as a producer and pulls screen captures from it. Next I only had to hook the vtable entry of BpGraphicBufferProducer:: onTransact.
Now we have to control the overflow in GraphicsBuffer::unflatten.

p1gl3t said:
Good news ( @Phate123, @awinston )! I have managed to crash the surfaceflinger on 4.5.2 (should also work on 4.5.3).
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Wow you are really good! I had started to piece some of this together and wanted to document it for good measure even though you are going to clearly beat the rest of us to this exploit. Arguably I could never figure it out, but never hurts to try. At least I am learning.
https://charleszblog.wordpress.com/2014/02/20/understanding-android-internals-graphics-basics-i/
http://translate.google.com/transla...dyhuabing/article/details/7489776&prev=search
http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-qQxyvr2Vc8w/VFYLxdacwpI/AAAAAAAAAes/HMMrUIwC9OY/s1600/Selection_043.png
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/native/+/master/libs/gui/tests/Surface_test.cpp
The screenshot test is where I was focusing but wasn't really getting very far.

Crashed unflatten as well
Okay so I crashed unflatten as well. Trying to figure out where to go from here. I am a little confused though because I did it natively by calling unflatten directly from a cpp program I wrote with a few lines of code. When you crash it like this how do I know it was the buffer overflow? Sorry, still trying to learn as I go.
03-05 17:06:47.380 2652-2652/? A/libc﹕ Fatal signal 11 (SIGSEGV) at 0x52464247 (code=1), thread 2652 (screenshot)
03-05 17:06:47.490 258-258/? I/DEBUG﹕ *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
03-05 17:06:47.490 258-258/? I/DEBUG﹕ AM write failure (32 / Broken pipe)
03-05 17:06:47.490 258-258/? I/DEBUG﹕ Build fingerprint: 'Amazon/thor/thor:4.4.3/KTU84M/13.4.5.2_user_452004220:user/release-keys'
03-05 17:06:47.490 258-258/? I/DEBUG﹕ Revision: '0'
03-05 17:06:47.490 258-258/? I/DEBUG﹕ pid: 2652, tid: 2652, name: screenshot >>> ./screenshot <<<
03-05 17:06:47.490 258-258/? I/DEBUG﹕ signal 11 (SIGSEGV), code 1 (SEGV_MAPERR), fault addr 52464247
03-05 17:06:47.490 955-1055/? W/NativeCrashListener﹕ Couldn't find ProcessRecord for pid 2652
03-05 17:06:47.500 258-258/? I/DEBUG﹕ r0 b723dfb8 r1 47424652 r2 be94a600 r3 00000020
03-05 17:06:47.500 258-258/? I/DEBUG﹕ r4 b723dfb8 r5 be94a618 r6 52464247 r7 be94a604
03-05 17:06:47.500 258-258/? I/DEBUG﹕ r8 be94a600 r9 00000000 sl be94a618 fp be94a6ec
03-05 17:06:47.500 258-258/? I/DEBUG﹕ ip b6f08f44 sp be94a590 lr b6f04f4b pc b6e34b94 cpsr 200b0030
03-05 17:06:47.500 258-258/? I/DEBUG﹕ d0 0000000000000000 d1 0000000000000000
03-05 17:06:47.500 258-258/? I/DEBUG﹕ d2 0000000000000000 d3 0000000000000000
03-05 17:06:47.500 258-258/? I/DEBUG﹕ d4 0000000000000000 d5 0000000000000000
03-05 17:06:47.500 258-258/? I/DEBUG﹕ d6 0000000000000000 d7 55ab5f0000000000
03-05 17:06:47.500 258-258/? I/DEBUG﹕ d8 0000000000000000 d9 0000000000000000
03-05 17:06:47.500 258-258/? I/DEBUG﹕ d10 0000000000000000 d11 0000000000000000
03-05 17:06:47.500 258-258/? I/DEBUG﹕ d12 0000000000000000 d13 0000000000000000
03-05 17:06:47.500 258-258/? I/DEBUG﹕ d14 0000000000000000 d15 0000000000000000
03-05 17:06:47.500 258-258/? I/DEBUG﹕ d16 0000002000000001 d17 0000000000000020
03-05 17:06:47.500 258-258/? I/DEBUG﹕ d18 b723a630b723a618 d19 b723a658b723a648
03-05 17:06:47.500 258-258/? I/DEBUG﹕ d20 b723a678b723a668 d21 b723a698b723a688
03-05 17:06:47.500 258-258/? I/DEBUG﹕ d22 b723aaf8b723a6a8 d23 b723af58b723af48
03-05 17:06:47.500 258-258/? I/DEBUG﹕ d24 0000000000000000 d25 0000000000000000
03-05 17:06:47.500 258-258/? I/DEBUG﹕ d26 0000000000000000 d27 0000000000000000
03-05 17:06:47.500 258-258/? I/DEBUG﹕ d28 0000000000000000 d29 0000000000000000
03-05 17:06:47.500 258-258/? I/DEBUG﹕ d30 0000000000000000 d31 0000000000000000
03-05 17:06:47.500 258-258/? I/DEBUG﹕ scr 00000010
03-05 17:06:47.510 258-258/? I/DEBUG﹕ backtrace:
03-05 17:06:47.510 258-258/? I/DEBUG﹕ #00 pc 00005b94 /system/lib/libui.so (android::GraphicBuffer::unflatten(void const*&, unsigned int&, int const*&, unsigned int&)+23)
03-05 17:06:47.510 258-258/? I/DEBUG﹕ #01 pc 00002f47 /data/local/tmp/screenshot
03-05 17:06:47.510 258-258/? I/DEBUG﹕ #02 pc 0000e4db /system/lib/libc.so (__libc_init+50)
03-05 17:06:47.510 258-258/? I/DEBUG﹕ #03 pc 0000308c /data/local/tmp/screenshot
03-05 17:06:47.510 258-258/? I/DEBUG﹕ stack:
03-05 17:06:47.510 258-258/? I/DEBUG﹕ be94a550 00000000
03-05 17:06:47.510 258-258/? I/DEBUG﹕ be94a554 b6010001
03-05 17:06:47.510 258-258/? I/DEBUG﹕ be94a558 00000000
03-05 17:06:47.510 258-258/? I/DEBUG﹕ be94a55c b6e0d44b /system/lib/libgui.so
---------- Post added at 12:26 AM ---------- Previous post was at 12:12 AM ----------
awinston said:
Okay so I crashed unflatten as well.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Is the trick to do it through the surfaceflinger process because it is running with escalated privileges?

