I'm stuck. I am building a custom Settings.apk for a new tablet and I've run across an error I can't find.
Any dialog that displays a SeekBar or variation simply FC's with a null pointer exception. I have a reference source tree that is a virgin copy from the android git. If I compile the stock Settings.apk, it does the same thing at the same places as my custom version.
The error occurs in the BrightnessPreference.java and the RingerVolumePreference.java files any time the dialog containing a SeekBar or Volumizer tries to display.
Here's an example of the code:
protected void onBindDialogView(View view) {
super.onBindDialogView(view);
mSeekBar = getSeekBar(view);
mSeekBar.setMax(MAXIMUM_BACKLIGHT - mMinBrightness); <-- errors here
It errors at setMax with a null pointer error, like the setMax method doesn't exist. My build environment seems fine. Everything I've built runs on the target devices, but this one has me stumped. Has anyone else tried building a Settings.apk lately, and does it display the volume (in sound) and brightness (in Display) dialogs?
BTW, the target is Froyo
Thanks,
--- Jem
Are you sure the mMinBrightness variable is defined? BrightnessPreference.java as shown here instead uses MINIMUM_BACKLIGHT and is defined as:
Code:
private static final int MINIMUM_BACKLIGHT = android.os.Power.BRIGHTNESS_DIM + 10;
It is then used to set the seekbar max:
Code:
mSeekBar.setMax(MAXIMUM_BACKLIGHT - MINIMUM_BACKLIGHT);
You can also look at the onBindDialogView in RingerVolumePreference.java here. If you want to check whether the java files change from the version I linked(2.2.1 Froyo), just use the arrows on either side of the currently listed version.
I appreciate the response. Yes it is defined and initialized earlier as referenced below.
=== Code ===
private int mMinBrightness;
private boolean mAutomaticAvailable;
// Backlight range is from 0 - 255. Need to make sure that user
// doesn't set the backlight to 0 and get stuck
private static final int MINIMUM_BACKLIGHT = android.os.Power.BRIGHTNESS_DIM + 10;
private static final int MAXIMUM_BACKLIGHT = android.os.Power.BRIGHTNESS_ON;
public BrightnessPreference(Context context, AttributeSet attrs) {
super(context, attrs);
mAutomaticAvailable = context.getResources().getBoolean(
com.android.internal.R.bool.config_automatic_brightness_available);
setDialogLayoutResource(R.layout.preference_dialog_brightness);
setDialogIcon(R.drawable.ic_settings_display);
mMinBrightness = MINIMUM_BACKLIGHT;
if (Settings.System.getInt(context.getContentResolver(),
Settings.System.LIGHT_SENSOR_CUSTOM, 0) != 0) {
mMinBrightness = Settings.System.getInt(context.getContentResolver(),
Settings.System.LIGHT_SCREEN_DIM, mMinBrightness);
}
}
=== code ===
Thanks,
--- Jem
It might be useful to rule out an issue with mMinBrightness not getting set or getting set incorrectly by either replacing it with MINIMUM_BACKLIGHT in the setMax line or using a toast message to display the value of mMinBrightness before setMax. If that doesn't reveal anything, could you paste the relevant logcat output for the error/fc and also upload your BrightnessPreference.java file somewhere so it could be downloaded.
I saved the dir's with my modified package and blew away the entire repo structure. I then reloaded the official Android tree from kernel.org. I have compiled the Settings.apk app ALL STOCK, and I get the same errors in the brightness and volume areas. A copy of the brightnesspreference.java and a log screenshot of the error tracking can be found at:
mlsoft dot sytes dot net/brightness.zip (I can't post the direct link)
The only change in the error is the line number (same call though).
At this point, I am wondering if anyone can build the Settings.apk from the repo and get it to display a seekbar or variant in brightness or volume settings using 2.2.1 (froyo). I am comfortable at this point thinking that it is in the tree structure and not my build environment. At least I have a place to hunt if you can reproduce the error on your end.
I really appreciate your help.
--- Jem
android:id="@*android
Yeah, same thing happened to me and I found answer.
I hope this might help.
You will find that two xml files using "@*android".
"It gives access to internal resources for platform apps.