awinston said:
Okay so I crashed unflatten as well. Trying to figure out where to go from here. I am a little confused though because I did it natively by calling unflatten directly from a cpp program I wrote with a few lines of code. When you crash it like this how do I know it was the buffer overflow? Sorry, still trying to learn as I go.
03-05 17:06:47.380 2652-2652/? A/libc﹕ Fatal signal 11 (SIGSEGV) at 0x52464247 (code=1), thread 2652 (screenshot)
03-05 17:06:47.490 258-258/? I/DEBUG﹕ *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
03-05 17:06:47.490 258-258/? I/DEBUG﹕ AM write failure (32 / Broken pipe)
03-05 17:06:47.490 258-258/? I/DEBUG﹕ Build fingerprint: 'Amazon/thor/thor:4.4.3/KTU84M/13.4.5.2_user_452004220:user/release-keys'
03-05 17:06:47.490 258-258/? I/DEBUG﹕ Revision: '0'
03-05 17:06:47.490 258-258/? I/DEBUG﹕ pid: 2652, tid: 2652, name: screenshot >>> ./screenshot <<<
03-05 17:06:47.490 258-258/? I/DEBUG﹕ signal 11 (SIGSEGV), code 1 (SEGV_MAPERR), fault addr 52464247
03-05 17:06:47.490 955-1055/? W/NativeCrashListener﹕ Couldn't find ProcessRecord for pid 2652
03-05 17:06:47.500 258-258/? I/DEBUG﹕ r0 b723dfb8 r1 47424652 r2 be94a600 r3 00000020
03-05 17:06:47.500 258-258/? I/DEBUG﹕ r4 b723dfb8 r5 be94a618 r6 52464247 r7 be94a604
03-05 17:06:47.500 258-258/? I/DEBUG﹕ r8 be94a600 r9 00000000 sl be94a618 fp be94a6ec
03-05 17:06:47.500 258-258/? I/DEBUG﹕ ip b6f08f44 sp be94a590 lr b6f04f4b pc b6e34b94 cpsr 200b0030
03-05 17:06:47.500 258-258/? I/DEBUG﹕ d0 0000000000000000 d1 0000000000000000
03-05 17:06:47.500 258-258/? I/DEBUG﹕ d2 0000000000000000 d3 0000000000000000
03-05 17:06:47.500 258-258/? I/DEBUG﹕ d4 0000000000000000 d5 0000000000000000
03-05 17:06:47.500 258-258/? I/DEBUG﹕ d6 0000000000000000 d7 55ab5f0000000000
03-05 17:06:47.500 258-258/? I/DEBUG﹕ d8 0000000000000000 d9 0000000000000000
03-05 17:06:47.500 258-258/? I/DEBUG﹕ d10 0000000000000000 d11 0000000000000000
03-05 17:06:47.500 258-258/? I/DEBUG﹕ d12 0000000000000000 d13 0000000000000000
03-05 17:06:47.500 258-258/? I/DEBUG﹕ d14 0000000000000000 d15 0000000000000000
03-05 17:06:47.500 258-258/? I/DEBUG﹕ d16 0000002000000001 d17 0000000000000020
03-05 17:06:47.500 258-258/? I/DEBUG﹕ d18 b723a630b723a618 d19 b723a658b723a648
03-05 17:06:47.500 258-258/? I/DEBUG﹕ d20 b723a678b723a668 d21 b723a698b723a688
03-05 17:06:47.500 258-258/? I/DEBUG﹕ d22 b723aaf8b723a6a8 d23 b723af58b723af48
03-05 17:06:47.500 258-258/? I/DEBUG﹕ d24 0000000000000000 d25 0000000000000000
03-05 17:06:47.500 258-258/? I/DEBUG﹕ d26 0000000000000000 d27 0000000000000000
03-05 17:06:47.500 258-258/? I/DEBUG﹕ d28 0000000000000000 d29 0000000000000000
03-05 17:06:47.500 258-258/? I/DEBUG﹕ d30 0000000000000000 d31 0000000000000000
03-05 17:06:47.500 258-258/? I/DEBUG﹕ scr 00000010
03-05 17:06:47.510 258-258/? I/DEBUG﹕ backtrace:
03-05 17:06:47.510 258-258/? I/DEBUG﹕ #00 pc 00005b94 /system/lib/libui.so (android::GraphicBuffer::unflatten(void const*&, unsigned int&, int const*&, unsigned int&)+23)
03-05 17:06:47.510 258-258/? I/DEBUG﹕ #01 pc 00002f47 /data/local/tmp/screenshot
03-05 17:06:47.510 258-258/? I/DEBUG﹕ #02 pc 0000e4db /system/lib/libc.so (__libc_init+50)
03-05 17:06:47.510 258-258/? I/DEBUG﹕ #03 pc 0000308c /data/local/tmp/screenshot
03-05 17:06:47.510 258-258/? I/DEBUG﹕ stack:
03-05 17:06:47.510 258-258/? I/DEBUG﹕ be94a550 00000000
03-05 17:06:47.510 258-258/? I/DEBUG﹕ be94a554 b6010001
03-05 17:06:47.510 258-258/? I/DEBUG﹕ be94a558 00000000
03-05 17:06:47.510 258-258/? I/DEBUG﹕ be94a55c b6e0d44b /system/lib/libgui.so
---------- Post added at 12:26 AM ---------- Previous post was at 12:12 AM ----------
Is the trick to do it through the surfaceflinger process because it is running with escalated privileges?
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Surfaceflinger runs under the system user (+drmrpc group) and should have access to /dev/qseecom, through which we can get root using CVE-2014-4322.
The problem is that the heap buffer overflow triggered by unflatten seems very difficult to exploit.
We must consider the following to achieve a controlled memory write:
sizeof(native_handle_t) + sizeof(int)*(numFds+numInts) must overflow 32 bits and remain small enough that the malloc succeeds and returns a valid heap address in h->data. If the malloc were to fail, we would memcpy to address 0 and get a seg fault.
as even after the malloc, numInts and numFds are used only after being multiplied by 4 (sizeof(int)), we can ignore the 2 most significant bits from both of them. This means that the only way to get any kind of bof is to generate transport from bit 29 to bit 30 on the sum numFds+numInts. Consequently, at least one of numInts or numFds must have bit 29 set. This doesn't sound very good because next we will do a memcpy of numFds * 4 bytes and next a memcpy of numInts * 4 bytes, meaning that at least one of the two memcpy calls will try to copy at least (1<<31) bytes. This will certainly lead to a segfault before we can trigger something from another thread...
the executable code is position independent so we would need to leak an address to be able to use rop.
Things don't look good at all... I really hope that I have made a mistake or that there is another approach to the problem.
I'm afraid that the pros would have already implemented an exploit by now, if it could have been done.

p1gl3t said:
We must consider the following to obtain a controlled memory write:
sizeof(native_handle_t) + sizeof(int)*(numFds+numInts) must overflow 32 bits and remain small enough that the malloc succeeds and returns a valid heap address in h->data. If the malloc were to fail, we would memcpy to address 0 and get a seg fault.
as even after the malloc, numInts and numFds are used only after being multiplied by 4 (sizeof(int)), we can ignore the 2 most significant bits from both of them. This means that the only way to get any kind of bof is to generate transport from bit 29 to bit 30 on the sum numFds+numInts. Consequently, at least one of numInts or numFds must have bit 29 set. This doesn't sound very good because next we will do a memcpy of numFds * 4 bytes and next a memcpy of numInts * 4 bytes, meaning that at least one of the two memcpy calls will try to copy at least (1<<31) bytes. This will certainly lead to a segfault before we can trigger something from another thread...
the executable code is position independent so we would need to leak an address to be able to use rop.
Things don't look good at all... I really hope that I have made a mistake or that there is another approach to the problem.
I'm afraid that the exploit pros would have already implemented an exploit if it could have been done.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
That have been my thoughts too. There is a memory corruption but it is difficult to use and it is not on areas that could be used to manipulate the return stack or a vtable entry. Or I just can't see the way. I have experience in this area,but it is kinda limited.
BTW: These drivers are not used by the Fire HDX by chance? https://www.codeaurora.org/projects...le-camera-drivers-cve-2014-4321-cve-2014-4324
Sadly I cannot find enough time to spend hours on digging. I hope there are some to be find this weekend though.

Phate123 said:
That have been my thoughts too. There is a memory corruption but it is difficult to use and it is not on areas that could be used to manipulate the return stack or a vtable entry. Or I just can't see the way. I have experience in this area,but it is kinda limited.
BTW: These drivers are not used by the Fire HDX by chance? https://www.codeaurora.org/projects...le-camera-drivers-cve-2014-4321-cve-2014-4324
Sadly I cannot find enough time to spend hours on digging. I hope there are some to be find this weekend though.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
I don't think a stack attack would have been feasible at all as the code should be compiled with stack protector on and we can't do a brute force on the canary value. Hijacking a vtable pointer or a got entry would have been the way to go, but we still wouldn't know what to write as everything is aslr'd.
Regarding those camera drivers, I think someone over at the Samsung section also mentioned them. I'll look into them and report back.

p1gl3t said:
I don't think a stack attack would have been feasible at all as the code should be compiled with stack protector on and we can't do a brute force on the canary value. Hijacking a vtable pointer or a got entry would have been the way to go, but we still wouldn't know what to write as everything is aslr'd.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Would you mind sharing your code even though it doesn't look like you will be able to exploit this overflow? I am still trying to get my head around the basic attack through surface flinger and it would help me greatly to better understand how at least in theory this works. No worries if you don't want to.

awinston said:
Would you mind sharing your code even though it doesn't look like you will be able to exploit this overflow? I am still trying to get my head around the basic attack through surface flinger and it would help me greatly to better understand how at least in theory this works. No worries if you don't want to.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Here you go: https://github.com/p1gl3t/CVE-2015-1474_poc.

p1gl3t, great job on creating a poc of the exploit :good:

p1gl3t said:
Regarding those camera drivers, I think someone over at the Samsung section also mentioned them. I'll look into them and report back.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
@jcase Says no on those camera group holes. http://forum.xda-developers.com/showpost.php?p=58945240&postcount=18
It's good to see other's working on 2015-1474 also :good:

ZPaul2Fresh8 said:
@jcase Says no on those camera group holes. http://forum.xda-developers.com/showpost.php?p=58945240&postcount=18
It's good to see other's working on 2015-1474 also :good:
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
@jcase is right, only mediaserver is executed under group camera so that it can access /dev/video*. You can see that in init.base.rc and ueventd.qcom.rc.
Now returning to the original topic... I fiddled around with unflatten, giving some input that should have made it crash.
What I did is I left numInts untouched and set numFds = -numInts. I was expecting surfaceflinger to crash every single time when it did the first memcpy. Somehow it didn't. I was baffled and had to gdb the process to see where my assumptions were wrong.
I breaked just before the first memcpy and printed the params:
Code:
(gdb) p $r0
$19 = 3074255348
(gdb) p $r1
$20 = 3074340312
(gdb) p $r2
$21 = 4294967248
r0 is the destination, r1 the source and r2 the number of bytes to copy. r2 is the unsigned representation of 4 * (-12) = 4 * numFds = -4 * numInts.
How did the program NOT crash???!! It even worked a second time, but crashed with SIGABRT in a free() because of heap corruption (I suppose). So even the second memcpy passed without segfault.
Here you have the memory map of surfaceflinger.
LE I have traced the memcpy. It looks like this on my Apollo 14.4.5.2
Code:
.text:0002218C __memcpy_base
.text:0002218C CMP R2, #4
.text:0002218E BLT.W loc_222DC
.text:00022192 CMP R2, #0x10
.text:00022194 BLT.W loc_222BE
.text:00022198 CMP R2, #0x20
.text:0002219A BLT.W loc_222AE
.text:0002219E CMP R2, #0x40
.text:000221A0 BLT loc_222A2
It seems like R2 (number of bytes) is treated like a signed int and the first branch is taken and the following instructions are executed
Code:
.text:000222DC loc_222DC ; CODE XREF: __memcpy_base+2
.text:000222DC LSLS R2, R2, #0x1F
.text:000222DE ITT CS
.text:000222E0 LDRCSH.W R3, [R1],#2
.text:000222E4 STRCSH.W R3, [R0],#2
.text:000222E8 ITT MI
.text:000222EA LDRMIB R3, [R1]
.text:000222EC STRMIB R3, [R0]
This ends up copying only n & 3 bytes, which is < 4. Basically, only the 2 least significant bits from n matter).
So... I guess we are able to write to h->data + numFds*4 as long as numFds*4 is negative. But having numFds as an offset may hurt us on the malloc side.
Now we have to defeat aslr somehow.

Any chance
I hope you are still working on this, we really need to get ride of the crappy Amazon OS and unlock the full potential of these amazing tablet specs.
I have an open tablet that I should repair, if there is need to take some photos of components please let me know, I am not into software hacking yet and it will takes me some time to get into it... but I want to contribute to make this possible, I hope more smart guys from around here join their effort to do it.
I wish if there is another tablet on the market who is as good as this one right now at an affordable price, to just see how CM12.1 behave on it, I tried it on a KFHD before I get it bricked it was fine but little bit laggy due to limited specs and low ram.

Hi, p1gl3t!
I'm interesting in your PoC and have to ask... Is your work on this done? And how might I use that for my specific device?

dadreamer said:
Hi, p1gl3t!
I'm interesting in your PoC and have to ask... Is your work on this done? And how might I use that for my specific device?
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Not sure what this thread was all about (didn't look back) but the last post was over 2 years ago. A lot has happened since then; every 3rd gen HDX can be bootloader unlocked opening the door to custom ROMS ranging from Android 4.4.4 to 7.1.1.
https://forum.xda-developers.com/kindle-fire-hdx/general/thor-unlocking-bootloader-firmware-t3463982
https://forum.xda-developers.com/kindle-fire-hdx/general/thor-4-5-5-2-easy-to-root-unlock-t3571240

Davey126 said:
every 3rd gen HDX can be bootloader unlocked opening the door to custom ROMS ranging from Android 4.4.4 to 7.1.1.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Well, that's true but not for my device I still have a slightly outdated smartphone. It is Docomo Fujitsu Arrows NX F-01F [ Android 4.4.2, build # V10R22A (kernel version 3.4.0), ARMv7 arch (armv7l, armeabi-v7a) ]. And it's got no public firmwares at all, no bootloader unlock and no root in easy ways. Besides of that, there's one "pleasant" addition - PXN (Privilege Execute-Never), which doesn't let me to root the phone with simple ways or common tools.
To bypass PXN I have to use some JOP approach but for it I need to get boot.img or kernel memory dump somehow. Because I have no factory ROMs I'm trying to pull out boot.img through known vulnerabilities of my dev. One of them is CVE-2015-1474 (GraphicBuffer integer overflow), which potentially might give me system privilegies to copy boot.img from that phone.
So I wonder if p1gl3t's code is ready to use and is able to give the system privilegies. It seems it should be compiled together with AOSP codebase. But I'm unsure if it would work well when I get it compiled.
Checked your links. There I see that the presence of root is required. But I can't gain root so can't use those tools.

dadreamer said:
Well, that's true but not for my device I still have a slightly outdated smartphone. It is Docomo Fujitsu Arrows NX F-01F [ Android 4.4.2, build # V10R22A (kernel version 3.4.0), ARMv7 arch (armv7l, armeabi-v7a) ]. And it's got no public firmwares at all, no bootloader unlock and no root in easy ways. Besides of that, there's one "pleasant" addition - PXN (Privilege Execute-Never), which doesn't let me to root the phone with simple ways or common tools.
To bypass PXN I have to use some JOP approach but for it I need to get boot.img or kernel memory dump somehow. Because I have no factory ROMs I'm trying to pull out boot.img through known vulnerabilities of my dev. One of them is CVE-2015-1474 (GraphicBuffer integer overflow), which potentially might give me system privilegies to copy boot.img from that phone.
So I wonder if p1gl3t's code is ready to use and is able to give the system privilegies. It seems it should be compiled together with AOSP codebase. But I'm unsure if it would work well when I get it compiled.
Checked your links. There I see that the presence of root is required. But I can't gain root so can't use those tools.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Have not seen @p1gl3t on this thread/forum in awhile; not sure if s/he is still active on XDA. Might try a PM. Given the age and, err, uniqueness of device in question I suspect you're in for quite a ride. Good luck.