It is NOT safe to build apps with such declarations unless you are building a bundled app within a full system image."
- from stackoverflow
"What is the purpose of the star in the ID string?"
Sorry that I can not post URL. I'm new user.
Sorry about not yet having built and tested the Settings.apk on my end but I haven't found the time to do so yet. Your issue could very well be what You Kim posted about and I'm sure I wouldn't have noticed that for awhile if at all. Here's the link to the stack overflow topic You Kim referenced. The two xml files in the Settings package this occurs in are res/layout/preference_dialog_brightness.xml and res/layout/preference_dialog_ringervolume.xml. That part looks like this:
Code:
<!-- In brightness layout -->
<[COLOR="Red"]SeekBar android:id="@*android:id/seekbar"[/COLOR]
android:layout_width="match_parent"
android:layout_height="wrap_content"
android:padding="20dip" />
<!-- In ringervolume layout -->
<!-- Used for the ring volume. This is what the superclass VolumePreference uses. -->
<[COLOR="red"]SeekBar android:id="@*android:id/seekbar"[/COLOR]
android:layout_width="match_parent"
android:layout_height="wrap_content"
android:paddingTop="2dip"
android:paddingLeft="20dip"
android:paddingRight="20dip" />
Thank you both. I have been through those files more than once and didn't notice the declarations. Outstanding work guys. I'm off to edit/recompile/test.
Thanks again,
--- Jem
Unfortunately, these changes didn't stop the null pounter errors. Something, somewhere HAS to be uninitialized, but damned if I can find it in the absseekbar, progressbar, or any other class in the seekbar hierarchy. I even tried setting a value of 255 in setMax to rule out variable problems, but that produces the same error at the same line.
I know there is a fix, Settings works on millions of Android devices, so it has to be something stupid I'm overlooking.
--- Jem
Well, it's almost 3am, but I fixed the problem in the brightness preference. SeekBarPreference handles the getSeekBar function, but it doesn't work as expected.
It assigns a static system res ID that obviously doesn't work as intended. So, I overrode the routine just above the call to onBindDialogView. Here is the routine in the seekbarpreference file:
(at sign)Override
protected static SeekBar getSeekBar(View dialogView) {
return (SeekBar) dialogView.findViewById(com.android.internal.R.id.seekbar);
}
Overridden in the brightnes preference file to this:
(at sign)Override
protected static SeekBar getSeekBar(View dialogView) {
return (SeekBar) dialogView.findViewById(R.id.seekbar);
}
I'll go back and write the original to accept a res ID as an argument later. For now at least the brightness control works. Tomorrow I'll go after the volume controls.
--- Jem
Author: Apriorit (Device Team)
Permanent link: apriorit(dot)com/our-company/dev-blog/62-marshalling-data-in-cf
In many situations when we create applications for different embedded systems or mobile platforms we can’t develop all parts of the product using managed code only.
For example we need several modules written in native language which perform some low level operations or we already have these libraries written on C++. So we have to use more than one programming language in our product and also use data marshaling in it.
In this article we will review some aspects of using data types and ways of using them during marshalling data to and from unmanaged code.
Making your interop calls more efficient
Marshaling is the act of taking data from one environment to another. In the context of .NET marshalling refers to transferring data from the app-domain you are in to somewhere else, outside.
You should remember that such Platform Invoke calls are slower than direct native calls and than regular managed calls. The speed depends on types marshaled between managed and native code, but nevertheless you should avoid using Platform Invoke calls if you have a chance to do this. Also it is recommended to use calls with some amount of transferred data than several “small” Platform Invoke calls.
Bitable types
It is recommended to use simple data types (int, byte, boolean, characters and strings). It makes the call more efficient and helps to avoid any convertions and copying. These blittable types have identical representation in both managed and unmanaged memory. But you should remember that in Compact Framework during marshaling boolean type is represented as 1-byte integer value (instead of 4-byte integer value in the full .NET Framework), character type (char) is always represented as 2-bytes Unicode character and String type is always treated as a Unicode array (in full .NET Framework it may be treated as a Unicode or ANSI array, or a BSTR).