Well, I have compiled that badscreencap by p1gl3t along with android 4.4.2 codebase and then pushed it to my dev. But whenever I run it I receive segfault:
Code:
[email protected]:/data/local/tmp $ ./badscreencap
pid 24824
display.update ret 0
IGraphicBufferConsumer::consumerDisconnect 0x18
BBinder::onTransact 0x40
BnGraphicBufferProducer::onTransact 0x34
BBinder::onTransact 0x40
BnGraphicBufferProducer::onTransact 0x34
BBinder::onTransact 0xb6889759
BnGraphicBufferProducer::onTransact 0xb6889391
BBinder::onTransact = 0xb6899048
*BBinder::onTransact = 0xb6889759
BBinder::onTransact = 0xb7b912b0
*BBinder::onTransact = 0xb6889759
--------
f1 04 00 ff f7 18 be 38 b5 04 46 0d 46 11 b1 08 46 f6 f7 50
--------
[1] + Stopped (signal) ./badscreencap
When I issue any one command after that I get
Code:
[email protected]:/data/local/tmp $
[1] + Segmentation fault ./badscreencap (core dumped)
Of course, no any signs of system privileges for my id. Checked this with logcat and it has got the following trace:
F/libc (24824): Fatal signal 11 (SIGSEGV) at 0x00000004 (code=1), thread 24824 (badscreencap)
D/wpa_supplicant(10784): wlan0: Control interface command 'SIGNAL_POLL'
D/wpa_supplicant(10784): signal_poll nl80211_signal_poll:10508 rssi:[-47]
D/wpa_supplicant(10784): nl80211: survey data missing!
D/wpa_supplicant(10784): wlan0: Control interface command 'PKTCNT_POLL'
I/DEBUG ( 266): *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
I/DEBUG ( 266): Build fingerprint: 'DOCOMO/F01F/F01F:4.4.2/V10R22A/F01F.20150107.043237:user/release-keys'
I/DEBUG ( 266): Revision: '37'
I/DEBUG ( 266): pid: 24824, tid: 24824, name: badscreencap >>> ./badscreencap <<<
I/DEBUG ( 266): signal 11 (SIGSEGV), code 1 (SEGV_MAPERR), fault addr 00000004
W/NativeCrashListener( 1119): Couldn't find ProcessRecord for pid 24824
I/DEBUG ( 266): r0 00000004 r1 beca97ac r2 b6f6f82c r3 00000004
I/DEBUG ( 266): AM write failure (32 / Broken pipe)
I/DEBUG ( 266): r4 00000000 r5 b7b8eee8 r6 b688b285 r7 00000000
I/DEBUG ( 266): r8 beca97e4 r9 00000000 sl beca99d8 fp beca98ac
I/DEBUG ( 266): ip b6ec1f38 sp beca9780 lr b6eba0d5 pc b6ee9b5c cpsr 000b0010
I/DEBUG ( 266): d0 0000000000000000 d1 0000000000000000
I/DEBUG ( 266): d2 0000000000000000 d3 0000000000000000
I/DEBUG ( 266): d4 0000000000000000 d5 0000000000000000
I/DEBUG ( 266): d6 0000000000000000 d7 3849498000000000
I/DEBUG ( 266): d8 0000000000000000 d9 0000000000000000
I/DEBUG ( 266): d10 0000000000000000 d11 0000000000000000
I/DEBUG ( 266): d12 0000000000000000 d13 0000000000000000
I/DEBUG ( 266): d14 0000000000000000 d15 0000000000000000
I/DEBUG ( 266): d16 7265646e6942422a d17 6e6172546e6f3a3a
I/DEBUG ( 266): d18 b6e8d399b6e8d4af d19 b6e8d07fb6e8d377
I/DEBUG ( 266): d20 b68827d1b6e8d071 d21 b6889759b68827f3
I/DEBUG ( 266): d22 0000000000000000 d23 0000000000000000
I/DEBUG ( 266): d24 0000000000000000 d25 0000000000000000
I/DEBUG ( 266): d26 0000000000000000 d27 0000000000000000
I/DEBUG ( 266): d28 0000000000000000 d29 0000000000000000
I/DEBUG ( 266): d30 0000000000000000 d31 0000000000000000
I/DEBUG ( 266): scr 00000010
I/DEBUG ( 266):
I/DEBUG ( 266): backtrace:
I/DEBUG ( 266): #00 pc 00003b5c /system/lib/libcutils.so (android_atomic_inc+8)
I/DEBUG ( 266): #01 pc 0000d0d1 /system/lib/libutils.so (android::RefBase::incStrong(void const*) const+6)
I/DEBUG ( 266): #02 pc 0002a3b5 /system/lib/libgui.so (android::sp<android::IBinder>::sp(android::sp<android::IBinder> const&)+20)
I/DEBUG ( 266): #03 pc 0003494f /system/lib/libgui.so (android::ScreenshotClient::update(android::sp<android::IBinder> const&, unsigned int, unsigned int, unsigned int, unsigned int)+78)
I/DEBUG ( 266): #04 pc 000349c1 /system/lib/libgui.so (android::ScreenshotClient::update(android::sp<android::IBinder> const&)+14)
I/DEBUG ( 266): #05 pc 00005de1 /data/local/tmp/badscreencap
I/DEBUG ( 266): #06 pc 0000e5a3 /system/lib/libc.so (__libc_init+50)
I/DEBUG ( 266): #07 pc 00005590 /data/local/tmp/badscreencap
I/DEBUG ( 266):
I/DEBUG ( 266): stack:
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca9740 00000000
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca9744 b6885b8b /system/lib/libgui.so (android::CpuConsumer::releaseAcquiredBufferLocked(int)+150)
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca9748 00000000
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca974c b68a0154 /system/lib/libgui.so
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca9750 b6f6e268 /data/local/tmp/badscreencap
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca9754 b7b900f0 [heap]
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca9758 b7b8fc40 [heap]
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca975c b7b8fc40 [heap]
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca9760 0000000c
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca9764 b6f6e268 /data/local/tmp/badscreencap
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca9768 b7b8fc40 [heap]
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca976c 00000000
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca9770 b6f6e268 /data/local/tmp/badscreencap
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca9774 b6885c09 /system/lib/libgui.so (android::CpuConsumer::unlockBuffer(android::CpuConsumer::LockedBuffer const&)+92)
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca9778 b7b8fc40 [heap]
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca977c beca9808 [stack]
I/DEBUG ( 266): #00 beca9780 beca97ac [stack]
I/DEBUG ( 266): ........ ........
I/DEBUG ( 266): #01 beca9780 beca97ac [stack]
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca9784 b68853b9 /system/lib/libgui.so (android::sp<android::IBinder>::sp(android::sp<android::IBinder> const&)+24)
I/DEBUG ( 266): #02 beca9788 beca9800 [stack]
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca978c b688f953 /system/lib/libgui.so (android::ScreenshotClient::update(android::sp<android::IBinder> const&, unsigned int, unsigned int, unsigned int, unsigned int)+82)
I/DEBUG ( 266):
I/DEBUG ( 266): memory near r1:
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca978c b688f953 b6f4b334 00000002 b7b8f0e0
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca979c 00000000 b6f3d1d8 b7b8eee8 b7b8fc40
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca97ac b7b8f0e0 b6f6e08f 00000000 b7b91270
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca97bc b6f6e268 b7b8f0e0 b6f6e24e b6899008
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca97cc b688f9c5 00000000 ffffffff 00000000
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca97dc b6f6dde5 00000000 b7b8f0a0 00000018
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca97ec 00000001 00000040 00000001 00000034