Method Inlining
The JIT compiler can inline some methods in order to make the calls more efficient. You can not force a method to be inlined by the compiler, but you can make it NOT to be inlined. In order to avoid inlining you can:
• make the method virtual;
• add branching to the method’s body;
• define local variables in the method;
• use 2-bit floating point arguments (or return value).
Disabling method inlining can help to detect a problem during Platform Invoke calls.
Sequential layout
In the Compact Framework all structures and classes always have sequential layout (the managed value type has the same memory layout as the unmanaged structure). This behavior can be specified by setting attribute LayoutKind.Sequential. You don’t need to specify this attribute in Compact Framework, but if you use these pieces of code in both full .NET Framework and Compact Framework you have to set it to avoid different behavior on two platforms.
The following sample shows how to send some pointers from C# code for storing them in the native module.
Code C#:
Code:
[StructLayout(LayoutKind.Sequential)]
public class BasePointers // you can use the struct too
{
public IntPtr pointer1;
public IntPtr pointer2;
}
[DllImport("NativeDLL.dll", CallingConvention = CallingConvention.Winapi)]
// Cdecl
public static extern int TransferStruct(BasePointers pointers);
Code C++:
Code:
struct BasePointers
{
unsigned int pointer1;
unsigned int pointer2;
}
extern "C" __declspec(dllexport) int CDECL TransferArray(BasePointers*
pointers);
One Calling Convention
The Calling Convention determines the order in which parameters are passed to the function, and who is responsible for the stack cleaning. The .NET Compact Framework supports only the Winapi value (Cdecl on this platform) of Calling Convention. It defines the calling convention for C and C++ (instead of the full .NET Framework which supports three different calling conventions). To avoid crashes of your application you should make sure that your calling conventions in both managed and native declarations are same.
If you specify the attribute to preserve signature of functions ([PreserveSig]) then the returned value will contain 32-bit HRESULT value that will give you more data to analyze errors during the native function execution. The Calling Convention can be specified by adding the attribute CallingConvention to the declaration of your function. As it was mentioned the .NET Compact Framework supports only “Winapi” Calling Convention that corresponds to Cdecl:
Code C#:
Code:
[UnmanagedFunctionPointer(CallingConvention.Winapi)]
public delegate int ProgressEventHandler(int progressValue);
Code C++:
Code:
typedef void (CDECL *ProgressEventHandler)(int progressValue);
Data Alignment
In some situations we need to transfer data between the managed and unmanaged code in the structures. As it’s written above all structures have sequential layout in the Compact Framework, but you should remember about representation of structs in the managed in unmanaged code. The way of packing structures depends on a platform and on a way how the members of structure are aligned. On ARM platform this value for alignment is four (all values in structures are aligned to 4 bytes).
Code:
typedef struct OurStruct
{
unsigned char valueChar;
usingned int valueInt;
} ourStruct_;
This structure could be perfectly acceptable in desktop code, but if you use such structure on the Windows Mobile platform then you might receive valueInt at the offset 4. If you use such structures in both desktop and device's side code you have to use them carefully during marshaling.
During marshaling data you might receive such errors as “Datatype misalignment” (0x80000002) or “Access violation” (0x80000005). It indicates that you are using wrong pointers or try to access to the wrong offset of data. For example, you transfer array of bytes from C# code to the native module and define you functions as:
C# code:
Code:
[DllImport("NativeDLL.dll", CallingConvention = CallingConvention.Winapi)]
// Cdecl
public static extern int TransferArray(IntPtr src, int srcSize);
C++ Native Module code:
extern "C" __declspec(dllexport) int CDECL TransferArray(byte* srcArr,
int srcSize);
If you try to use the pointer “srcArr” as the pointer on integer (int*) and then try to use the corresponding value you will receive an error :
Code:
int value = *(int*)srcArr; // Datatype misalignment
The simple way to avoid this problem is to change declaration of C++ function and change the pointer on array of bytes to the pointer on array of integer and use it without any problems:
Code:
extern "C" __declspec(dllexport) int CDECL TransferArray(int* srcArr,
int srcSize);
Marshal class
You can use methods in the class Marshal to manually convert managed objects and perform conversions between IntPtrs. These methods are PtrToStructure, GetComInterfaceForObject, PtrToStringBSTR, GetFunctionPointerForDelegate and others. It allows you to control marshaling. These methods are also useful for debugging issues with marshaling parameters where the runtime is not able to convert a particular argument.
You cannot pass delegate directly to the native module as parameter of you function because the .NET Compact Framework does not support marshaling of delegates. Instead you should use method Marshal.GetFunctionPointerForDelegate for getting function pointer which you can pass to the native code and call it.
Code:
Code:
class MainClass
{
[UnmanagedFunctionPointer(CallingConvention.Winapi)]
public delegate int ProgressEventHandler(int progressValue);
...
void OnProgressChanged(int progressValue)
{
...
}
…
…
[DllImport("NativeDLL.dll", CallingConvention = CallingConvention.Winapi)]
// Cdecl
public static extern int SetCallbackFunction(IntPtr functionPointer);
}
// Passing function pointer
Delegate d = new ProgressEventHandler(OnProgressChanged);
IntPtr progressChanged = Marshal.GetFunctionPointerForDelegate(d);
int result = SetCallbackFunction(progressChanged);
But you should be aware of Garbage Collector (GC) in such situation. The GC might collect you delegates and your function pointers will become invalid. It may happen when you passed the function pointer to the native code as callback method in order to call it later - GC might think that there are no references to it in the managed code. To avoid this situation you should keep reference to this delegate. For example, you can store it in the classes variable or create some delegates pool, in which you can keep references to the several delegates.
GCHandle
Since we're passing a pointer to some data we need to allocate memory for that data and make sure that the GC will not remove that memory. One of the possible ways to manage this situation is to use GCHandle.
If you want to pass some class (or array of bytes) to the unmanaged code and you need to pin memory for the proper work with it in the unmanaged code you can write:
Code:
class SampleClass
{
...
}
SampleClass classSample = new SampleClass();
GCHandle classHandle = GCHandle.Alloc(classSample, GCHandleType.Pinned);
IntPtr ptrToClass = classHandle.AddrOfPinnedObject();
int result = PassPtrToUnmanagedCode(ptrToClass); // our function
You can also make an instance of GCHandle as a member of the class to avoid deleting them by GC. Also you should remember that the structure is value-type. And pinning it to the memory will cause a problem, because structure will be copied and GCHandle will handle a reference to created “boxed” copy of the object. It will be hard to find such problem in the future.
Conclusion
During marshaling data you may face with the problems described above. Very often you may get “NotSupportedException” and other exceptions. To find a problem you can enable logging of setting the registry keys. One of the logging components is “Interop ”. The log provides information about Platform Invoke calls and marshaling. You can read MSDN for more information about Creating Log Files.
With the .NET Compact Framework 2.0 you can use Platform Invoke calls in managed application, even though there are a few limitations. You should remember all differences and limitations between full .NET Framework and the Compact Framework to avoid problems in your applications.
If someone could please look this over and help me put an end to this I would be eternally grateful. I am also offering a reward, in BTC or cash or whatever payment you prefer, to whoever can decipher it and give me a rundown of what has been done, and possibly a way to fix it. This is not a troll post and the text file is safe to open. I am literally begging for help, I am not attempting to ruin anybodies ****. Verizon, Suddenlink, and Spectrum have all verified the breach but nobody will give me and details as to exactly what they did to my devices. I will pay anyone that can give me a rundown as I am unabke to decipher wtf is going on. It is just a text file. Please, please help me.
dumpstate
MediaFire is a simple to use free service that lets you put all your photos, documents, music, and video in a single place so you can access them anywhere and share them everywhere.
www.mediafire.com
Lol, that's one attachment I'm not opening.
Try in safe mode. If still misbehaving and you believe it's malware, takes more then an hour or two to fully delete, factory reset (delete Google account before doing so). Backup all critical although this should've already been done.
In running on Android 9 or higher this will purge it.
After factory reset change Google account password (copy it down) and all other sensitive account passwords.
Load no social media apps on the device; they are malware.
Load all 3rd party apps with caution and do not side load unless the app/source are known good.
Try to determine the origin of the infection, likely either an app you installed or a download. Do not repeat the mistake.
blackhawk said:
Lol, that's one attachment I'm not opening.