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca97fc 00000001 b7b8fc40 b7b8f0e0 00000000
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca980c 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca981c 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca982c 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca983c 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca984c 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca985c beca98b4 beca98b4 beca98bc 00000001
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca986c b6f3cfd8 b6f6db95 00000000 00000000
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca987c b6f015a5 00000000 00000000 00000000
I/DEBUG ( 266):
I/DEBUG ( 266): memory near r2:
I/DEBUG ( 266): b6f6f80c b6f6f9d0 b6f6f8ac b6f6f8fc b6f6f958
I/DEBUG ( 266): b6f6f81c b6f6f9a8 0000058c 00000000 00000000
I/DEBUG ( 266): b6f6f82c b6f6d769 b6f6d7e1 b6f6d5eb b6f6d5f9
I/DEBUG ( 266): b6f6f83c b6f6d899 b6883bd5 b6883ce9 b68843d1
I/DEBUG ( 266): b6f6f84c b6882dd5 b68828f1 b68829e9 b6883a59
I/DEBUG ( 266): b6f6f85c b6f6d8f5 b6889391 b6881f99 b6884cf1
I/DEBUG ( 266): b6f6f86c b6884ac9 b688372d b68839b9 b6884fb9
I/DEBUG ( 266): b6f6f87c b68822a9 b6882889 b68826f5 b6882679
I/DEBUG ( 266): b6f6f88c b6882383 b6882359 b688232f b6882305
I/DEBUG ( 266): b6f6f89c b688241d 00000588 fffffffc 00000000
I/DEBUG ( 266): b6f6f8ac b6f6d92d b6f6d5fd b6e8d075 b6e8d071
I/DEBUG ( 266): b6f6f8bc b6e8d071 b6e8d1e9 b6e8d079 b6e8d079
I/DEBUG ( 266): b6f6f8cc b6e8d071 b6e8d4af b6e8d399 b6e8d377
I/DEBUG ( 266): b6f6f8dc b6e8d07f b6e8d071 b6f6d7cf b6f6d805
I/DEBUG ( 266): b6f6f8ec b6889759 0000057c fffffff0 00000000
I/DEBUG ( 266): b6f6f8fc b6f6d7c9 b6f6d7ff b6f6d5eb b6884fb1
I/DEBUG ( 266):
I/DEBUG ( 266): memory near r5:
I/DEBUG ( 266): b7b8eec8 b7b8eed0 0000001b 00000001 00000001
I/DEBUG ( 266): b7b8eed8 b7b8eec4 00000001 00000000 00000023
I/DEBUG ( 266): b7b8eee8 b689d17c b689d1d0 b7b8ef88 b7b8efc8
I/DEBUG ( 266): b7b8eef8 00000001 b689d200 b7b8ef08 0000001b
I/DEBUG ( 266): b7b8ef08 00000002 00000002 b7b8eefc 00000001
I/DEBUG ( 266): b7b8ef18 006e0061 0000001b b689e97c b7b8e408
I/DEBUG ( 266): b7b8ef28 b689e9a4 b7b8ef38 00660072 0000001b
I/DEBUG ( 266): b7b8ef38 00000001 00000002 b7b8ef28 00000000
I/DEBUG ( 266): b7b8ef48 00000000 0000001b b6e9a888 b7b8eff0
I/DEBUG ( 266): b7b8ef58 00000001 00000000 00000010 00000023
I/DEBUG ( 266): b7b8ef68 00000001 00000001 b7b8f0d4 00000001
I/DEBUG ( 266): b7b8ef78 00000000 00000000 00000020 00000043
I/DEBUG ( 266): b7b8ef88 b6e9a944 00000001 00000000 00000001
I/DEBUG ( 266): b7b8ef98 00000000 b7b8ef50 b6e9a858 00000000
I/DEBUG ( 266): b7b8efa8 00000000 00000000 00000010 00000000
I/DEBUG ( 266): b7b8efb8 b7b8a048 b6e9a9ac b7b8efc8 0000001b
I/DEBUG ( 266):
I/DEBUG ( 266): memory near r6:
I/DEBUG ( 266): b688b264 a81047a0 ea4cf7f4 a8104604 ea4ef7f4
I/DEBUG ( 266): b688b274 f7f4a804 4620ea4c bdf0b01d 00014f3c
I/DEBUG ( 266): b688b284 b09db5f0 a8044604 461f4615 f7f4460e
I/DEBUG ( 266): b688b294 a810ea26 ea22f7f4 a804491c f7f44479
I/DEBUG ( 266): b688b2a4 4631ea24 f7f4a804 a803eada f7f46829
I/DEBUG ( 266): b688b2b4 a903ead0 f7f4a804 a803ead2 fe31f7f5
I/DEBUG ( 266): b688b2c4 a8044639 ea16f7f4 a8049922 ea12f7f4
I/DEBUG ( 266): b688b2d4 a8049923 ea0ef7f4 a8049924 ea0af7f4
I/DEBUG ( 266): b688b2e4 210e68a0 68032200 aa049200 ab10695c
D/wpa_supplicant(10784): wlan0: Control interface command 'SIGNAL_POLL'
I/DEBUG ( 266): b688b2f4 a81047a0 ea04f7f4 a8104604 ea06f7f4
I/DEBUG ( 266): b688b304 f7f4a804 4620ea04 bdf0b01d 00014e94
I/DEBUG ( 266): b688b314 1d05b538 f1004604 f7f4004c 4628ee1e
I/DEBUG ( 266): b688b324 fdfff7f5 f7f54620 4620fdfc b538bd38
I/DEBUG ( 266): b688b334 4615460c 4620e004 f7ff3d01 3460ffe9
I/DEBUG ( 266): b688b344 d1f82d00 0000bd38 b09db530 a8044604
I/DEBUG ( 266): b688b354 f7f4460d a810e9c4 e9c0f7f4 23004925
I/DEBUG ( 266):
I/DEBUG ( 266): memory near r8:
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca97c4 b6f6e24e b6899008 b688f9c5 00000000
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca97d4 ffffffff 00000000 b6f6dde5 00000000
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca97e4 b7b8f0a0 00000018 00000001 00000040
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca97f4 00000001 00000034 00000001 b7b8fc40
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca9804 b7b8f0e0 00000000 00000000 00000000
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca9814 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca9824 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca9834 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca9844 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca9854 00000000 00000000 beca98b4 beca98b4
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca9864 beca98bc 00000001 b6f3cfd8 b6f6db95
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca9874 00000000 00000000 b6f015a5 00000000
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca9884 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca9894 b6f6d594 b6f6f668 b6f6f670 b6f6f678
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca98a4 beca98b0 00000000 b6f57881 00000001
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca98b4 beca99d8 00000000 beca99e7 beca99f8
I/DEBUG ( 266):
I/DEBUG ( 266): memory near sl:
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca99b8 beca99d4 00000000 00000000 5c2cbe0e
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca99c8 6dbb4e08 7c900b9b 76a8a152 006c3776
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca99d8 61622f2e 72637364 636e6565 5f007061
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca99e8 622f2e3d 63736461 6e656572 00706163
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca99f8 48544150 62732f3d 2f3a6e69 646e6576
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca9a08 622f726f 2f3a6e69 74737973 732f6d65
D/wpa_supplicant(10784): signal_poll nl80211_signal_poll:10508 rssi:[-47]
D/wpa_supplicant(10784): nl80211: survey data missing!
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca9a18 3a6e6962 7379732f 2f6d6574 3a6e6962
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca9a28 7379732f 2f6d6574 6e696278 4f4f4c00
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca9a38 4f4d5f50 50544e55 544e494f 6e6d2f3d
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca9a48 626f2f74 4e410062 494f5244 4f525f44
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca9a58 2f3d544f 74737973 56006d65 5f454249
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca9a68 45504950 5441505f 642f3d48 702f7665
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca9a78 73657069 45485300 2f3d4c4c 74737973
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca9a88 622f6d65 732f6e69 4e410068 494f5244