Try in safe mode. If still misbehaving and you believe it's malware, takes more then an hour or two to fully delete, factory reset (delete Google account before doing so). Backup all critical although this should've already been done.
In running on Android 9 or higher this will purge it.
After factory reset change Google account password (copy it down) and all other sensitive account passwords.
Load no social media apps on the device; they are malware.
Load all 3rd party apps with caution and do not side load unless the app/source are known good.
Try to determine the origin of the infection, likely either an app you installed or a download. Do not repeat the mistake.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
It's much more complicated than that. I had a neighbor living downstairs that acessed my devices and used them for nefarious purposes. The man has known gang connections, and, due to the large amount of DHL packages being dropped on my door step, I believe he may have been using the access he had to my devices to order illegal items. I will try to create a .txt file with the main portion of the code I received so nobody has to unzip it. Just give me a few minutes. You will see some ****ed up ****. Please just take a look when I get it converted.
Also, no amount of reformats will cure the problem as the recovery partition has been deleted. They used some sort of Apache open source files that essentially "clones" the device, giving others access to them without my knowledge. There is currently a federal investigation going on in regards to this but, since nobody will give me any answers, I have to depend of the internet to read the code. I am no coding master, unfortunately. The verizon rep I spoke with did, however, tell me that the breach seemed "personal" and that the perpetrator had access to view, make calls, and send texts without my knowledge. You'll see once I get this text file up.
Reflash the device. Rethink your security and roommates in the future...
Here is the main dumpstate.txt. You won't have to unzip. If there are any other files from the dumpstate, please let me know and I will up them in a non zipped format
blackhawk said:
Lol, that's one attachment I'm not opening.
Try in safe mode. If still misbehaving and you believe it's malware, takes more then an hour or two to fully delete, factory reset (delete Google account before doing so). Backup all critical although this should've already been done.
In running on Android 9 or higher this will purge it.
After factory reset change Google account password (copy it down) and all other sensitive account passwords.
Load no social media apps on the device; they are malware.
Load all 3rd party apps with caution and do not side load unless the app/source are known good.
Try to determine the origin of the infection, likely either an app you installed or a download. Do not repeat the mistake.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
https://www.mediafire.com/file/2x70i1awl23eb91/dumpstate.txt/file please take a look, it is just a .txt file. Nothing to extract
If you do not feel comfortable downloading the .txt, here is a link to the text. It takes forever to load as the file is around 70mb, but all the info is there https://ghostbin.com/ibMHH/xda
blackhawk said:
Reflash the device. Rethink your security and roommates in the future...
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
I have reflashed the device countless times. If you look at the code, the efs/recovery partition has been deleted. I have a friend that's a cop, and he told me they are able to "clone" (his words, not mine) anybodies device rendering them beyond repair. Here is Samsungs response after sending the device in for repairs.
Also, it was not a roommate, it was a man living beneath me that is a known gang member from the Doat/Bailey area in Buffalo. A quick Google search will show countless shootings in the area.
I'm literally begging for help. I promise to pay up to anyone that can help me. I've been dealing with this for almost a year and nobody will do anything to help.
blackhawk said:
Reflash the device. Rethink your security and roommates in the future...
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
It has nothing to do with security. we all know how easy it is to access somebody elses router using Kali.
Thanks everyone, just a quick look at the text file is all i need
Can someone please look at the text file, all of my stuff has been ruined for over a year and I can't code. I am in desperate need of help
jonny_fresh said:
https://www.mediafire.com/file/2x70i1awl23eb91/dumpstate.txt/file please take a look, it is just a .txt file. Nothing to extract
If you do not feel comfortable downloading the .txt, here is a link to the text. It takes forever to load as the file is around 70mb, but all the info is there https://ghostbin.com/ibMHH/xda
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
thats a big a** text file
jonny_fresh said:
I have reflashed the device countless times. If you look at the code, the efs/recovery partition has been deleted. I have a friend that's a cop, and he told me they are able to "clone" (his words, not mine) anybodies device rendering them beyond repair. Here is Samsungs response after sending the device in for repairs.
Also, it was not a roommate, it was a man living beneath me that is a known gang member from the Doat/Bailey area in Buffalo. A quick Google search will show countless shootings in the area.
I'm literally begging for help. I promise to pay up to anyone that can help me. I've been dealing with this for almost a year and nobody will do anything to help.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
You are on Galaxy S9+ with Verizon carrier, yes?
jonny_fresh said:
It has nothing to do with security. we all know how easy it is to access somebody elses router using Kali.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Using Kali does not magically make you a hacker. Download the original firmware and flash it using Odin3. Your phone should work now.
1) toss that phone if you are unable to do a full factory image flash on it. This will reflash the recovery partition So if you still have no recovery after a year then a new phone is a better option for you.
2) cloning a phone is pretty low as far as usefulness to a scammer versus a single malware app installed in system or well hidden in plain sight (internet service(s),network settings name combined with a gear icon and its default click action just opens the settings menu is enough to go unnoticed by most people not looking for it)
3) Get a new phone and if thats still your neighbor move if you cant control your mail access etc.
edit: I went hard off topic so I removed the blah blah blah and simplified my post.
The text file is humungous. I wish I had the ability to read it.
This didn't just happen to one phone, it is all of my computers, multiple phones, laptops, android car radio etc.
I am currently using a Librem mini and it is the only thing that has not been altered.
I believe it has something to do with the processors. A few years back there was a widely reported backdoor in both AMD and Intel chips and, from what I can tell, the architecture of the CPU is being written.
Here is some of the top lines from the Galaxy s9+:
------ MEMORY INFO (/proc/meminfo) ------
MemTotal: 5713080 kB
MemFree: 716700 kB
MemAvailable: 2664684 kB
Buffers: 128612 kB
Cached: 1835988 kB
SwapCached: 78272 kB
Active: 2002424 kB
Inactive: 1461928 kB
Active(anon): 979180 kB
Inactive(anon): 541668 kB
Active(file): 1023244 kB
Inactive(file): 920260 kB
Unevictable: 3292 kB
Mlocked: 3292 kB
RbinTotal: 593920 kB
RbinAlloced: 0 kB
RbinPool: 0 kB
RbinFree: 355812 kB
SwapTotal: 2621436 kB
SwapFree: 2004904 kB
Dirty: 80 kB
Writeback: 0 kB
AnonPages: 1495048 kB
Mapped: 935336 kB
Shmem: 18468 kB
Slab: 310684 kB
SReclaimable: 102060 kB
SUnreclaim: 208624 kB
KernelStack: 56160 kB
PageTables: 97716 kB
NFS_Unstable: 0 kB
Bounce: 0 kB
WritebackTmp: 0 kB
CommitLimit: 5477976 kB
Committed_AS: 122731980 kB
VmallocTotal: 263061440 kB
VmallocUsed: 0 kB
VmallocChunk: 0 kB
CmaTotal: 237568 kB
CmaFree: 62632 kB
------ MEMORY INFO (/proc/meminfo_extra) ------
SystemHeap: 145712 kB
SystemHeapPool: 160436 kB
VmallocAPIsize: 20364 kB
KgslSharedmem: 195292 kB
ZSwapDevice: 125644 kB
------ MEMSIZE INFO (/proc/memsize/kernel) ------
Kernel : 47332 KB
.text : 22016 KB
.rodata : 11500 KB
.data : 2983 KB
.BSS : 7973 KB
.ETC : 2862 KB
paging : 100021 KB
log_buffer : 2048 KB
pid_hash : 32 KB
vfs_hash : 12288 KB
mm_init : 4152 KB
others : 4326 KB
Total : 170199 KB
------ MEMSIZE INFO (/proc/memsize/reserved) ------
v1
0x000000000-0x000000000 0x02a40000 ( 43264 KB ) xxxxx unusable unknown
0x000000000-0x000000000 0x02400000 ( 36864 KB ) xxxxx reusable mem_dump
0x000000000-0x000000000 0x01000000 ( 16384 KB ) xxxxx unusable qseecom_ta
0x000000000-0x000000000 0x02000000 ( 32768 KB ) xxxxx reusable linux,cma
0x000000000-0x000000000 0x08c00000 ( 143360 KB ) xxxxx reusable secure_displa