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca9a98 41445f44 2f3d4154 61746164 444e4100
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca9aa8 44494f52 5353415f 3d535445 7379732f
I/DEBUG ( 266):
I/DEBUG ( 266): memory near fp:
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca988c 00000000 00000000 b6f6d594 b6f6f668
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca989c b6f6f670 b6f6f678 beca98b0 00000000
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca98ac b6f57881 00000001 beca99d8 00000000
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca98bc beca99e7 beca99f8 beca9a35 beca9a4e
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca98cc beca9a63 beca9a7d beca9a92 beca9aa5
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca98dc beca9ac0 beca9acb beca9af4 beca9b13
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca98ec beca9b26 beca9b34 beca9b5c beca9e57
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca98fc beca9e83 beca9e9a beca9ebf beca9ee9
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca990c beca9f02 beca9f16 beca9f3d beca9f67
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca991c beca9f8d beca9f9a beca9fb4 beca9fd7
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca992c beca9fe2 00000000 00000010 0007b0d7
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca993c 00000006 00001000 00000011 00000064
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca994c 00000003 b6f68034 00000004 00000020
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca995c 00000005 00000008 00000007 b6f56000
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca996c 00000008 00000000 00000009 b6f6d530
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca997c 0000000b 000007d0 0000000c 000007d0
I/DEBUG ( 266):
I/DEBUG ( 266): memory near ip:
I/DEBUG ( 266): b6ec1f18 b6f1e845 b6f052ef b6f05357 b6f196c1
I/DEBUG ( 266): b6ec1f28 b6f15749 b6f1542c b6f1cb11 b6f1e239
I/DEBUG ( 266): b6ec1f38 b6ee9b54 b6ee9b34 b6ee9b74 b6ee9b0c
I/DEBUG ( 266): b6ec1f48 b6ee9bb8 b6f00de1 b6f2d62f b6f164dd
I/DEBUG ( 266): b6ec1f58 b6f1ba3d b6f1e7b9 b6f2d3bb b6f167db
I/DEBUG ( 266): b6ec1f68 b6f20c55 b6f135e4 b6f20035 b6f05f01
I/DEBUG ( 266): b6ec1f78 b6f05f29 b6f05f71 b6f003d0 b6f05f1b
I/DEBUG ( 266): b6ec1f88 b6f01b38 b6f01a34 b6f13468 b6f13348
I/DEBUG ( 266): b6ec1f98 b6eeb151 b6f06279 b6f13180 b6f1fec3
I/DEBUG ( 266): b6ec1fa8 b6f01810 b6f01f44 b6f02190 b6f0227c
I/DEBUG ( 266): b6ec1fb8 b6f01f84 b6f01ec0 b6f01fa0 b6f140ec
I/DEBUG ( 266): b6ec1fc8 b6ede927 b6f13d10 b6ede919 b6f13510
I/DEBUG ( 266): b6ec1fd8 b6f0086c b6f021ec b6f00ab8 b6f00ad8
I/DEBUG ( 266): b6ec1fe8 b6f13530 b6f14964 b6f14984 b6f138b4
I/DEBUG ( 266): b6ec1ff8 b6f1f0f9 b6f14944 b6ec2000 ffffffff
I/DEBUG ( 266): b6ec2008 00000001 ffffffff b6ebb42d 00000000
I/DEBUG ( 266):
I/DEBUG ( 266): memory near sp:
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca9760 0000000c b6f6e268 b7b8fc40 00000000
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca9770 b6f6e268 b6885c09 b7b8fc40 beca9808
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca9780 beca97ac b68853b9 beca9800 b688f953
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca9790 b6f4b334 00000002 b7b8f0e0 00000000
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca97a0 b6f3d1d8 b7b8eee8 b7b8fc40 b7b8f0e0
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca97b0 b6f6e08f 00000000 b7b91270 b6f6e268
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca97c0 b7b8f0e0 b6f6e24e b6899008 b688f9c5
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca97d0 00000000 ffffffff 00000000 b6f6dde5
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca97e0 00000000 b7b8f0a0 00000018 00000001
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca97f0 00000040 00000001 00000034 00000001
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca9800 b7b8fc40 b7b8f0e0 00000000 00000000
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca9810 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca9820 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca9830 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca9840 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
I/DEBUG ( 266): beca9850 00000000 00000000 00000000 beca98b4
I/DEBUG ( 266):
I/DEBUG ( 266): code around pc:
I/DEBUG ( 266): b6ee9b3c e1910f9f e080c003 e1812f9c e3520000
I/DEBUG ( 266): b6ee9b4c 1afffffa e12fff1e e1a03000 f57ff05f
I/DEBUG ( 266): b6ee9b5c e1930f9f e2801001 e1832f91 e3520000
I/DEBUG ( 266): b6ee9b6c 1afffffa e12fff1e e1a03000 f57ff05f
I/DEBUG ( 266): b6ee9b7c e3e02000 e1930f9f e080c002 e1831f9c
I/DEBUG ( 266): b6ee9b8c e3510000 1afffffa e12fff1e e1a03000
I/DEBUG ( 266): b6ee9b9c f57ff05f e1910f9f e000c003 e1812f9c
I/DEBUG ( 266): b6ee9bac e3520000 1afffffa e12fff1e e1a03000
I/DEBUG ( 266): b6ee9bbc f57ff05f e1910f9f e180c003 e1812f9c
I/DEBUG ( 266): b6ee9bcc e3520000 1afffffa e12fff1e 6883b508
I/DEBUG ( 266): b6ee9bdc 47984608 2140ea6f ea801840 eb023290
I/DEBUG ( 266): b6ee9bec ea831302 bd082093 2203b5f8 46046943
I/DEBUG ( 266): b6ee9bfc 43726846 0f92ebb3 0076d923 46302104
I/DEBUG ( 266): b6ee9c0c ebe4f7ff b1e04605 1e772200 6821e011
I/DEBUG ( 266): b6ee9c1c 3022f851 6858e00a e00cf8d3 0c00ea07
I/DEBUG ( 266): b6ee9c2c 102cf855 f84560d9 4673302c d1f22b00
I/DEBUG ( 266):
I/DEBUG ( 266): code around lr:
I/DEBUG ( 266): b6eba0b4 000078c4 4604b510 ffe2f7ff f7fd4620
I/DEBUG ( 266): b6eba0c4 4620e918 b510bd10 1d206844 ea2af7fd
I/DEBUG ( 266): b6eba0d4 f7fd4620 f1b0ea28 d1085f80 f04f4621
I/DEBUG ( 266): b6eba0e4 f7fd4070 68a0ea26 68996803 bd104788
I/DEBUG ( 266): b6eba0f4 6844b510 f7fd1d20 4620ea16 ea12f7fd
I/DEBUG ( 266): b6eba104 f1b0b138 d1085f80 4070f04f f7fd4621
I/DEBUG ( 266): b6eba114 68a0ea10 68996803 bd104788 68186843
I/DEBUG ( 266): b6eba124 30044770 beb4f003 4604b538 460d3004
I/DEBUG ( 266): b6eba134 ea04f7fd d1192801 07d968e3 6823d409
I/DEBUG ( 266): b6eba144 5f80f1b3 e00cd100 e8bd4620 f0034038
I/DEBUG ( 266): b6eba154 68a0bea7 694a6801 47904629 07c268e0
I/DEBUG ( 266): b6eba164 68a0d504 6801b110 4790684a b570bd38
I/DEBUG ( 266): b6eba174 68444605 4620460e e9e0f7fd d10b2801
I/DEBUG ( 266): b6eba184 463168a0 68da6803 68e04790 d40307c0
I/DEBUG ( 266): b6eba194 46286829 4798684b 46314620 4070e8bd
I/DEBUG ( 266): b6eba1a4 bfc2f7ff 4604b570 460e3004 e9baf7fd
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Besides of the crash it seems to be incomplete because the code lacks any final ways of gaining elevated privileges (payload w/ reverse shell or something like that).
I assume it all makes no sense due to the loss of relevance for others. So I'll turn my attention to another CVE's out there. This could be the most elegant and shortest way of getting system though.

dadreamer said:
Well, I have compiled that badscreencap by p1gl3t along with android 4.4.2 codebase and then pushed it to my dev. But whenever I run it I receive segfault:
When I issue any one command after that I get
Of course, no any signs of system privileges for my id. Checked this with logcat and it has got the following trace:
Besides of the crash it seems to be incomplete because the code lacks any final ways of gaining elevated privileges (payload w/ reverse shell or something like that).
I assume it all makes no sense due to the loss of relevance for others. So I'll turn my attention to another CVE's out there. This could be the most elegant and shortest way of getting system though.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Is your goal to gain root on FireOS v3/v4/5 or are you experimenting with this for other reasons? If the former there are far easier methods (FireOS version dependent) of achieving this; even a theoretical way to unlock the bootloader sans root.

[Completed] RILD crash while Integrating ZTE 3G modem for Custom board with Android

Hello all,
We have ported Android 4.4 (kitkat) version on a custom board with iMX6 processor and are successful in getting Android running on the custom board. Now, when tried to add support for 3G modem provided by ZTE, the rild daemon is crashing continuously there disabling the complete telephony.
Android service for rild in init.rc file is as below
service ril-daemon /system/bin/rild -l /system/lib/libreference-ril.so -- -d /dev/ttyUSB2
class main
socket rild stream 660 root radio
socket rild-debug stream 660 radio system
user root
group radio cache inet misc audio
The sockets are getting created with the specified permissions as specified in the init.rc but unfortunately rild daemon is crashing throwing segmentation fault (SIGSEGV). The core dump of the crash
F/libc ( 2810): Fatal signal 11 (SIGSEGV) at 0x0000000c (code=1), thread 2821 (rild)
I/DEBUG ( 2387): *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
I/DEBUG ( 2387): Build fingerprint: 'HKI/indus_1012/i1012:4.4.2/1.0.0-rc3/20140630:user/dev-keys'
I/DEBUG ( 2387): Revision: '405525'
I/DEBUG ( 2387): pid: 2810, tid: 2821, name: rild >>> /system/bin/rild <<<
I/DEBUG ( 2387): signal 11 (SIGSEGV), code 1 (SEGV_MAPERR), fault addr 0000000c
I/DEBUG ( 2387): r0 0000000c r1 00000000 r2 00000011 r3 00000000
I/DEBUG ( 2387): r4 0000000c r5 00000000 r6 00000000 r7 4021909c
I/DEBUG ( 2387): r8 40219157 r9 4021d02c sl 402190fc fp 4021d028
I/DEBUG ( 2387): ip 4021cf00 sp 405f7cd8 lr 4015315d pc 4014f708 cpsr 200d0010
I/DEBUG ( 2387): d0 0000000000000000 d1 0000000000000000
I/DEBUG ( 2387): d2 0000000000000000 d3 0000000000000000
I/DEBUG ( 2387): d4 0000000000000000 d5 0000000000000000
I/DEBUG ( 2387): d6 0000000000000000 d7 0243d58000000000
I/DEBUG ( 2387): d8 0000000000000000 d9 0000000000000000
I/DEBUG ( 2387): d10 0000000000000000 d11 0000000000000000
I/DEBUG ( 2387): d12 0000000000000000 d13 0000000000000000
I/DEBUG ( 2387): d14 0000000000000000 d15 0000000000000000
I/DEBUG ( 2387): d16 41826b235ab851ec d17 3f50624dd2f1a9fc
I/DEBUG ( 2387): d18 41c2ab23a6000000 d19 0000000000000000
I/DEBUG ( 2387): d20 0000000000000000 d21 0000000000000000
I/DEBUG ( 2387): d22 0000000000000000 d23 0000000000000000
I/DEBUG ( 2387): d24 0000000000000000 d25 0000000000000000
I/DEBUG ( 2387): d26 0000000000000000 d27 0000000000000000
I/DEBUG ( 2387): d28 0000000000000000 d29 0000000000000000
I/DEBUG ( 2387): d30 0000000000000000 d31 0000000000000000
I/DEBUG ( 2387): scr 00000010
I/DEBUG ( 2387):
I/DEBUG ( 2387): backtrace:
I/DEBUG ( 2387): #00 pc 0000e708 /system/lib/libc.so
I/DEBUG ( 2387): #01 pc 00012159 /system/lib/libc.so (readdir+10)
I/DEBUG ( 2387): #02 pc 000026fd /system/lib/libreference-ril-mw3820.so
I/DEBUG ( 2387): #03 pc 00004069 /system/lib/libreference-ril-mw3820.so
I/DEBUG ( 2387): #04 pc 0000d248 /system/lib/libc.so (__thread_entry+72)
I/DEBUG ( 2387): #05 pc 0000d3e0 /system/lib/libc.so (pthread_create+240)
I/DEBUG ( 2387):
I/DEBUG ( 2387): stack:
I/DEBUG ( 2387): 405f7c98 00000000
I/DEBUG ( 2387): 405f7c9c 00000000
I/DEBUG ( 2387): 405f7ca0 00000000
I/DEBUG ( 2387): 405f7ca4 00000000
I/DEBUG ( 2387): 405f7ca8 00000000
libc.so is not getting loaded but libc.so and libreference-ril-mw3820.so are all available in the system/lib folder. and the contents of system.prop is
rild.libpath=/system/lib/libreference-ril-mw3820.so
rild.libargs=-d /dev/ttyUSB2
but still the above crash persists. Any help on this would be of great help.

Hello and thank you for using XDA Assist.
XDA Assist is for new users to receive guidance on how to navigate through XDA to find the information they seek.
It does not sound like you are an inexperienced user. Your best bet is to ask in the specific device forum or the main Android Q&A section.
We here at XDA Assist will never give you a technical answer.
Good Luck
Ragnar
EDIT 2DAYS NO REPLY. THREAD CLOSED.