0x000000000-0x000000000 0x00800000 ( 8192 KB ) xxxxx reusable secure_sp
0x000000000-0x000000000 0x00200000 ( 2048 KB ) xxxxx unusable pil_mdata_buf
0x000000000-0x000000000 0x01000000 ( 16384 KB ) xxxxx reusable adsp
0x000000000-0x000000000 0x24400000 ( 593920 KB ) xxxxx reusable camera_mem
0x000000000-0x000000000 0x00000000 ( 0 KB ) xxxxx unusable initrd
0x000000000-0x000000000 0x00001000 ( 4 KB ) xxxxx unusable sec_debug_aut
0x000000000-0x000000000 0x00400000 ( 4096 KB ) xxxxx unusable sec_debug_low
0x000000000-0x000000000 0x00100000 ( 1024 KB ) xxxxx unusable ramoops
0x000000000-0x000000000 0x00200000 ( 2048 KB ) xxxxx unusable ss_plog
0x000000000-0x000000000 0x00100000 ( 1024 KB ) xxxxx unusable ipa_fw_ld
0x000000000-0x000000000 0x00f00000 ( 15360 KB ) xxxxx unusable rkp
0x000000000-0x000000000 0x00200000 ( 2048 KB ) xxxxx unusable tima
0x000000000-0x000000000 0x00000000 ( 0 KB ) xxxxx unusable cont_splash
0x000000000-0x000000000 0x02000000 ( 32768 KB ) xxxxx unusable qseecom
0x000000000-0x000000000 0x02000000 ( 32768 KB ) xxxxx unusable pil_adsp
0x000000000-0x000000000 0x00100000 ( 1024 KB ) xxxxx unusable pil_spss
0x000000000-0x000000000 0x01000000 ( 16384 KB ) xxxxx unusable pil_slpi
0x000000000-0x000000000 0x00200000 ( 2048 KB ) xxxxx unusable pil_mba
0x000000000-0x000000000 0x00800000 ( 8192 KB ) xxxxx unusable cdsp
0x000000000-0x000000000 0x00500000 ( 5120 KB ) xxxxx unusable pil_video
0x000000000-0x000000000 0x07800000 ( 122880 KB ) xxxxx unusable modem
0x000000000-0x000000000 0x00500000 ( 5120 KB ) xxxxx unusable camera
0x000000000-0x000000000 0x00002000 ( 8 KB ) xxxxx unusable gpu
0x000000000-0x000000000 0x00005000 ( 20 KB ) xxxxx unusable ipa_gsi
0x000000000-0x000000000 0x00010000 ( 64 KB ) xxxxx unusable ipa_fw
0x000000000-0x000000000 0x05540000 ( 87296 KB ) xxxxx unusable removed
0x000000000-0x000000000 0x00100000 ( 1024 KB ) xxxxx unusable xbl
0x000000000-0x000000000 0x00600000 ( 6144 KB ) xxxxx unusable hyp
0x000000000-0x000000000 0x00000000 ( 0 KB ) xxxxx unusable initmem
0x000000000-0x000000000 0x0a6358b2 ( 170199 KB ) xxxxx unusable kernel
Reserved : 578359 KB
.kernel : 170199 KB
.DT&EPARAM : 408160 KB
System : 5713080 KB
.common : 4881592 KB
.reusable : 831488 KB
Total : 6291439 KB ( 6143.98 MB )
*** Error dumping /sys/kernel/mm/rbincache/stats (RBIN STAT): No such file or directory
------ SWAP INFO (/proc/swaps) ------
Filename Type Size Used Priority
/dev/block/vnswap0 partition 2621436 616532 -1
*** Error dumping /dev/memcg/midgard/cgroup.procs (HEIMDALL INFO): No such file or directory
*** Error dumping /dev/memcg/midgard/memory.swapfile (HEIMDALL INFO): No such file or directory
*** Error dumping /dev/memcg/midgard/memory.swapquota (HEIMDALL INFO): No such file or directory
*** Error dumping /dev/memcg/midgard/memory.swappiness (HEIMDALL INFO): No such file or directory
*** Error dumping /dev/memcg/midgard/memory.stat (HEIMDALL INFO): No such file or directory
------ compressed core&heap dump in /data/log/core (gzip -1 -f /data/log/core/..) ------
*** command 'gzip -1 -f /data/log/core/..' failed: exit code 1
------ compressed core&heap dump in /data/log/core (gzip -1 -f /data/log/core/.) ------
------ DUMPSYS CRITICAL (/system/bin/dumpsys) ------
When I view the logs in the recovery menu it shows the architecture, if that's what you'd call it (the 0x00000000), it says 'moving blocks' and changing the digits to others that don't match. There is a very long and complicated story behind all of this that originates from my illegal immigrant Chinese landlord and about 30 sign in attempts on my accounts from China.