Recent Broadcom driver for >4.4.4 ROMs

Said ahead, I would have posted this in http://forum.xda-developers.com/galaxy-s2-plus/orig-development/rom-cyanogenmod-12-1-t3084287 where it belonged, since the bug was reproduced on that ROM, if it wasn't for that stupid "You must spam 10 times before you may properly report bugs" setting on this forum.
There appears to be some crashes in Chromium in >4.4.4 ROMs, related to this:
https://code.google.com/p/chromium/...er_bug_list_json.cc&sq=package:chromium&l=913
These crashes can be triggered by aggressive scrolling in either Chromium itself or any application utilizing libwebviewchromium.so. It will produce something along the lines of:
Code:
E/chromium( 4906): [ERROR:gl_renderer.cc(466)] Reached limit of pending sync queries.
--- snip, several repetions ---
E/chromium( 4906): [ERROR:gl_renderer.cc(466)] Reached limit of pending sync queries.
E/chromium( 4906): [ERROR:gl_fence_egl.cc(34)] Failed to get EGLSync attribute. error code:12300
E/chromium( 4906): [ERROR:gl_fence_egl.cc(50)] Failed to wait for EGLSync. error:EGL_BAD_PARAMETER
F/chromium( 4906): [FATAL:gl_fence_egl.cc(52)] Check failed: g_ignore_egl_sync_failures.
W/google-breakpad( 5032): -----BEGIN BREAKPAD MICRODUMP-----
W/google-breakpad( 5032): V WebView:45.0.2454.95
--- snip ---
F/libc ( 4906): Fatal signal 6 (SIGABRT), code -6 in tid 4961 (RenderThread)
I/DEBUG ( 146): property debug.db.uid not set; NOT waiting for gdb.
I/DEBUG ( 146): HINT: adb shell setprop debug.db.uid 100000
I/DEBUG ( 146): HINT: adb forward tcp:5039 tcp:5039
I/DEBUG ( 146): *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
I/DEBUG ( 146): Build fingerprint: 'samsung/s2vepxx/s2vep:4.2.2/JDQ39/I9105PXXUBNG1:user/release-keys'
I/DEBUG ( 146): Revision: '5'
I/DEBUG ( 146): ABI: 'arm'
I/DEBUG ( 146): pid: 4906, tid: 4961, name: RenderThread >>> com.google.android.gm <<<
I/DEBUG ( 146): signal 6 (SIGABRT), code -6 (SI_TKILL), fault addr --------
I/DEBUG ( 146): Abort message: '[FATAL:gl_fence_egl.cc(52)] Check failed: g_ignore_egl_sync_failures.
I/DEBUG ( 146): '
I/DEBUG ( 146): r0 00000000 r1 00001361 r2 00000006 r3 00000000
I/DEBUG ( 146): r4 52ea8dd8 r5 00000006 r6 00000016 r7 0000010c
I/DEBUG ( 146): r8 402c4de4 r9 52ea7ff4 sl 00000000 fp 000001eb
I/DEBUG ( 146): ip 00001361 sp 52ea7b48 lr 40280c59 pc 402a67fc cpsr 600f0010
I/DEBUG ( 146):
I/DEBUG ( 146): backtrace:
I/DEBUG ( 146): #00 pc 000397fc /system/lib/libc.so (tgkill+12)
I/DEBUG ( 146): #01 pc 00013c55 /system/lib/libc.so (pthread_kill+52)
I/DEBUG ( 146): #02 pc 000149b3 /system/lib/libc.so (raise+10)
I/DEBUG ( 146): #03 pc 000110ed /system/lib/libc.so (__libc_android_abort+36)
I/DEBUG ( 146): #04 pc 0000f5cc /system/lib/libc.so (abort+4)
I/DEBUG ( 146): #05 pc 002b8bf9 /data/app/com.google.android.webview-1/lib/arm/libwebviewchromium.so
The "EGL_KHR_fence_sync" EGL extension is supposed to be fixed in all Broadcom based devices shipping with Android >4.4.4. Obviously this isn't the case with this platform, as the driver fix got never backported.
There is no point in reporting this upstream to the Chromium team. So .... what to do?
EDIT:
OK....
The broken extension is announced in /vendor/lib/egl/libGLES_vc4.so @0x6F78A-0x6F79C
Somebody is probably going to smack me for suggesting to fiddle around in binary content, but it looks like the sanest approach to fix the bug.
Copy 0x1F bytes from (src start) 0x6F79D to (dest start) 0x6F78A (beware of overlap when performing the copy)
Set 0x13 bytes to 0x00 at (start) 0x6F7A9
That removes the extension from the string, moves the trailing extension list forward, and fills the resulting gap with null bytes in order not to break alignment.
The extension isn't mandatory, the existing implementation is broken, so let's just get rid of that thing.
Change is not tested yet. Someone feel like trying?
EDIT2:
That thing isn't as easy to deactivate as I expected. And it turns out, it actually is a mandatory feature in EGL 1.5 ...
But if the driver isn't announcing it any longer, who is then? Broken software emulation as well?
Next step: Patching it out of libwebviewchromium.so, getting that Android <=4.4.4 workaround back in.
EDIT3:
Meh, too much work for me. Then it's back to <=4..4.4 for me. May someone else try to work around that bug.

Can someone tell me what file from system/libs or any other folder is causing this error on my custom ROM

I'm not able to play videos on google without it glitching out, I just think it's an open GL error but im not rly sure, does someone knows about this?
Process: com.spotify.music
Flags: 0x38d83e44
Package: com.spotify.music v85204766 (8.7.18.1138)
Foreground: Yes
Build: 'BLU/xxx/xxx:7.1.2/xxxx/xxx:userdebug/release-keys'
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
Cardinal-AOSP Version: '4.5'
Build fingerprint: 'BLU/xxx/xxx:7.1.2/xxxx/xxx:userdebug/release-keys'
Revision: '0'
ABI: 'arm'
pid: 5099, tid: 5220, name: RenderThread >>> com.spotify.music <<<
signal 6 (SIGABRT), code -6 (SI_TKILL), fault addr --------
Abort message: 'GL errors! frameworks/base/libs/hwui/renderthread/CanvasContext.cpp:550'
r0 00000000 r1 00001464 r2 00000006 r3 00000008
r4 8f5f0978 r5 00000006 r6 8f5f0920 r7 0000010c
r8 94ae0b80 r9 00000000 sl 973882fc fp 973882f8
ip 00000000 sp 8f5eff38 lr b4384ec7 pc b4387748 cpsr 20070010
backtrace:
#00 pc 0004a748 /system/lib/libc.so (tgkill+12)
#01 pc 00047ec3 /system/lib/libc.so (pthread_kill+34)
#02 pc 0001d6f5 /system/lib/libc.so (raise+10)
#03 pc 00019241 /system/lib/libc.so (__libc_android_abort+34)
#04 pc 000171f8 /system/lib/libc.so (abort+4)
#05 pc 0000c1dd /system/lib/libcutils.so (__android_log_assert+112)
#06 pc 00024077 /system/lib/libhwui.so
#07 pc 00025a73 /system/lib/libhwui.so
#08 pc 00029035 /system/lib/libhwui.so (_ZN7android10uirenderer12renderthread12RenderThread10threadLoopEv+80)
#09 pc 0000e3fd /system/lib/libutils.so (_ZN7android6Thread11_threadLoopEPv+140)
#10 pc 00066c11 /system/lib/libandroid_runtime.so (_ZN7android14AndroidRuntime15javaThreadShellEPv+80)
#11 pc 00047993 /system/lib/libc.so (_ZL15__pthread_startPv+22)
#12 pc 00019c8d /system/lib/libc.so (__start_thread+6)