I may have been hit with Digital Wu-Flu.
I am currently using a Note 20 Ultra and have flashed it counltess times. One of the most obvious signs is when I insert an SD card, it writes multiple folders to it, and being "Android". It says there is 15 items in the folder but when I open it there is nothing there, even with hidden files checked. There is one empty folder in it, i think called data, but when I go to delete that it says it does not exist. I'm not a noob by any means, I'm just not good with coding, and I know for a fact all of my devices have been utterly destroyed.
How do you know this was the gang member living below you doing this? What did they purchase illegally online? What does your Chinese landlord have to do with any of this?
This is such a complicated mess!
also, https://files.catbox.moe/0mu4za.jpg
If Samsung can't fix it, neither can I. I don't know what they did, or how they did it, but every single device I own is beyond reair. Verizon, Samsung, Spectrum, Suddenlink have all verified the breach but not a single company will give any specifics or do anything to help. Likely because they don't want to be held liable for whatever security flaw allowed this to happen.
jonny_fresh said:
also, https://files.catbox.moe/0mu4za.jpg
If Samsung can't fix it, neither can I. I don't know what they did, or how they did it, but every single device I own is beyond reair. Verizon, Samsung, Spectrum, Suddenlink have all verified the breach but not a single company will give any specifics or do anything to help. Likely because they don't want to be held liable for whatever security flaw allowed this to happen.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
What even happened? So far all I understand that your accounts online have been accessed.
FoorKob said:
How do you know this was the gang member living below you doing this? What did they purchase illegally online? What does your Chinese landlord have to do with any of this?
This is such a complicated mess!
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
He had some dude staying downstairs with him for like 3 weeks prior to this all happening. Dude never made a sound, the only reason we knew he was there was because there was a random pair of shoes in the hallway. The day I got the Critical Security Alert from Google, the downstairs neighbor came outside and started screaming at me, trying to fight me, nervous as **** and just literally flipping the fk out. When I woke up the next day my phone had been reset, all my themes and icons were back to stock. Then the guy started repeatedlyt calling the cops on me for no reason.
The Chinese landlord lady used an alias to purchase the property. I believe it was just used as a shell property to ship the illicit items to the house. There was a non stop flow of DHL packages coming to the house, and the dude would pull up (always in strangers cars) grab the package, and leave. We regularly heard him talking on the phone about drug deals, picking up the 'bag', order came in, etc. I knew the guy had gang affiliations but hadno idea he was using my devices to order his supply.
Also, the Chinese lady had hidden spy cameras hidden throughout the house and was spying on us for YEARS. I never understood why until I figured out what they were doing with my devices. Makes sense that they would want to know when and if I was home/asleep so they could push **** to the PC, place orders, drop packages, etc. It is such a long and ****ed up story I could go on all day but the last day I was there, I unplugged one of the cameras as they had microphones on them, so I was being illegally eavsdropped on. The cops showed up and clearly were connected to this gang banger. See for yourself, it's ****ed up. Please understand that I had to be very careful what I said because I KNEW they were just going to say hE'S CraZy.
The girl mentioned filed multipl false reorts against us. This was right around the time all this went down. The police knew she was filing false reports and, rather than do anything about it, they added it to their massive stack of years of bull**** reports, attempting to set me up. The girl ended up getting stabbed in the face.
FoorKob said:
What even happened? So far all I understand that your accounts online have been accessed.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
It wasn't just the accoutns, it was the devices themselves. A cop friend of mine told me there is a method cops can use called 'cloning' which basically makes your phone look normal but others can be doing whatever they want in the background. Every device and OS was effected, which leads me to believe it is a CPU exploit. I think the accounts were just the access point.